To evaluate the foreign policy of the Kishida Government in Japan and global geopolitics, The Ankara Center for Crisis and Political Studies (ANKASAM) presents below the interview with Sylwia Monika Gorska, PhD Candidate in International Relations at the University of Central Lancashire, UK.
1. What has changed in Japan’s foreign policy with the appointment of Shigeru Ishiba as Prime Minister? What are the things that Kishida has done differently from the previous government?
Under Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, Japan pursued a careful but steady expansion of its security posture. His administration committed to raising defence spending to 2% of GDP by 2027[1] aligning Japan with NATO’s standard benchmark. Kishida also focused on strengthening regional security ties through Reciprocal Access Agreements (RAAs) with Australia and the UK, while deepening partnerships with the Philippines and India. A key feature of his approach was emphasizing that Japan’s growing military capabilities-such as the acquisition of 500 Tomahawk cruise missiles from the U.S.[2] -were strictly defensive and in line with Japan’s constitutional pacifism.
Since taking office in November 2024, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has continued Japan’s military expansion but with a more assertive approach. As a long-time advocate for constitutional reform, he has pushed to formally recognize the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) as a military entity within Japan’s constitution, a move Kishida was more cautious about. Ishiba has also sought revisions to the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to increase Japan’s operational autonomy, particularly in strategic areas like Guam.[3]
While Kishida adopted a step-by-step approach within existing pacifist constraints, Ishiba is actively positioning Japan as a more independent and strategically autonomous player in regional security. His administration is also prioritizing the development of Japan’s domestic defence industry to reduce reliance on U.S. arms exports, investing in advanced missile defence and hypersonic weapons.
However, Ishiba’s agenda faces challenges. Komeito, the pacifist coalition partner of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), remains a key obstacle to constitutional amendments and significant increases in military spending. Domestically, Ishiba has justified these changes by framing them as a necessary response to growing security threats while remaining careful to work within legal constraints to avoid direct clashes with Japan’s pacifist political factions.
2. What is Japan’s approach to the recent developments in the China-U.S. rivalry?
Ishiba has adopted a more proactive foreign policy, particularly in the context of U.S.-China competition. While Kishida aimed to maintain a delicate balance-deepening Japan’s security ties with the U.S. while keeping economic relations with China stable-Ishiba has placed a stronger emphasis on reinforcing Japan’s defence posture and expanding security partnerships across the Indo-Pacific.
One notable shift is his advocacy for a more structured regional security framework. He has openly proposed the creation of an “Asian NATO”[4] to enhance defence cooperation among like-minded countries. However, this proposal has been met with scepticism from regional partners like India and even the U.S., who are wary of escalating tensions with China or undermining existing security frameworks like the QUAD. Beijing has strongly opposed the idea, warning that it would further divide the region.
Despite this assertive stance, Ishiba recognizes the importance of stabilizing relations with China. Shortly after taking office, his Foreign Minister, Takeshi Iwaya, visited Beijing, marking a step toward diplomatic engagement. Japan and China have since agreed to resume parliamentary exchanges and hold high-level security dialogues, signalling a desire to maintain open channels of communication. Economically, Japan announced plans to ease visa requirements for Chinese tourists to boost economic and people-to-people ties.
Concurrently, Japan is recalibrating its economic strategy in response to both China and shifting U.S. trade policies. Ishiba’s government focuses on strengthening Japan’s technological self-reliance, particularly in semiconductor production. Japan has been actively supporting the Rapidus Corporation’s efforts to develop 2nm semiconductor chips by 2027,[5] aiming to reduce dependence on Chinese and Taiwanese supply chains.
However, trade relations with the U.S. under President Trump’s second term have presented new challenges. The reintroduction of tariffs on Japanese steel and aluminium has led to renewed tensions, with Ishiba warning that such protectionist measures could discourage Japanese investment in the U.S. Additionally, the administration’s decision to block Nippon Steel’s acquisition of U.S. Steel in early 2025 has underscored growing scrutiny of foreign investments in critical industries, adding further complications to Japan-U.S. economic ties.
To navigate these challenges, Japan has been seeking economic-security cooperation beyond the U.S. A key example is Japan’s Economic 2+2 dialogue with the UK,[6] a format it previously reserved for U.S.-Japan relations. This move reflects Japan’s broader strategy of diversifying security and economic partnerships, ensuring it is not overly dependent on any single ally while reinforcing supply chain resilience and economic security.
Ishiba’s foreign policy reflects a careful balancing act-strengthening deterrence through enhanced security cooperation with the U.S. while ensuring Japan’s economic engagement with China remains stable enough to avoid unnecessary escalation.
3. How do you evaluate Japan’s absence from the UN’s nuclear weapons ban meeting?
Japan’s decision to abstain from the 2025 UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) meeting is consistent with its long-standing stance of prioritizing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework over the TPNW. While Japan is the only country to have experienced atomic bombings, its security strategy remains deeply tied to the U.S. nuclear umbrella, making it unlikely to sign a treaty that would conflict with its extended deterrence commitments.
Under Kishida, Japan emphasized nuclear disarmament within the NPT framework while simultaneously reinforcing its reliance on U.S. deterrence in response to North Korea’s nuclear advancements. Ishiba has continued this approach but with an even greater emphasis on deterrence, particularly through missile defence and deeper integration with the U.S. strategic posture.
