Since its establishment, Türkiye has closely followed international developments in line with its goal of reaching the level of modern civilizations and has taken part or tried to take part in important international organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in this process. During the Cold War, Türkiye aimed to get rid of the pressure of the Soviet Union and avoid political and economic isolation in the process of integration into the Western Bloc. During this period, it aimed to support economic integration by establishing stronger ties with the West and thus aimed to increase its security against Soviet threats. In addition, it continued to seek balance against the United States of America (USA) and tried to prevent the balance of power in the West from developing against it.
Türkiye’s relations with the European Economic Community (EEC) have been shaped not only in the name of economic development, but also as an effort by Türkiye to benefit from the aid of this community and to maintain its current market share. In addition, it has influenced the political dynamics in Europe and has taken a strategic stance, especially against Greece’s unfavourable initiatives. With this multifaceted foreign policy strategy, Türkiye aimed to consolidate its position in the international arena and defend its country’s interests. In order to achieve this strategic goal, Türkiye applied to the EEC on 31 July 1959. At first, the EEC member states strongly discussed Türkiye’s application due to Türkiye’s Islamic identity and the fact that the goods of a Muslim country would enter the European market, but since the interests of the EEC countries were prioritized, they offered Türkiye an association relationship rather than membership. Because at that time, communism did not only threaten Türkiye, but also posed a great threat to European countries.
Türkiye accepted the EEC’s proposal for a partnership, whereupon the Ankara Agreement was signed on September 12, 1963, and with the entry into force of the treaty on December 1, 1964, the relations between the parties started both legally and officially. Although Article 28 of the treaty. Although the article stipulates membership to Türkiye, it has shown itself at the beginning of the relations that this process will spread over a very long time, that it will be very difficult for Türkiye to become a member of the EU, and that the relations built between the parties will depend on both the changes in the geopolitical conjuncture and the strategic interests of the EU. Therefore, relations have come to this day in a bumpy course.
In this process, the EU implemented the Customs Union with Türkiye on 1 January 1996, granted candidate status to Türkiye at the Helsinki Summit on 12 December 1999 and started accession negotiations with Türkiye on 3 October 2005. At every stage of these developments, Türkiye has increased its hopes for EU membership. At the end of each process, the relations were strained and even reached the breaking point. For example, although accession negotiations started on October 3, 2005, Türkiye-EU relations have deteriorated over time and have reached a point of tension in many areas. The main reasons for this situation are multidimensional and structural.
At the beginning of these problems is the Cyprus problem. Türkiye refused to open its ports to the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, and the EU saw this as a serious obstacle to the progress of the negotiations. The Cyprus issue has led to the politicization of technical processes and deepened the crisis of confidence. In the second place, the EU cites Türkiye’s inability to make progress on the chapters containing the harmonization criteria. In the third place, there is the EU’s enlargement fatigue and the implementation of double standard policies against Türkiye. Increasing anti-immigration, Islamophobia and prejudices against Türkiye within the EU have led to a weakening of the membership perspective. This has strengthened the perception in the Turkish public that the EU is applying double standards. In the fourth place are tensions with the Eastern Mediterranean and Greece. Türkiye’s energy policies in the Eastern Mediterranean and maritime jurisdiction disputes with Greece have further strained relations due to the EU’s solidarity with Southern European countries. In the last place, there is populist politics and mutual harsh rhetoric. The rising populist rhetoric both in Türkiye and in some EU countries has made the diplomatic language more confrontational and weakened the basis for dialogue. All these factors have led to the blockage of Türkiye-EU relations not only for technical but also for political and ideological reasons, and by blurring the perspective of membership, the relations have reached the point of tension and even rupture. Therefore, this tension between the parties has been carried to the present day.
So, what has changed today that the EU has chosen to revive relations with Türkiye? The answer to this question is obvious. The reason for this change in the EU, as in previous periods, is closely related to both the changes in the geopolitical conjuncture and the redefinition of the EU’s strategic interests. In other words, the détente in EU-Türkiye relations is shaped within the framework of geopolitical necessities, energy and trade strategies, and the pressures created by the global policies of the US.
In this process, the following factor comes to the fore: First, the Russia-Ukraine War and the increasing importance of NATO, Russia’s aggression have led the EU to reconsider its security policies, and Türkiye’s strategic position in the Black Sea and its military capacity in NATO have become indispensable. In addition, Türkiye’s mediating role in Ukraine (Grain Corridor) and its balanced relationship with the West have positively affected the EU’s approach to Ankara. The second influential factor is the security of energy supply and Türkiye’s role as an energy corridor, the EU’s effort to reduce its dependence on Russian energy, TANAP and alternative sources in the Eastern Mediterranean have become critical. Türkiye has come to the fore as a key actor in the supply of energy to Europe.
Another important factor in the process is the emergence of the US trade wars and the need for the EU to diversify its economic relations. The trade wars, which started during the Trump era and continued under the Biden administration, increased the US-EU trade tensions and directed the EU to alternative markets. In particular, the U.S.’s steel and aluminium tariffs and technology export restrictions have negatively affected the EU economy, which has made trade cooperation with Türkiye attractive. In addition, Türkiye’s young population, production capacity and the potential to update the Customs Union have been seen as an important alternative in reducing the EU’s fragility in global supply chains.
