Interview

Leverhulme Early Career Researcher at Newcastle University, Dr. Maria Papageorgiou: “China’s Engagement in the Middle East is Multifaceted.”

Infrastructure investments under the Belt and Road Initiative deepen China’s economic engagement in the Middle East.
Confucius Institutes and health diplomacy strengthen China’s soft power strategies in the region through cultural diplomacy tools.
China’s mediation initiative between Saudi Arabia and Iran, along with its strategic partnerships with GCC countries, aims to enhance regional cooperation.

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Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM) presents an interview with Maria Papageorgiou, Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at Newcastle University, to assess China’s soft power strategies in the Middle East, its impact on the global balance of power and regional technological cooperation.

1. How does China develop cultural and economic soft power strategies in the Middle East? In what ways does this approach strengthen its relationships with countries in the region?

China’s engagement in the Middle East has been multifaceted however its main emphasis has been on economic and soft power initiatives, aiming to build influence and foster long-term partnerships with key countries in the region. At the forefront of China’s strategy is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has driven extensive investment in infrastructure projects throughout the Middle East. These projects include ports, railways, and energy facilities, with a particular focus on oil-rich Gulf states that supply China’s growing energy needs. At the same time China has initiated a number of projects that include participation of countries in the region indicating what Beijing has attributed as win-win cooperation.

Diplomatically China has engaged both bilaterally with several countries in the region and upgrading their relations over the years to comprehensive strategic partnerships but also multilaterally by participating in summits with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab League. In addition, the permanent membership of Iran in the SCO and the dialogues status for other members of the GCC reveals China’s intentions to include the countries of the region to the broader Eurasian security and economic architecture and also recognises their status aspirations. In addition, the diplomatic efforts and mediation of China in restoring the diplomatic ties and reactivate a 2001 security cooperation agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran indicates its soft power reach in the region and also a more balanced relations with the countries in the Gulf. Peace and stability in the region are besides imperative for China’s economic plans in the region and the safety of its trade routes and even the survival of the BRI.

Alongside its economic strategy, China leverages cultural diplomacy to strengthen ties and build a favorable image in the Middle East. A prominent example is the establishment of Confucius Institutes in many countries in the region, which promote Chinese language and. These institutions play a key role in fostering cultural exchange and awareness, helping to shape a positive image of China among younger generations and also provide scholarships and academic exchanges to Middle Eastern students to study at Chinese universities.

Media influence is another pillar of China’s soft power in the Middle East. Chinese state-owned outlets, such as CGTN Arabic, broadcast news and entertainment content tailored to local audiences, aiming to present a China-friendly perspective and counterbalance Western media narratives. Finally, China has encouraged tourism and people-to-people exchanges and has even facilitated an almost 50% increase in Chinese visits to places like UAE and Egypt and has supported the sports events hosted by Middle Eastern countries.

Moreover, during the COVID-19 pandemic, China utilized health diplomacy to further portray itself as a responsible power and build a positive image in the Middle East. By providing medical supplies, expertise, and vaccines to countries in need, especially in a period where there was limited Western assistance to countries outside China demonstrated its commitment to supporting its partners in times of crisis.

2. How does China’s presence in the Middle East influence global power dynamics? What implications does this have for the strategies of other major powers?

China’s growing presence in the Middle East has begun to influence global power dynamics, reshaping traditional alliances and challenging long-standing dominance, particularly that of the United States. For decades, the Middle East has been a region heavily influenced by the U.S., primarily through its extensive military presence, arms exports, and security partnerships. However, as U.S. focus has pivoted toward the Indo-Pacific, especially with alliances like AUKUS and the Quad, and Russia’s limited presence in the region except on Syria amidst the war in Ukraine and arms exports, China has seized opportunities to strengthen its influence in the Middle East, creating ripple effects in global strategic alignments.

China has pursued this influence largely through diplomatic and economic channels. For example, China’s success in facilitating a rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran showcased its role as a mediator and reliable partner for countries interested in diplomacy over military intervention. Furthermore, China’s ability to sell military technology to key U.S. allies, like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, underscores its emergence as an alternative to Western military suppliers and also creates cracks in the security relations between Middle Eastern countries and US, even though it cannot fully replace the extensive security guarantees provided by the U.S. in the region.

