While the North Pole Region (Arctic), which has gained an important place in international politics for reasons such as climate change, environmental problems, and the discovery of energy resources, was the subject of China’s growing interest as a non-regional state; it also poses some opportunities and challenges for the Beijing administration. Within the framework of the White Paper published in 2018, China bases its Arctic policy on research activities, maritime transport, and cooperation developed with the countries of the region.[1]
The Arctic Region, known as the North Pole, has been gaining importance in recent periods due to the rapidly melting glaciers creating new sea routes with the intensification of global warming and the energy resources they contain.
The region has been the scene of the Cold War between the two neighboring superpowers across the sea, the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and in this period, it was believed that the one owns the North Pole will rule the world.[2] The Arctic region is still considered one of the areas where a third world war is likely to break out. According to a study conducted by the US Geological Survey (USGS) in 2008, there are 90 billion barrels of oil (13% of undiscovered oil reserves) and 44 billion cubic meters of natural gas at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean.[3] In addition, the Arctic is becoming more important day by day due to its mining and mineral resources and fishing activities are intense.
Russia, Canada, the USA (Alaska), Denmark (Greenland) and Norway have coastlines in the Arctic region. The formation of new sea routes with melting glaciers offers cost and time savings for global trade. Apart from the riparian countries, this situation also attracts the attention of global actors such as the European Union (EU), Japan, China, and India. China has stated that it will base its Arctic policy on the principles of respect, cooperation, mutual interest, and sustainability.
Although China is a state outside the Arctic region, it considers itself a global power and “near Arctic state” that has a say in Arctic issues, and in this sense, it shows an enthusiastic outlook in the areas of cooperation. The basis of the Beijing administration’s interest in the Arctic forms the energy and mineral resources and maritime trade routes owned by the region. In addition, China emphasizes that beyond scientific research, it aims to achieve a level of cultural exchange in areas such as the environment, climate change, and economic development through global governance, regional cooperation, and building bilateral and multilateral relations.
Accordingly, it is aimed to improve the economic and social sustainability of the region and create a shorter and more reliable shipping lane through the “Polar Silk Road”, which was created by including the Northern Sea Route (NSR) in the Belt-Road Project. At this point, Russia, which has the longest coastline, is an extremely strategic actor due to its existing natural gas infrastructure, icebreaker fleet, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility located in Yamal.
In 2019, Russia and China made their intention clear to cooperate on the development of the Northern Sea Route and the search and management of energy resources. China is a major shareholder of the LNG enterprise in Yamal and invests in oil and gas exploration in the Black Sea. Thus, Beijing is becoming the main foreign partner of Moscow in the Arctic territories and intends to increase its participation in the exploration and management of the Northern oil deposits belonging to Russia.[4] In this context, the region comes into prominence as an area where China’s competition with Russia can be tested.
China is a country that needs an energy resource supply to maintain its economic growth. For this reason, the Arctic has the potential to provide long-term economic benefits to China with its energy and mineral wealth. Moreover, compared to regions of the world that are rich in natural resources but have conflicts, such as Africa and the Middle East, which are unstable and where external actors are more involved, the Arctic poses fewer geopolitical risks.
On the other hand, the North Pole brings with it some challenges as well as the opportunities mentioned above. Firstly, as at the South Pole, no agreement has been reached between the countries of the region at the North Pole. However, China makes an intensive academic effort regarding the legal status of the region and conducts studies on the geostrategic importance of the Arctic.
In this context, the Beijing administration proposed in 2010 that the marine areas beyond the EEZs should be included in the common heritage of humanity and has received support from the Western World in this regard.[5] Another challenge is climate change and the consequences that it brings. While climate change offers the opportunity to create new maritime trade routes, it also causes some environmental problems that negatively affect the regional ecosystem.
In this sense, the extraction and transportation of energy and mineral resources harm the environment. The risk of oil spills, environmental pollution, and the impact of local people on these activities are the main problems that may arise. Based on climate change and its effects, the Beijing administration bases the justifications for its Arctic policy on economic sustainability in the context of energy and maritime trade routes. China emphasizes that the ecological changes in the region have a transboundary nature, drawing attention to the fact that the bad course may lead to mass migration from Asia to the Northern and Western regions.