Another important factor is NATO’s expanding role and Türkiye’s contribution to defence. Increasing global security threats (Russia, China) have reinforced the importance of NATO, and Türkiye’s military capacity (UAVs, presence in the Middle East, Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean) has become an element to be considered in the EU’s defence strategies. As a natural reflection of all these developments, the resumption of the Türkiye-EU High-Level Economic Dialogue Meeting in 2025 is of critical importance in terms of moving the strategic rapprochement between the parties to the institutional level. The reactivation of this dialogue mechanism will enable both the management of mutual economic interests in a more sustainable framework and the taking of concrete steps on issues such as the updating of the Customs Union, the green deal, digital transformation and the resilience of supply chains. Moreover, this dialogue should not be limited to the economic field, but should be considered as one of the structural foundations of the new era in which Türkiye-EU relations are redefined.
However, in the face of this development, Türkiye’s full membership to the European Union should not be expected in the short term. Because, although geopolitical imperatives, energy security and global trade dynamics will revive EU-Türkiye relations today, the full membership process requires a much deeper and multidimensional transformation and it is necessary to evaluate the historical and cultural identity of the European Union, especially the value foundations established on the basis of “Christian brotherhood”.
First, the political will for Türkiye’s membership in the EU is still limited. Some member states, especially France and Austria, do not favor Türkiye’s full membership; instead, they propose alternative models such as strategic partnerships. In addition, the EU frequently emphasizes the lack of progress in the membership acquis and expects Ankara to reform this issue.
Secondly, the Türkiye file is still challenging in terms of the EU’s internal integrity and enlargement policy. The EU, which is more cautious about post-Brexit enlargement, prioritizes smaller countries with high adaptation capacity, such as the Western Balkans. Establishing a full membership relationship with a large, dynamic and strategically independent actor like Türkiye raises serious debates in terms of the current EU structural balances.
Thirdly, and most importantly, although the EU is officially a union built on secular, pluralistic and democratic values, when its founding philosophy is examined, it is seen that it carries a political and cultural code fed by the Catholic and Christian democratic traditions of Western Europe. The Catholic Christian democratic roots of founding leaders such as Schuman, Adenauer and De Gasperi contributed a conception of “a Christian peace” to the European project. This cultural background has been influential in the formation of European identity over time and has made the EU in a sense the modern expression of the idea of “Christian Europe”. In this context, Türkiye’s Muslim identity and the fact that it comes from a different civilization basin are seen as a fundamental reservation about the accession process in some EU circles. The argument that “Türkiye is outside the cultural borders of Europe”, which was frequently emphasized especially in France during the Nicolas Sarkozy period, is the clearest expression of this historical-cultural approach. Likewise, the Christian Democratic line in Germany has defended the “privileged partnership” proposal for Türkiye for many years and has distanced itself from the perspective of full membership. This situation shows that beyond geopolitical and strategic interests, there is a structural obstacle to Türkiye’s EU membership as an identity issue.
The fact that Türkiye is governed by a secular constitutional system, is a member of NATO and has established strong relations with the West is not enough to overcome this cultural barrier. Because the issue is not only political, but also about European identity and collective memory. However, despite this cultural and historical barrier, structural imperatives such as the deepening of global crises, the Russian threat, energy supply security, migrant crises and trade restructuring push the EU to act more pragmatically. For this reason, the EU prefers to establish functional partnerships with Türkiye by keeping its cultural identity-based reservations in the background for a while.
The emphasis placed on strengthening cooperation between the parties in the fields of security, energy and economy at the Türkiye-EU High Level Economic Dialogue Meeting held in Brussels on 3 April 2025 shows that EU-Türkiye relations have been redefined and are maintained on a functional basis. If the meeting had been considered as a strategic step towards the resumption of the suspended accession negotiations within the framework of Türkiye’s full membership perspective, the EU could have positioned this meeting differently or canceled the meeting citing domestic political developments in Türkiye. As a result of the evaluations, the EU did not put this option into practice and concluded that it was a more rational choice to continue the dialogue. The meeting on 3 April 2025 clearly revealed the areas that the EU prioritizes in its relations with Türkiye. In this context, the main strategic issues that come to the fore are as follows:
- Macroeconomic Stability and Structural Reforms: During the meeting, the economic outlook of the parties was evaluated and the fiscal discipline and structural reform agenda implemented by Türkiye were discussed positively.
- Updating the Customs Union: The need to update the existing Customs Union has been confirmed by the parties. Türkiye’s production capacity and the vulnerabilities experienced by the EU in the global supply chain were among the main factors that increased the importance of this update.
- Security of Energy Supply and Türkiye’s Role as a Transit Country: In the context of the EU’s strategy to reduce its dependence on Russian energy, Türkiye’s key role with TANAP and other energy transition projects was highlighted.
- Deepening Investment and Trade: At the meeting, it was emphasized that joint projects should be developed in areas such as increasing mutual direct investments, green transformation and digitalization.
- Visa Liberalization and Financial Cooperation: Providing visa facilitation to Turkish citizens and increasing cooperation between Türkiye and Europe-based financial institutions were also among the main agenda items discussed.
As can be understood from the content of the meeting, the EU prioritizes the non-membership but strategic cooperation model regarding Türkiye and enters a period in which relations are redefined. This shows that the EU adopts a pragmatic approach in line with common interests by maintaining a constructive dialogue with Türkiye.
