Suwalki Corridor, which is situated between Russia’s exclave, Kaliningrad Oblast and Belarus, is located between Poland and Lithuania, members of the Organization for North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) and consists of 100 kilometres of rugged and mountainous terrain. The corridor that is also known as the “Suwalki Gap” is crucial for the security of the Baltics as it draws a line between Russia-ally Belarus and Kaliningrad. This corridor, which is the sole remedy to reach the Baltic countries from Poland and Central Europe by road and rail, is connecting Europe and the Baltic States, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia with this feature. In the event of an attack, the corridor is leaving the Baltic Region vulnerable through preventing the three countries from accessing NATO’s main areas.[1]
In 2014, after Russia’s annexation of Crimea by violating international law, has raised the issue of defenseless the corridor by the countries in the region because of this gap which would inosculate Kaliningrad and his ally Belarus could become key to the invasion of the Baltic countries.[2]
While Russia’s possible move to seize control of the corridor seems unlikely, given that it would mean an attack on NATO territory and the military response of the United States (USA), Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine is demonstrating that this possibility should not be ignored. Because, although Moscow has repeatedly stated that Ukraine will not be invaded by Russia, it has breached the world’s faith in his word due to the operations that started on February 24, 2022. Thus, it is imperative to focus on the military assets Putin has amassed around Belarus.
Further, the United States and its allies headed towards the Baltic Sea and the eastern flank of NATO following the Ukrainian occupation. The Kremlin might perceive the situation as a threat to Kaliningrad and take possession of the Suwalki Corridor to build a land bridge in its exclave. In addition, the heavy sanctions imposed on Russia due to the invasion of Ukraine may cause Putin to make moves to open a new “front” on the regional borders of the NATO alliance, where the power of the West is considerably weak.
Prior to the start of the campaign against Ukraine, Russia, like all major military forces, has frequently moved its capabilities around its own borders and deployed troops to the allied states for the exercises. In this context, the Belarus and Russian armies held the “Zapad” military exercise in September 2021 involving 12,000 soldiers and 950 vehicles[3] During the exercise, it was observed that Russian and Belarusian troops conducted attacks on Belarus in the direction of Kaliningrad in order to practice the closing of the Suwalki Corridor.[4] The idea of Putin’s offensive in Ukraine in an attempt to regain the former Soviet region could lead to increased pressure on the Baltic states is assertable.
The increased tension between Russia and the West already reinforces Moscow’s claims in Ukraine; The U.S. and its allies are likely to focus on the Corridor which is considered to be NATO’s “Achilles’ Heel”[5] Because if the New Cold War has deepened, the Suwalki Gap could become the place where the NATO-Russia conflict breaks out. In this case, the fate of the Baltic states will depend on the situation of the Suwalki Corridor, where many weaknesses in NATO’s strategy and in powerlessness on the scope of military capability merge.
With 29 member states, including the United States, NATO has much more military power than Russia. But many of NATO’s troop and tank reserves, as far as US forces are concerned, are thousands of miles away from the Suwalki Corridor.
Russia, on the other side, has increased its permanently deployed buildups, including advanced warplanes and nuclear weapons, around the Suwalki corridor, namely in Belarus and Kaliningrad after the mentioned exercises.
Due to this reason, Western powers may reciprocate Russia’s military presence along the Polish-Lithuanian border. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO established small-scale, multinational combat units in Poland and three Baltic nations to pursue a deterration policy on Moscow.
