According to the information conveyed about the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), the foundations of its special United Nations (UN) status date back to 1968. This status formed the basis of the bicommunal negotiation process initiated to secure the political rights of Turkish Cypriots. The process, which started under UN mediation, laid the legal foundation for negotiations aimed at resolving the Cyprus issue. However, the unilateral recognition of the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) as the sole representative of the “Republic of Cyprus” became one of the biggest obstacles preventing the TRNC from gaining international legitimacy. The UN’s policies towards Cyprus have generally been inclined to recognize GCASC as the legitimate government, rather than treating the two communities on the island as equals in accordance with this status.
Throughout the historical process, Turkey has been the only country to officially recognize the TRNC. However, Bangladesh and Pakistan made attempts to recognize the TRNC in its early years, but they swiftly retracted these decisions due to international pressure. Notably, after Bangladesh declared independence from Pakistan in 1972 and became the first country recognized by Turkey, this could have served as a significant factor in Bangladesh’s recognition of the TRNC. Nonetheless, the process was disrupted due to pressure from the United States (US) and the UN. In 1973, a temporary recognition decision for the TRNC was taken, but it lasted only a single day before it was quickly withdrawn.[1] This situation revealed that the recognition of the TRNC is not merely a legal matter but largely a political issue shaped by global power dynamics.
The declaration of the TRNC’s independence on November 15, 1983, was met with widespread international reaction. Just three days later, on November 18, 1983, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 541. This resolution declared the TRNC’s declaration of independence to be incompatible with the 1960 Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee. It called on all UN member states not to recognize the TRNC. Furthermore, it emphasized the need to support the UN Secretary-General’s good offices mission in finding a bicommunal solution to the Cyprus problem. The resolution laid the legal foundation for the TRNC’s international isolation process.[2]
From the perspective of international law, the diplomatic crisis regarding the Cyprus issue and the status of the TRNC can be explained through a key decision taken at the 1948 Bogota Conference of the Organization of American States. At the Bogota Conference, a significant decision regarding the rights and obligations of states was adopted. This decision emphasized that the existence of a state does not depend on its recognition by other states and that sovereignty and political integrity are independent of the recognition process. Article 9 of the convention articulates this as follows: “The political existence of the State is independent of recognition by other States. Even before being recognized, the State has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its preservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate concerning its interests, to administer its services, and to determine the jurisdiction and competence of its courts.” In this context, it has been clearly demonstrated that the lack of recognition of the TRNC does not negate its existence as a state, and it continues to maintain its legitimacy under international law.[3]
The recognition of states in international law has been discussed within the framework of constitutive and declaratorytheories, becoming a significant topic of debate in international relations. The constitutive theory links the acceptance of a state’s existence to its recognition by other states, viewing recognition as an essential condition for statehood. According to this theory, for the TRNC to achieve full state status, it must be recognized by the international community.
In contrast, the declaratory theory argues that statehood is based on objective criteria. It emphasizes that entities fulfilling the four essential elements outlined in the Montevideo Convention—permanent population, defined territory, government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states—should be considered states regardless of their recognition status. According to this theory, the TRNC meets all the necessary elements of statehood, and its lack of recognition is solely due to political pressures.
The recognition status of the TRNC can be better understood by examining the example of Kosovo. On February 4, 2008, the Council of Europe decided to support Kosovo’s independence, and following its declaration of independence on February 17, 2008, Kosovo was swiftly recognized by the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and Turkey. However, Russia and Serbia strongly opposed it. Within the European Union (EU), divisions arose, with GCASC, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, and Greece announcing that they would not recognize Kosovo. GCASC’s stance was directly related to the TRNC issue; it avoided recognizing Kosovo to prevent the argument that the TRNC should also be recognized if Kosovo were accepted as an independent state.
This situation demonstrates that the recognition of the TRNC is not a legal issue but is entirely shaped by political motives. GCASC exerted diplomatic pressure on Western countries, using the Kosovo issue as a precedent to block the recognition of the TRNC, thereby adopting an inconsistent stance in terms of international law.
Kosovo’s example, in line with the principles emphasized at the Bogota Conference, shows that it was able to act independently despite not being recognized by some states. It has been argued that the TRNC could adopt a similar strategy. However, the existence of powerful states that supported Kosovo facilitated its international recognition. The main obstacle for the TRNC lies in the lack of a strong ally and the collective opposition of the international community rather than a divided stance.
At the UNSC meeting held on January 31, 2025, a resolution was adopted to maintain the current status quo regarding the Cyprus issue, and the mandate of the peacekeeping force was extended until January 31, 2026. The unanimously adopted resolution reflects the UN’s persistent insistence on a one-state solution, closing the door to a two-state alternative while striving to maintain the existing balance and perpetuating the half-century-long stalemate.[4]
Although the TRNC remains unrecognized in the international system, its admission as an “observer member” in the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) for the first time, with the encouragement of the Republic of Turkey, is regarded as a historic decision. However, this status has remained limited to that context within the organization. The OTS has not taken any direct or indirect stance on the Cyprus issue.