China’s focus on issues such as economic efficiency, product quality, environmental protection, energy, and social security within the framework of technological innovations means that China can lead the development policies of the countries in the region on environmental and energy issues. In this context, while Beijing is developing solutions for local problems such as food production and energy security; in return, China gets the chance to import food resources such as Arctic seafood and oil and natural gas extraction.
The Chinese Government uses its investment capacity and the bilateral and multilateral cooperation it has developed within the framework of the Arctic Circle as the best way to engage in the region. The Arctic Circle was established by the Ottawa Declaration in 1996 by Russia, Canada, the USA, Greenland, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, and Finland. The Council operates as an intergovernmental forum aimed at promoting cooperation, coordination, and interaction between Arctic states and their indigenous peoples on sustainable development and environmental issues. China joined the Council with observer status in 2013.
While China is applying more proactive diplomacy through its investments in Arctic maritime projects towards Iceland, Greenland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden; it exhibits an appearance that is prone to cooperation and working in harmony with countries such as Canada, the USA, and Russia.[6] Because countries with relatively less access to local resources can benefit more from bilateral and multilateral partnerships than large states. For instance, Greenland, which is small in terms of its population and economy compared to other Arctic countries, is heavily home to Chinese investments.[7]
The Beijing administration sees particularly Russia and Canada as having a say in the region. Canada is an important position for China with its market opportunities and mineral wealth in the energy sector. Moscow, on the other hand, is Beijing’s main ally in the Arctic in the context of the joint polar partnership, intensive cooperation in the field of energy, and the pursuit of multipolarity. China also began to establish a mutual dialogue with the United States on maritime law and polar issues in 2010. There are partnerships between Washington and Beijing on the Alaska Gasline Development Corporation, Sinopec, Bank of China, and China Investment Corporation collaborations on the Alaska Natural Gas Project.[8]
China is developing its trade relations with the states of the region within the framework of bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms in many investment areas, including foreign direct investment. In addition, it creates a dependency relationship with the states it invests in through the Belt-Road Project. In other words, the situation means that the debtor countries becoming dependent on Beijing, and important trade areas in which China is a stakeholder and investor are forced to be transferred to China.
Such a scenario will ultimately increase China’s involvement in decision-making processes related to the Arctic and will allow China to establish hierarchical relations in geopolitical competition using soft power elements. It is seen that China’s activities towards the Arctic region, which it considers a common heritage of humanity, are evolving towards becoming a shareholder rather than a stakeholder, especially when considering its investment areas and company positions.
[1] “China’s Arctic Policy”, The State Council of the Peole’s Republic of China, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm, (Date of Accession: 17.10.2022).
[2] David Curtis Wright, “A Dragon Eyes the Top of the World: Arctic Policy Debate and Discussion in China, China Maritime Studies Institute”, U.S Naval War College, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books/2/, (Date of Accession: 17.10.2022).
[3] “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle”, ABD Jeolojik Araştırma Kurumu, https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf, (Erişim Tarihi: 17.10.2022).
[3] Aki Tonami, “China’s Arctic Policy”, Springer Link, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/978-1-137-53746-1_2, (Date of Accession: 17.10.2022).
[4] Aki Tonami, “China’s Arctic Policy”, Springer Link, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/978-1-137-53746-1_2, (Date of Accession: 17.10.2022).
[5] Alexandre Cornet, “From the Polar Silk Road to the Arctic Rimland: A Case Study of the Belt and Road Challenges for the European Union” IRIS Asia Focus, https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Asia-Focus-90-Anglais-1.pdf, (Date of Accession: 17.10.2022).
[6] Aki Tonami, “China’s Arctic Policy”, Springer Link, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/978-1-137-53746-1_2, (Date of Accession: 17.10.2022).
[7] Mark E. Rosen-Cara B. Thuringer, “Unconstrained Foreign Direct Investment: An Emerging Challenge to Arctic Security”, Channel NewsAsia, https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/COP-2017-U-015944-1Rev.pdf, (Date of Accesion: 17.10.2022).
[8] Lim, Kong Soon, “China’s Arctic Policy and the Polar Silk Road Vision”, SSRN, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3603710, (Date of Accession: 17.10.2022).
