While hopes for peace are rising in the Russian-Ukrainian inter-delegation negotiations in Istanbul on March 29, 2022, the most interesting message given by Russia was the fact that Vladimir Medinski, who headed the Russian delegation, said that his country did not oppose Ukraine’s membership to the European Union (EU).
In his explanation about the issue, Medinski has said that “Kremlin is not contesting Ukraine’s demand joining the EU.[1] Whereas, during the “Maidan Incidents” that erupted in 2014, Moscow wanted to punish Kiev’s EU orientation, and after the end of the incident, a process came which culminated in the annexation of Crimea in an unlawful manner. In other words, Ukrainians were exposed to Russian interference when they wanted to join the EU in 2014.
At this point, the idea that there is a differentiation in Russian foreign policy emerges. On February 24, 2022, Russia launched its so-called “Special Operations” campaign against Ukraine, and she called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastward enlargement policy and Kiev’s NATO orientation a threat to his national security. In the first stage, this led to the perception that Moscow maintained its 2014 course regarding EU enlargement. The “Primakov Doctrine,” which Russia describes as the “Near Abroad Doctrine,” mainly pursues the aim of preventing the expansion of Western influence in the post-Soviet space, thereby maintaining Russia’s regional hegemony. Therefore, the EU is not exempt from the regional reading of the Russian state mind. Therefore, Medinski’s statements are extremely eye-catching.
It is possible to relate the foreign policy in question to the misalignment of the war in Ukraine. In a sense, Russia is discussing exit scenarios from the war and is looking for a formula that it could present as an “honorable retreat”.
In this context, the Moscow administration told countries in the post-Soviet geography through Ukraine, “I do not allow you to look to the West for security and defense policy. However, you can define yourself politically and culturally in terms of the Western values you feel belong to.” and maybe she felt the need to give her message in that sense. Indeed, the Kremlin may also act to define the EU-United States of America (USA) and thus EU-NATO separation by developing such discourse at a time when EU membership applications are made by states such as Georgia and Moldova, and particularly Ukraine.
Another way of expressing this is to say that Moscow has agreed to make concessions so that the EU could move away from the USA to become relatively closer to Russia. The aim is to read as the break-up of the anti-Russian bloc that was formed on the occasion of the Ukrainian War. However, it is possible to say that all such comments are incomplete. This is because in the background of Russia’s announcement, the notion that the countries, particularly Ukraine, will not be admitted into the EU is decisive.
As it is known, the EU membership processes are finalized by negotiations on chapters approved by all member states. It is crucial for Russia to find countries like Hungary, which is already an EU member, that don’t want to oppose Russia. The Budapest Administration in particular, as well as various actors, may block the membership process of the candidate countries with veto that will bring to the chapters. This is a substantial possibility.
As a matter of fact, “We still have reliable allies in the world,” which comes frequently from Russia. This may be what the statements indicate.
More importantly, these states do not meet the criteria for the EU membership. Moreover, this shortcoming does not consist of legislation that could be compensated through time-related reforms such as democratic values and economic capacity. This is because the territorial integrity and sovereignty of these countries are: therefore, boundaries are disputed. Therefore, the EU seems unlikely to accept these countries as members. In fact, the EU is not expected to take any action by accepting Ukraine as an exception. The Union will not want to open this door for the other candidate countries. Moreover, the Union’s acceptance of neighborly relations with Russia, which takes into account the borders involved in discussions, does not seem rational.
In fact, Moscow could have given the go-ahead for those countries’ EU accession for even those reasons. Member states will thus enter the Union in the first phase; If they realize that they cannot become a member over time, it will be necessary for them to start questioning Western values. For Moscow, this formula could be conceived as an ideal roadmap for breaking the Western influence in its immediate surroundings.
In this step, the difference in Ukraine’s membership between 2014 and 2022 is also worth mentioning. As mentioned before, when Ukraine’s EU membership was brought up in 2014, Crimea was not annexed and Kiev did not lose control over Luhansk and Donetsk. In short, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine was not in a dispute over the period mentioned. Russia did not allow this direction in the process. Today, Moscow continues to deliver messages suggesting that countries in the former Soviet region, particularly Ukraine, are not interested in the EU. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that Russia has created conditions in Ukraine for the EU, which could not accept the country as a member.
In respect to this, the membership goals of countries such as Georgia and Moldova, and particularly Ukraine, reflect a picture that is disconnected from reality. Hence, the Trans-Dniester problem of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Moldova in Georgia remains. Therefore, one of the possibilities for the states mentioned is that the EU might bring up formulas such as the “Privileged Partnership”. However, it is not clear to what extent such formulas will satisfy the relevant states.
In conclusion, Medinski’s statement pointed out that Moscow was reversing its position on Ukraine’s EU membership bid, but it may be said that different accounts were in the background. These accounts, on the one hand, aim to shake up the spirit of togetherness in the Western Alliance that is created by the anti-Russia movement. On the other hand, it might also be based on the assumption that countries such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, due to their conflict zones and the related border problems and sovereignty problems, will not be admitted to the EU. More importantly, Russia may have chosen to pave the way for a process that would undermine the countries put forward by the so-called impasse.
[1] “Россия не против вступления Украины в ЕС – помощник президента РФ”, Vesti¸ https://vesti.az/v-mire/rossiya-ne-protiv-vstupleniya-ukrainy-v-es-pomoshhnik-prezidenta-rf-459994, (Date of Accession: 29.03.2022).