China’s involvement has also gained traction amidst recent regional crises that highlight a shifting focus back to the Middle East. The energy crisis following the war in Ukraine and renewed tensions, such as the Israel-Palestine and Israel-Iran conflicts, have brought the region back in the forefront. China’s strategy, however, is not without limitations. Although China’s neutral stance and diplomatic presence have been welcomed, particularly in the wake of local dissatisfaction with U.S. policies, China lacks the military reach and established security presence that the U.S. maintains in the region. This gap is apparent in its cautious rhetoric, emphasizing de-escalation, ceasefire and peaceful resolutions without direct involvement in the complex security dynamics. That was evident through certain diplomatic initiatives China promoted that did not proceed and were left as such. For instance, its five-point proposal to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for a comprehensive ceasefire to end the fighting or the Beijing Declaration, a deal brokering unity between Hamas, Fatah and other 12 Palestinian and indicate that China lacks the influence over Israel and Iran remains limited; it cannot match the U.S. security umbrella or directly influence the political or military decisions of Israel or Iran.

This growing presence of China in the region and more positive image creates tensions in the relations of US with its allies in the region that they seek to diversify both their economy but also their security in their longer term. This increasing call for strategic autonomy in the region has significant implications in the US in various fronts such as its arms exports in the region, the oil prices and also other economic issues. Thus, particularly the U.S., may need to re-evaluate their strategies in the region by seeking to sustain its alliances and commitments in the Middle East, where China’s approach appeals to nations frustrated by Western policies. Additionally, it needs to offer better economic alternatives so it won’t further facilitate China’s economic reach in the region which could pose issues of national security especially with the use of emerging technologies.

3. How do China’s technological collaborations with Middle Eastern countries support regional technological development? What is the potential for these partnerships in the future?

China’s technological collaboration with Middle Eastern countries is fuelling significant advancements in the region’s digital infrastructure, economic diversification, and strategic autonomy. These partnerships are driven by mutual benefits: while China seeks to expand its digital footprint and showcase its expertise as a tech leader, Middle Eastern nations look to modernize and diversify their economies away from oil dependency, aligning with ambitious national strategies such as Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030. This collaboration is reshaping the Middle Eastern technology landscape, impacting local development and global power dynamics alike.

One of the most visible areas of collaboration is infrastructure development, where Chinese companies like Huawei play a leading role. For instance, Huawei has partnered with Saudi Arabia to enhance digital infrastructure for religious pilgrimages and is collaborating with Dubai to modernize its airport. Through agreements with the UAE’s Cybersecurity Council and entities like DEWA, Huawei is also involved in establishing cybersecurity frameworks and fibre optic networks. Additionally, Chinese companies are heavily engaged in implementing 5G networks across Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as part of China’s Digital Silk Road initiative. This infusion of high-tech capabilities strengthens the region’s digital backbone, promoting economic resilience and expanding China’s role as a tech provider. In addition, in Saudi Arabia investments by Chinese e-commerce giant Alibaba and its majority stake in Turkey’s Trendyol signal a commitment to expanding digital commerce. However, the offering of additional opportunities by the West such as the Microsoft 1.5 billion investment in United Arab Emirates artificial intelligence firm G42 could recalibrate the economic relations and allegiances in the region.

Dr. Maria Papageorgiou
Dr. Maria Papageorgiou is a Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at Newcastle University, specializing in Sino-Russian relations, China’s engagement in the Middle East, and great power competition in emerging technologies. Previously, she held academic roles at the University of Exeter, UCL, Bradford University, and SOAS. She has taught modules in international relations theory, foreign policy, China as an international actor, and research methods. Maria has published in high-ranking journals and contributed commentary and interviews to media and think tanks. She has testified before the U.S. Congress’s U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on China’s Middle East engagement, presented evidence for the Strategic Defence Review at the British Ministry of Defence, and been invited to speak at the 2024 Summit on Responsible Use of Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain (REAIM) in Seoul.
Dilara Cansın KEÇİALAN
Dilara Cansın KEÇİALAN
Dilara Cansın KECİALAN is currently pursuing her master's degree in Political Science and Public Administration at Burdur Mehmet Akif Ersoy University. She completed her master's degree in International Relations at Khoja Akhmet Yassawi University. She graduated from Anadolu University, Department of International Relations. She is also studying in the Department of New Media and Journalism at Atatürk University. Working as a Eurasia Research Assistant at ANKASAM, Kecialan's main areas of interest are Eurasia and Turkestan regions. She speaks English, Russian and a little Ukrainian and learning Kazakh.

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