Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Moscow on 20-22 March 2023. The visit in question was followed closely by the international community due to the expectations that the Beijing administration could act as a mediator in the Russia-Ukraine War. Because the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave the message that Beijing can be positioned as a mediator in the statement it published on February 24, 2023 due to the first year of the war.[1]
As a matter of fact, in the aforementioned declaration, the Beijing administration emphasized the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine on the one hand; On the other hand, it condemned the unilateral sanctions imposed on Russia and drew attention to the importance of ending the war.
One month after this event, the visit of the Chinese President to Moscow brought the mediation discussions to the agenda. Moreover, European actors have such expectations from Xi. Because it is known that both German Chancellor Olaf Sholz and French President Emmanuel Macron wanted Xi to use his influence over Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Despite the aforementioned expectation, the messages given during Xi’s visit indicate that mediation is not among the priority discussions. Although, during the talks, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated to Xi that they were open to negotiations[2] during the talks, on the day the two met, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida visited Kiev and Kishida met with Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelenski.
Essentially, this development can be interpreted as the rivalry on the Beijing-Tokyo line also reflected in the Russia-Ukraine War. Moreover, it can be stated that Japan is positioned in accordance with the narrative of the struggle between “democracies and autocracies”, which is frequently expressed by the Kiev administration. This is very much in line with the United States (US) President Joe Biden’s effort to build the “Club of Democracies”. Therefore, it can be argued that in the current conjuncture where the blockade has increased over the Russia-Ukraine War, competition and polarization have spread to Asia-Pacific in the context of Japan and China.
Due to all this information, it can be said that there was not enough mediation work to meet the expectations during Xi’s visit. In fact, this visit, made shortly after the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) decision on Putin’s arrest, can be read as the Chinese President’s support for his Russian counterpart.[3] Moreover, this support has a much more important and meaningful dimension for both parties. This is the unity in the rising objection to the unipolar world order.
In the context of the search for multipolarity, it can be stated that strong messages were given in the meeting between the two leaders. Especially, when saying goodbye to Putin, Xi said, “Changes are taking place in the world that have not been experienced in 100 years. We will lead this change together.” to say,[4] his statement revealed that the two actors acting together in structures such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS will continue to cooperate against the American leadership. On the other hand, during the meeting, Putin said, “We are working in solidarity with the UN, UNSC and other organizations to create a more just and democratic multipolar world order.” It is useful to remember that you use the expressions.[5]
In fact, it is known that Beijing and Moscow prefer different methods on the road to multipolarity and this causes separation between the parties. Because Russia wants to achieve its “great power” status in the international system with a conflicting character; that is, it tries to make its Western counterparts accept that it is a “great power” through interventions against countries such as Georgia and Ukraine. On the other hand, China wants a transition to multipolarity through mutual economic interdependence and tries to turn its economic rise into an advantage, especially within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. However, the USA’s accelerating its strategy of encircling China through alliances such as ANZUS, QUAD and AUKUS and its provocative moves, especially on Taiwan, brings Beijing closer to Moscow.
To open the subject, the search for multipolarity and the pressure of the USA, despite all the differences, deepen the cooperation on the Russia-China line. At this point, it is seen that the issue also has an Asia-Pacific dimension. Therefore, the above-mentioned Kishida’s visit to Kiev is not a coincidence. Because, after the Russia-Ukraine War, Japan openly supported the sanctions targeting the Moscow administration, and the Kuril Islands Problem; that is, he brought his conflicts with Russia to the agenda. Beijing is Tokyo’s most important regional rival.
It is clear that the competition in the Asia-Pacific has been effective in the cooperation between Moscow and Beijing. As a matter of fact, the naval exercises organized by Russia and China from time to time in the Pacific can be described as the output of this. Moreover, the rapprochement between the parties is not limited to geopolitical factors, and the search for multipolarity results in the development of economic cooperation in various fields, especially in energy. It is known that this cooperation increased after the sanctions imposed on Russia by Western actors. Of course, this shows Beijing’s indirect support to Moscow, even though it is not directly involved in the war. Moreover, it can be stated that the cooperation between the parties will further develop. Already in the meeting between the leaders, the signing of the “Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Partnership and Deepening Strategic Cooperation[6] and Xi’s invitation to Putin to Beijing confirms this.[7]
As it can be understood, despite the difference in the method of imposing the “great power” status on the West, the parties come together in the context of the search for multipolarity under the pressure of the USA and loudly voice their search for a new world order. It can be argued that the pressure increased by the Washington administration, especially in the South China Sea and Taiwan, triggered the rapprochement between Beijing and Moscow.
To summarize briefly, Xi, who visited Moscow shortly after the ICC decision regarding Putin, drew attention to the importance of negotiation on Ukraine, but the highlight at the summit was the emphasis on the desire of the parties for a multipolar world. In this sense, it can be said that messages are given to contradict the claims that there are some problems in the relations between the two countries. This can be interpreted as a harbinger of further development and deepening of cooperation on the Moscow-Beijing line.
[1] “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis”, FMPRC, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230224_11030713.html, (Date of Accession: 23.03.2023).
[2] “Xi Invites Putin to China in Show of Support as Moscow Talks Continue”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/21/putin-xi-talks-moscow-japanese-pm-to-ukraine, (Date of Accession: 23.03.2023).
[3] “China’s Xi Stresses Close Ties with ‘Dear Friend’ Putin During His First Visit to Russia Since Ukraine Invasion”, CNN, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/20/europe/xi-putin-china-russia-visit-monday-intl-hnk/index.html, (Date of Accession: 23.03.2023).
[4] Ibid.
[5] “Moskova’da Tarihi Mesaj… Çinli Lider Dünyaya İlan Etti! ‘Batı’da Alarm Zillerinin Çalmasına Neden Olacak’”, Hürriyet, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/moskovadan-tarihi-mesaj-cinli-liderin-dunyaya-ilan-etti-batida-alarm-zillerinin-calmasina-neden-olacak-42238259, (Date of Accession: 23.03.2023).
[6] “Çin Devlet Başkanı Şi Cinping, Moskova’dan Ayrıldı”, CNN Türk, https://www.cnnturk.com/dunya/cin-devlet-baskani-si-cinping-moskovadan-ayrildi, (Date of Accession: 23.03.2023).
[7] “Xi Invites Putin…”, op.cit.
