No state will want to cooperate with other states in the shadow of conflict. Ensuring security is essential in a world where states are constantly exposed to threats. Indeed, Brussels perceived Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an “existential threat.” The challenges the European Union (EU) encountered regarding its common security and defense policy have put enlargement policy back on the agenda.
While the enlargement policy was not on the political agenda of the European Community before 1993, its relations with neighboring countries were based on trade and aid agreements. With the Yugoslav War, Europe decided to pursue an expansion policy to guarantee its regional security. At the Copenhagen Summit in 1993, the European Council confirmed that accepting new members could represent a solution to the security problem. Thus, the political, economic, administrative, and legal criteria for joining the EU, called the “Copenhagen criteria,” were determined. [1]
The enlargement policy has transformed into a structure in which states that threaten Europe’s internal and external security are reformed and integrated according to the norms, values, and laws of the Union constituting Europe’s security buffer. During the Kosovo crisis in 1999, the European Commission declared that states’ mere political compliance with the Copenhagen criteria was sufficient reason to participate in accession negotiations.
After carrying out its largest enlargement in 2004, the Commission adopted a different approach to enlargement. It has now begun to pay more attention to the risks and imbalances a potential expansion may bring. In 2005, Brussels also stated that future enlargement negotiations would be “an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed in advance.” [2]
Although the 2004 enlargement aimed to reunify the continent after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it ignored the integration problems encountered over time with EU member states. [3] There are two types of nationalism in Europe: ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism. These two species also compete for dominance. While post-communist European member states aim for ethnic and cultural diversity, Western European countries want to preserve national identities and liberal principles.
One reason for the integration problem experienced by post-communist member states within the Union may be that each European nation has a different perception of historical experiences. According to Habermas, Europe understood the dangers of national mobilization in light of the Second World War. Therefore, they accept forms of transnational cooperation. [4] In other words, Western Europeans perceived the destructive character of nationalism. In Central and Eastern Europe, by contrast, the response of societies in transition struggling for inclusion and recognition in the Union to the crisis caused by rapid modernization has been a clear return to the nation-state.[5]
While Brussels pursued its expansion policy with different levels of integration with surrounding countries after 2004, to preserve the EU’s efficiency and development, it gave Ukraine “candidate country” status in June 2022 and Ukraine’s desire to start EU membership negotiations in December this year caused controversy.
The fact that Ukraine is in a difficult financial situation compared to the current Member States and the possibility of benefiting more from cohesion funds poses a problem. Furthermore, Brussels has difficulty finding consensus as member states use their veto power to protect their interests. Budapest has openly stated that it is against Ukraine’s membership of the EU. [6]
Ukraine is far from meeting the Copenhagen criteria, which it must meet to join the EU, amid accusations of a democratic deficit and corruption. The Union’s ability to absorb new members has also become more vulnerable than before due to the impact of global events. Despite this risk, the Commission’s effort to act quickly on the membership of Ukraine and countries that have been waiting to join the bloc for almost 20 years reveals the new nature of the enlargement policy.
In the past, security threats have acted as a catalyst and stimulated a policy of European expansion. Over time, enlargement policy has ceased to be a way to “make a positive contribution to the security and stability of the European continent.”[7] It has transformed into a policy based on the expansion of Europe’s hegemonic area and does not give clear hopes of full integration to neighboring countries that threaten its internal and external security.
Today, member states such as Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia endanger the functioning of the EU single market and the integrity of the laws resulting from European agreements. In these countries, the rule of law has eroded. Although the Commission lifted the ban on the export of Ukrainian grain, the fact that Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland continued to maintain this unilateral ban[8] revealed a severe loss of power vis-à-vis member states. Furthermore, the victory of Roberto Fico in the elections in Slovakia with his pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian approach[9] is another indication that member states are increasingly moving away from the path set by the EU.
In the face of these events, the potential expansion of the Union with Ukraine risks further weakening Brussels rather than providing the security Europe desires and becoming a more vital figure on the international stage. The EU must first resolve the conflict it is experiencing with its member states without further jeopardizing its effectiveness and development. Europe’s asymmetrical relationship structure discriminates between members rather than members within the Union having equal rights and obligations. Furthermore, with its hasty approach to Ukraine’s accession to the Union, the Commission risks creating discredit and a lack of trust instead of ensuring security on the European periphery.
[1] “Accession criteria (Copenhagen Criteria)”, Access to European Union law, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/accession-criteria-copenhagen-criteria.html, (Erişim Tarihi: 15.10.2023).
[2] “Conclusions of the Presidency, Brussels European Council, 16-17 December, 2004”, Council of the European Union 2005, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/83201.pdf, (Erişim Tarihi: 15.10.2023).
[3] “The Enlargement of the Union”, European parliament, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/167/the-enlargement-of-the-union, (Erişim Tarihi: 15.10.2023).
[4] Verovšek, P. J. (2020). Integration after totalitarianism: Arendt and Habermas on the postwar imperatives of memory. Journal of International Political Theory, 16(1), 2-24.
[5] Habermas, J. (2001). Why Europe Needs a Constitution. New Left Review, 11(Sept/ Oct), pp. 5-26
[6] “Tough Issues To Clear Before EU Membership Talks With Ukraine, Hungray’s Orban Says”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/tough-issues-clear-start-eu-membership-talks-with-ukraine-pm-orban-2023-09-29/, (Erişim Tarihi: 29.09.2023).
[7] “Conclusions of the Presidency, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December, 1999’ Council of the European Union 1999, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm, (Erişim Tarihi: 15.10.2023).
[8] “Poland, Hungary, Slovakia To Introduce Bans On Ukraine Grains”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-does-not-extend-ban-ukraine-grains-imports-neighbouring-eu-countries-2023-09-15/, (Erişim Tarihi: 15.09.2023).
[9] “Slovakia’s Fico Strikes Deal On Coalition After Election Win”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/slovak-election-winner-sign-memorandum-with-prospective-government-partners-2023-10-11/, (Erişim Tarihi: 11.10.2023).