Since November 2022, Kubanychbek Omuraliev has been serving as the Secretary-General of the OTS. While outlining the organization’s key priorities for 2025, Omuraliev did not make a direct reference to the status of the TRNC within the organization. Omuraliev emphasized that under Kyrgyzstan’s chairmanship, the OTS would focus on deepening economic integration, accelerating digital transformation, and enhancing regional cooperation. Among the 16 agreements signed at the 2024 Bishkek Summit, there was no provision related to the TRNC, and the Cyprus issue was not included in the OTS’s primary agenda items.[5]
Among the members of the OTS, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan renewed their commitments to deepening trilateral cooperation by signing the Ankara Declaration on January 29, 2025. The declaration emphasized strengthening cooperation on regional and international matters. Regarding the Palestinian issue, it welcomed the declaration of a ceasefire in Gaza, underlined the necessity of its strict implementation, and adopted a common stance supporting a two-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, no mention was made of the TRNC or the Cyprus issue.[6]
This situation reveals a clear lack of an explicit approach within the understanding of Turkic World Diplomacy in the OTS regarding the position of the TRNC. Considering Turkey’s stance on promoting the recognition of the TRNC and achieving a fair and lasting solution to the Cyprus issue on international platforms, it is evident that the “two-state solution” approach adopted for the Palestinian issue bears similarities to the “two-state solution” principle between the GCASC and the TRNC. However, the failure of the OTS to adopt this approach and present a common stance on the Cyprus issue leaves the TRNC isolated in its quest for international recognition.
On January 8, 2025, during a joint press conference, TRNC President Ersin Tatar and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan emphasized that the two-state solution model is the only realistic option for the Cyprus issue. Fidan pointed out that other solution models tried in the past had failed and stressed that mutual trust and recognition of each other’s sovereign rights between the two sovereign states would bring significant gains in terms of economic development, stability, and regional cooperation. However, he noted that this reality is often avoided in international discourse and particularly highlighted that political actors in GCASC seek to maintain the current situation by avoiding risks that could disrupt the status quo. Despite Turkey’s ongoing diplomatic efforts, the repetitive discourse on the Cyprus issue without concrete steps has turned the process into a vicious circle.[7]
At this point, the Global Security Initiative (GSI) announced by China in April 2022 offered an important perspective on the Cyprus issue. Chinese Ambassador to Cyprus Liu Yantao, in a published statement, emphasized that the GSI could contribute to the resolution of the Cyprus issue, stressing the necessity of adhering to the UN Charter and Security Council resolutions, respecting the will of the Cypriot people, and focusing on a permanent solution based on a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation.[8] In this context, it is observed that China’s economic relations with GCASC and the neutral stance of Central Asian Turkic states on the Cyprus issue stem from their desire to avoid international sanctions and pressures and to protect their trade and economic ties with China.
In this framework, maintaining the observer member status of the TRNC within the OTS and avoiding its assumption of a broader political role within the organization is considered the most likely scenario. While Turkey and Azerbaijan continue their support for the TRNC, other member states refrain from engaging in a direct recognition process to avoid diplomatic pressures. Instead, strengthening the TRNC’s economic and cultural ties with Turkic World Diplomacy is seen as a more feasible option for breaking its international isolation.
Alternatively, economic and trade cooperation could be developed to enable the TRNC to gain a more active position within the OTS. Mechanisms such as the Turkish Investment Fund and the Middle Corridor projects could accelerate the integration of the TRNC into the organization. However, this process is progressing as a de facto diplomatic engagement rather than legal recognition and is being managed in line with the strategy of OTS members to maintain the international balance.
On the other hand, the official recognition of the TRNC by OTS members is considered the least likely scenario. Countries such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are expected not to support such a step, considering their relations with the West and China. Such a decision would provoke strong diplomatic reactions against the OTS in the international system. Therefore, the organization’s priority will focus on steps to increase the economic and cultural integration of the TRNC rather than its political recognition. Given the current conjuncture, no radical change in the diplomatic status of the TRNC is expected. However, under the leadership of Turkey and Azerbaijan, efforts will likely aim at making the TRNC more visible on the international stage within the framework of Turkic World Diplomacy.
[1] Michael Rubin, “Is Now the Time for a Cyprus Deal?”, Commentary, https://www.commentary.org/michael-rubin/is-now-the-time-for-a-cyprus-deal, (Access Date: 07.02.2025).
[2] “Concerns declaration by the Turkish Cypriot community of its secession from the Republic of Cyprus. In: Resolutions and decisions of the Security Council, 1983”, United Nations, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/58970/files/S_RES_541%281983%29-EN.pdf, (Access Date: 07.02.2025).
[3] “Bogota Conference of American States, Charter of the Organization of American States; March 30-May 2, 1948”, Election Observation and Democracy Support (EODS), https://www.eods.eu/template/default/compendium/Part%207/001_Charter_of_the_Organization_of_American_States_1948.pdf, (Access Date: 07.02.2025).
[4] “The situation in Cyprus – Security Council, 9854th meeting”, United Nations, https://media.un.org/avlibrary/en/asset/d333/d3334606, (Access Date: 07.02.2025).
[5] “Key achievements and plans of Organization of Turkic States for 2025 under Kyrgyzstan’s chairmanship – interview with Kubanychbek Omuraliev”, AKIpress, https://akipress.com/news:817552, (Access Date: 07.02.2025).
[6] “Ankara Declaration strengthens trilateral cooperation between Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Uzbekistan”, Azernews, https://www.azernews.az/nation/237098.html, (Access Date: 07.02.2025).
[7] “President Ersin Tatar and Hakan Fidan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, hold joint press conference following their meeting”, Presidency of TRNC, https://kktcb.org/en/president-ersin-tatar-and-hakan-fidan-minister-of-foreign-affairs-13134, (Access Date: 07.02.2025).
[8] “Beijing on the Cyprus Problem: One China, One Cyprus?” ChinaMed Project, https://chinamed.substack.com/p/beijing-on-the-cyprus-problem-one#_ftn3, (Access Date: 07.02.2025).