But they do not have sufficient preventative leverage for the Russian contingent, as it was designed not to violate the terms of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which have signed in 1997 that hindered NATO’s ability to permanently contribute troops to the Baltics and Poland.[6]
The Founding Act, which was designed 25 years ago, was executed after the parties agreed that the agreement was based on “the current and predictable security environment” binding Russia to “impose similar restrictions on conventional force deployments to Europe.” Now, about 120,000 Russian soldiers, a range of armoured vehicles, rockets, artillery and more are breaking into Ukraine from the northeast, east and south of Ukraine. Compendiously, these capabilities require the termination of the said Act due to the change in the security environment in today’s conditions, where conventional combat power in Eastern Europe has reached its maximum level since the end of the Cold War.[7]
All these developments bring us that NATO should strengthen its presence and military bases in the Suwalki region. Within this framework, it can be expected that, as a result of Russia’s unilateral termination, NATO will no longer be subject to Founding Act. In this regard, NATO’s rapid improvement of the military infrastructure in the Suwalki region and significantly and permanently support the standing of allied forces in Northeast Europe seems likely. But a further strengthening of NATO presence in the region could create a “security dilemma” due to maximum security for the Suwalki Corridor means a security threat to Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast. Russia’s growing threat perception may mean an enhanced strengthening of its forces in external regions. As a result, increasing the military presence of parties at the point of regional security may carry the arms race between NATO and Russia to the Baltic Region.
Another possibility for the securitization of the Corridor is that the West is focusing on a regime change in Belarus. A “Maidan Uprising” in Belarus could lead to the breaking of the alliance on the Moscow-Minsk line and the establishment of a “democratic” pro-Western government in Minsk which will be accepted as a safe zone in one part of the Corridor. However, it remains unclear when such a situation will occur and how Russia will respond.
As a last resort, the acceptance of the atmosphere of insecurity created by the corridor can be considered. Because, although Suwalki poses intimidation to the Baltic countries, it actually contains a threat to Russia’s exclave Kaliningrad. Thus, the vulnerability of the Baltic states is balanced by the vulnerability of the Oblast.
This is what has been called a “mutual security gap” in international policy, which is familiar to Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This scenario is more acceptable to NATO since a significant increase in NATO’s conventional attack capabilities could stimulate a Russian response and thus had led to the creation of insecurity in the whole of Europe.
After all, there are several options for dealing with the vulnerability of the Suwalki Corridor, which is considered to be the most fragile point of the Western powers. Besides, the consequences for Europe of the current presence of Russian forces in Ukraine must also be taken into consideration.
Responses and sanctions against Kremlin by European powers are pursued to Russia’s isolation from the international community. In response to this, there is no warranty about Russia will not take another step by aiming at the Baltics region. Moreover, the measures that NATO will take while eliminating the insecurity regarding the Baltic, even if Russia does not have such an aim, may still create an atmosphere of conflict due to the threat it poses to Kaliningrad.
In this regard, the West is expected to take Suwalki Corridor under preservation without any movement to provoke Russia. Thus, it would be fair to say that the Suwalki Corridor is a dead-lock point because it contains both a dilemma and a paradox.
[1]Janusz Bugasjki, “The Suwalki Corridor”, CEPA, https://cepa.org/the-suwalki-corridor/, (Date of Accession: 24.03.2022)
[2] Michal Baranowski, “Secure NATO’s Borders Before Putin’s War Spills over”, The German Marshall Fund, https://www.gmfus.org/news/secure-natos-borders-putins-war-spills-over, (Date of Accession: 25.03.2022)
[3] Shari Kulha, “How the Little-Known Suwalki Corridor Could Largely Block NATO Assistance to Baltic States”, National Post, https://nationalpost.com/news/world/how-the-little-known-but-vital-suwalki-corridor-could-block-nato-road-and-rail-assistance-to-baltic-states, (Date of Accession: 26.03.2022)
[4] “Baltic States Fear Encirclement as Russia Security Threat Rises”, Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/38b1906f-4302-4a09-b304-dc2ecf5dc771, (Date of Accession: 26.03.2022)
[5] David Axe, “The Suwalki Gap Is NATO’s Achilles’ Heel and the Place Where Russia Could Start War”, The Daily Beast, https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-suwalki-gap-is-natos-achilles-heel-and-the-place-where-russia-could-start-war, (Date of Accession: 26.03.2022)
[6] Ronald Sury, “Ukraine War Follows Decades of Warnings That NATO Expansion into Eastern Europe Could Provoke Russia”, The Conservation, https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-follows-decades-of-warnings-that-nato-expansion-into-eastern-europe-could-provoke-russia-177999, (Date of Accession: 26.03.2022)
[7] Ibid.