However, there is an ongoing credibility challenge for Japan. By continuing to reject the TPNW while advocating for global disarmament, Japan risks appearing inconsistent, particularly among ASEAN nations and the Global South, where support for the treaty remains strong.
This raises diplomatic concerns about whether Japan’s disarmament advocacy can remain influential, given its simultaneous deepening of deterrence commitments.
At the same time, Japan continues to engage in nuclear risk reduction and arms control initiatives through the G7 framework and multilateral dialogues. Ishiba’s administration has reaffirmed Japan’s role in advocating for transparency among nuclear-armed states while maintaining its reliance on extended deterrence. This dual approach highlights Japan’s strategic effort to balance its historical disarmament advocacy with the evolving regional security environment.
4. Do you think the efforts for denuclearization in the Asia-Pacific are being eroded? If your answer is yes, what are the factors leading to this, can you explain?
Yes, denuclearization efforts in the Asia-Pacific are under severe strain due to multiple geopolitical and strategic developments.
Firstly, North Korea’s declaring itself a permanent nuclear state[7] has effectively eliminated any possibility of voluntary denuclearization. Since then, Pyongyang has continued expanding its tactical nuclear arsenal, conducting multiple missile tests, and strengthening its military ties with Russia. Recent intelligence reports suggest that North Korea may be receiving advanced missile and satellite technology from Moscow in exchange for supplying munitions to Russia’s war in Ukraine.[8] This deepening military cooperation further complicates efforts to curb Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions.
Secondly, China’s nuclear modernization is influencing regional deterrence dynamics. As its capabilities evolve, China continues to emphasize the role of nuclear deterrence within its broader security strategy.
Thirdly, the uncertainty surrounding U.S. extended deterrence under the Trump administration has intensified public discourse in South Korea regarding the need for an independent nuclear deterrent. While Seoul has not pursued nuclear weapons development, the establishment of the U.S.-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group[9] in 2023 was intended to reassure South Korea of Washington’s commitment. However, given Trump’s history of advocating for U.S. allies to assume a greater share of defence costs, concerns persist that South Korea may consider nuclear armament if U.S. security guarantees appear unreliable.
Japan, while remaining firmly committed to the U.S. nuclear umbrella, has been strengthening its missile defence and counterstrike capabilities as part of its 2022 National Security Strategy.[10] This marks a strategic evolution in Tokyo’s deterrence posture. Unlike South Korea, Japan has categorically rejected the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons, citing its Three Non-Nuclear Principles. However, Japan’s growing investments in long-range strike capabilities and hypersonic missile technology signal a shift toward greater self-reliance in deterrence while maintaining alignment with U.S. strategic policies.
The ongoing war in Ukraine has reinforced the perception that nuclear weapons act as a shield against external intervention. Observing Russia’s nuclear threats constraining Western military responses, both North Korea and China have likely drawn strategic lessons that could further cement their nuclear postures. This has contributed to an overall erosion of disarmament efforts and a shift toward strengthening deterrence rather than advancing arms control initiatives.
[1] “Press Conference by Prime Minister Kishida”, Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/statement/202212/_00006.html, (Date Accessed: 11.03.2025).
[2] “Japan signs contract with U.S. on Tomahawk missile purchase”, Kyodo News, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2024/01/4d19ab4836f7-japan-signs-contract-with-us-on-tomahawk-missile-purchase.html, (Date Accessed: 11.03.2025).
[3] “Ishiba’s security plans face rocky road, create jitters in LDP”, Asahi, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/15449915, (Date Accessed: 11.03.2025).
[4] “FOCUS: Japan PM Ishiba opts for pragmatic diplomacy, no talk of Asian NATO”, Kyodo News, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2024/10/34f18b53c7c6-focus-japan-pm-ishiba-opts-for-pragmatic-diplomacy-no-talk-of-asian-nato.html,(Date Accessed: 11.03.2025).
[5] “Rapidus aims to supply cutting-edge 2-nm chip samples to Broadcom”, Nikkei Asia, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Tech/Semiconductors/Rapidus-aims-to-supply-cutting-edge-2-nm-chip-samples-to-Broadcom, (Date Accessed: 11.03.2025).
[6] “UK-Japan Economic 2+2”, GOV UK, https://shorturl.at/YlOAx, (Date Accessed: 11.03.2025).
[7] “The DPRK’s Changed Nuclear Doctrine: Factors and Implications”, Tandfonline, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2023.2188859, (Date Accessed: 11.03.2025).
[8] “Exclusive: Ukraine sees marked improvement in accuracy of Russia’s North Korean missiles”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukraine-sees-marked-improvement-accuracy-russias-north-korean-missiles-2025-02-06/,(Date Accessed: 11.03.2025).
[9] “Upgrading U.S.-ROK Nuclear Deterrence: The Role of the Nuclear Consultative Group”, NBR, https://www.nbr.org/publication/upgrading-u-s-rok-nuclear-deterrence-the-role-of-the-nuclear-consultative-group/, (Date Accessed: 11.03.2025).
[10] “National Security Strategy of Japan”, CAS, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf, (Date Accessed: 11.03.2025).
