Since the end of the Cold War, the unipolar world order that emerged has undergone significant changes since the 2000s, experiencing transformations primarily in economic and security aspects, if not geopolitics. Interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States, China’s economic ascent, Russia’s leveraging both energy and military power, and the increased territorial claims by regional powers have reshaped the structure of international relations. Additionally, non-state factors have experienced substantial changes, significantly transforming the global system.
Factors such as the gradual breaking of technological monopolies and the increase in know-how, the alleviation of geographical difficulties with mega projects, the widespread use of sea, land and rail transport, the reach of information technologies and telecommunication tools to almost all social tissues, and the increase in the awareness of organisation and freedom of information in social media are the elements of the hegemony debates we face today, which are perhaps less taken into account, but have a deeper socio-political, socio-cultural and geo-strategic impact. Societies and, consequently, states with increased awareness want to follow policies that are centered on themselves and, in a way, are entering the phase that Strategist Zbigniew Brezezinski called “Global Political Awakening.” In a context where countries are increasingly becoming more integrated both in terms of commerce, diplomacy, and social relations, they seek to be present in regions primarily to satisfy their conjunctural or long-term interests rather than pursuing the ideological goals of a single pole.
Over the past two decades, there has been a redistribution of power due to the reflexes of states and the structural transformation of the system. The spheres of influence of existing actors are in flux and new geographies are gaining geopolitical importance, resulting in the reformulation of alliances. The series of coups in Africa, the growing significance of the Middle Corridor and new commercial routes, and the dynamism of the Global South as a whole, all in the wake of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, and the Israel-Palestine conflict, suggest that we are now living through a time known as the “New Great Game”. French President Emmanuel Macron’s visits to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on 1-2 November 2023[1] carry significance not only as a necessity of French foreign policy, but also for interpreting the fundamental changes on the agenda of international relations.
Since the colonial era, France’s political, military, and cultural influence on the African continent has diminished over time, causing Africa to seek out new alliances in response to shifting geopolitical conditions. China’s economic investments, Turkey’s humanitarian assistance, and Russia’s growing military power are among the examples of these new partnerships. Undoubtedly, France has suffered the greatest decline in power since the redistribution of influence in the African continent, after being the most influential power on the continent in the past.
The Niger coup, the most recent in a series of coups in Chad, Mali, and Burkina Faso, is remembered as the final one aiming to diminish France’s influence in Africa. The forced expulsion of the French ambassador to Mali, Joël Meyer, and the ban on the sale of uranium to France is one of the worst possible scenarios for France, which has long bought uranium from Africa. In particular, the declining relationship between France and Russia, another uranium-producing nation, indicates that France may experience a deficit in the supply of essential uranium. Given that France generates over 70% of its electricity from nuclear facilities that rely on uranium,[2] it is undeniable that uranium and energy supply was the main topic of Macron’s visits to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which are among the top 5 uranium producers. In fact, the inclusion of business figures in Macron’s delegation confirmed this. Moreover, the struggle over Central Asia according to the rules of the “New Great Game” is another pillar of the issue.
The Central Corridor, which has gained importance in recent years as a result of the high security risks in the northern and southern trade routes and the geopolitical rivalry in these two regions, has become a centre of attraction as a consequence of the efforts of the countries in the region to resolve the problems between them on a win-win basis and to position themselves as a corridor of stability rather than an area of geopolitical rivalry. The rich underground resources of this geography, with which Russia has been interacting for many years through the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), and China through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Belt and Road Initiative, are currently the most prominent region in the West’s search for energy and mineral alternatives. Institutionally, the relationships that actors such as the European Union (EU), Germany and France have established with Central Asia over the past year are no coincidence. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who recently travelled to Azerbaijan for diplomatic contacts, made the following statement:[3]
“The European Union wants to work with Azerbaijan to build connections with Central Asia and beyond. So we follow with great interest the discussions and the ideas about trans-Caspian connections.”
In addition to this statement, the meeting between German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, President of Kyrgyzstan Sadyr Japarov, President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev, President of Tajikistan Imamali Rahman and President of Turkmenistan Serdar Berdimuhamedov at the First Germany-Central Asia Summit in Berlin on 29 September 2023[4] can be seen as a reflection of changing geopolitical Dynamics.
