Russia’s large-scale military assault on Ukraine in February 2022 resonated worldwide and led to profound changes in international relations. This attack has impacted security dynamics not only in Europe but also in Asia, prompting countries like Japan to reevaluate their relationships with Russia.
It is crucial to examine how Japan’s historically intricate relations with Russia have transformed in the aftermath of the Ukraine Crisis, and to specifically assess the implications of this situation on Japan’s energy policies and regional strategies, given its reliance on energy imports. Such an evaluation will contribute to a deeper understanding of Japan’s national interests and foreign policy priorities.
Japan-Russia relations have often been marked by tensions. Following the Russo-Japanese War at the beginning of the 20th century, one of the defining factors in their bilateral relations has been the ongoing disputes over the ownership of islands in the northeastern part of Hokkaido. These islands are known as the “Northern Territories” in Japan and the “Southern Kuril Islands” in Russia.[1]
During the tenure of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, strengthening relations with Russia became a prominent priority in Japan’s foreign policy. This strategic emphasis was primarily driven by Japan’s objective to adopt an optimistic diplomatic approach towards Russia, with the ultimate aim of negotiating a peace treaty that would enable the reclamation of part of the disputed territories known in Japan as the Northern Territories.
Aiming to improve relations with Russia, the Abe administration exercised caution in its missile defense cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to avoid provoking Russia. Furthermore, Japan exhibited selectivity and reluctance in imposing sanctions on Moscow in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, leading to divergences with NATO. In essence, during Abe’s tenure, Russia emerged as a factor hindering the development of NATO-Japan relations.
Russia’s initiation of military action against Ukraine in 2022 has profoundly transformed the Japanese public’s perceptions of Russia. Surveys conducted by the Tokyo Government in 2022 revealed that public sentiment towards Russia had deteriorated to its most negative level ever recorded.[2] In response to the war in Ukraine, the Japanese public has demonstrated substantial support for sanctions against Russia.
Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, who is less committed to improving relations with Russia and signing a peace treaty than Abe, perceives Russia’s attack on Ukraine as a direct challenge to Japan, remarking that “Ukraine of today may be East Asia of tomorrow.” Kishida also addressed these concerns in Japan’s National Security Strategy, published in December 2022.[3]
“Japan’s security environment is as severe and complex as it has ever been since the end of World War II. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has easily breached the very foundation of the rules that shape the international order. The possibility cannot be precluded that a similar serious situation may arise in the future in the Indo-Pacific region, especially in East Asia.”
Despite its geographical distance from the war zone, Japan’s concerns regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reflect Tokyo’s alignment with NATO states in recognizing the interconnectedness of Asia-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic security. This shift has reversed the cautious approach towards NATO relations seen during the Abe administration, leading Japan to embrace Europe and NATO as strategic partners in its foreign and security policy.
One of the primary lessons Japan has derived from the war in Ukraine is the critical importance of deterrence. In this context, the Kishida administration has pledged to allocate 2% of Japan’s GDP to defense expenditures by the fiscal year 2027, as detailed in the National Security Strategy, to enhance the country’s defensive posture.[4] This allocation aligns with the United States’ policy urging NATO allies to spend 2% of their Gross Domestic Product on defense. In this context, it can be asserted that the war in Ukraine has resulted in closer strategic alignment between NATO and Japan, as well as more frequent interactions at all levels.
In response to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Kishida administration implemented sanctions similar to those imposed by NATO and G-7 countries. Notably, Japan, which has traditionally refrained from employing sanction policies to avoid conflict in its foreign policy since the end of World War II, adopted sanction strategies similar to those of the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA) in the face of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. A key driver behind Japan’s shift in foreign policy, driven by significant concerns that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty could serve as a precedent for states in the Asia-Pacific region, is to convey a strong signal to China and North Korea that any comparable acts of aggression will be similarly sanctioned by the international community.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, given its role as a significant supplier in global energy imports, has prompted substantial changes in Japan’s energy policies. Prior to the conflict in Ukraine, Russia accounted for 3.6% of Japan’s oil imports, 8.8% of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports, and 11% of its coal imports. The attacks in Ukraine by Russia, one of the world’s foremost producers and exporters of oil and gas, has precipitated a substantial increase in oil and gas prices, posing significant challenges particularly for nations such as Japan that are heavily dependent on energy imports.[5] Two months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, in April 2022, Japan announced its intention to gradually reduce imports of Russian coal and oil, and by December, Japan, in coordination with the G7 countries, agreed to implement a price cap on Russian crude oil. By the end of 2022, Japan had reduced its imports of Russian oil and coal by 56% and 41%, respectively, compared to the previous year.[6]
The energy crisis triggered widespread concerns regarding energy security on a global scale, leading numerous countries to enhance their renewable energy policies in an effort to bolster domestic electricity production. On the other hand, Tokyo has opted to continue importing Russian oil and gas from the Sakhalin projects, where Japanese companies have made significant investments, and has sustained cooperation with Russia in initiatives such as the Sakhalin 2 project, which supplies approximately 9% of Japan’s LNG.[7] In this context, unlike the United States and many European countries, Japan has not largely seized the Ukraine War as an opportunity to reduce its dependence on energy imports and accelerate the transition to domestic renewable energy. One of the primary reasons for this hesistance is Japan’s concern that a large-scale shift to renewable energy could increase its trade dependence on China, which dominates the renewable energy markets.[8] In light of these developments, Japan’s energy policy response has remained confined to the long-term continuation of fossil fuel usage.
In conclusion, the Russia-Ukraine War has led to significant changes in Japan’s foreign policy and energy strategies. This conflict has prompted Japan to strengthen its relations with NATO and to emphasize more strongly the connection between Asia-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic security. Historically characterized by complex relations with Russia, Japan has reshaped its energy policies by imposing stringent sanctions on Moscow in the context of the Ukraine Crisis.
Japan’s decision to significantly reduce Russia’s share in its energy imports has intensified Tokyo’s efforts to ensure energy security. However, unlike many other countries, Japan has aimed to continue the long-term use of fossil fuels rather than accelerating the transition to renewable energy. These strategic shifts in Japan’s foreign policy reflect its efforts to safeguard national interests and maintain regional security.
[1] “Geopolitical chess: Unpacking the Northern Territories conundrum”, The Japan Times, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2024/02/13/japan/japans-northern-territories/, (Date of Access: 24.05.2024).
[2] “The Invasion of Ukraine Turned Japan’s Russia Policy on Its Head”, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/the-invasion-of-ukraine-turned-japans-russia-policy-on-its-head/, (Date of Access: 24.04.2024).
[3] “The ‘Russia Factor’ in NATO-Japan Relations”, United States Institute of Peace, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/06/russia-factor-nato-japan-relations, (Date of Access: 24.05.2024).
[4] Ibid.
[5] Hanssen, U., & Koppenborg, F. (2023). More weapons than windmills: Japan’s military and energy policy response to Russia’s attack on Ukraine. Czech Journal of International Relations. Retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.32422/cjir.733, (Date of Access: 24.05.2024).
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