From this perspective, it would be correct to read Macron’s efforts as steps to regain the influence it has lost to Russia in Africa by strengthening its ties with Central Asian countries, which are pursuing an increasingly independent foreign policy, and to ensure the security of supply of critical resources such as uranium, oil and rare metals. The presence of rare metals in Central Asian countries, which play a crucial role in the production of a wide range of technologies such as wind turbines, solar panels and rechargeable batteries for electric vehicles, which play a key role in the green transformation initiative to which the EU attaches particular importance, makes Paris’ opening up to Central Asia all the more meaningful when the concept of “de-risking”, which has recently been mentioned in discussions between China and Europe, is taken into account.
Undoubtedly, the interest of European nations overall and France specifically in Central Asia serves the interests of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the Central Corridor. Kazakhstan, which has pursued a more independent and multidimensional foreign policy under President Tokayev, introduced a more transparent and participatory domestic administration and gradually broken up the monopolies in the commercial sector, has the potential to be a strong alternative and a reliable economic partner in the eyes of Europe. Indeed, Tokayev’s portrayal of France as a ““vital and reliable partner”“ and the fact that Kazakhstan is Europe’s third largest supplier of oil after Norway and the United States reveal the extent of this relationship.[5] France plays a significant role in the Uzbekistan Strategy-2030 of President Mirziyoyev, who has opened up Uzbekistan’s economy to the world and undertaken a radical transformation since taking office. Mirziyoyev’s cordial greeting to Macron and his statement “I have been waiting for this visit for a long time” gave the impression that a partnership would be established in the fields of trade, innovation, investment and cultural-humanitarian cooperation. It is worth mentioning that Macron promised to support the signing of an extended partnership between the EU and Uzbekistan. It is a fact that Paris’ efforts, Germany’s initiatives, and the EU’s institutional approach will benefit the Central Corridor. This corridor extends to Europe, shortening the arrival time significantly and increasing its capacity thanks to new investments. It is plausible that the West’s “Build Back Better World” initiative will focus more on investments in Central Asia.
In addition to their objectives based on mutual interest, it should be noted that France’s objectives are far from realpolitik and may include an attempt to prevent the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, an observer member of the Council of Turkic States, from being invited to the last summit in Kazakhstan. The destabilising stance adopted by Paris was unwelcome during the realisation of the geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus, and also the TRNC’s strong defence of its rights in the Eastern Mediterranean on a legal basis, which undermined France’s destabilising stance in the Eastern Mediterranean, disrupted the instabilising stance of Paris. France’s request for the not invited to TRNC from the Organisation of Turkic States may have achieved a response. Although there was much anticipation that the TRNC would be invited to the Astana summit, we must not disregard that France’s gain, if it is true, is conjunctural and has no geopolitical equivalent.
To summarize, a more comprehensive understanding of France’s and the West’s interest in Central Asia can be gained by examining it from the perspective of the evolving new geopolitics in the changing world balance, rather than solely through an interstate lens. On one hand, it is foreseeable that the West, aware of the gradual erosion of its power and the loss of its traditional spheres of influence, will take steps in line with the new geopolitical realities; on the other hand, the Central Asian countries, which are beginning to discover more of their potential with the dynamism of the Central Corridor, will engage in more interaction in the future.
[1] “Macron Visits Kazakhstan on Strategic Tour of Central Asia”, Aljazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/1/macron-in-kazakhstan, (Erişim Tarihi: 8.11.2023).
[2] “Nuclear Power in France”, World Nuclear, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/france.aspx, (Erişim Tarihi: 08.11.2023).
[3] “Statement by President von der Leyen with Azerbaijani President Aliyev”, European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_22_4583, (Erişim Tarihi: 08.11.2023).
[4] Gamze Bal, “Almanya-Orta Asya Stratejik Ortaklığında Orta Koridorun Önemi”, ANKASAM, https://www.ankasam.org/almanya-orta-asya-stratejik-ortakliginda-orta-koridorun-onemi/, (Erişim Tarihi: 08.11.2023).
[5] Ido Vock, “Why France’s Emmanuel Macron is courting Central Asia”, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67283849, (Erişim Tarihi: 08.11.2023).
