The approach of “strategic autonomy” within French foreign policy tradition, existing since the De Gaulle era, has encountered fundamental challenges in adapting to the new international conditions. Although Emmanuel Macron, upon assuming office in 2017, initially opted to adhere to the French foreign policy tradition, this stance faced interruptions in subsequent periods. Macron’s close relationship with the President of the United States, Donald Trump, was leveraged to counterbalance German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Despite differing perspectives between Trump and Macron, the latter was aware that reaching agreements with Merkel, who pursued independence, would be more challenging. Consequently, priority was given to granting Macron greater space for “European leadership,” leading to an increase in Macron’s visibility within Europe.
However, the method of close collaboration with Trump did not yield positive outcomes for French interests in other regions’ geopolitical arenas. Essentially, France had already partially lost its influence in the Middle East during the Cold War era. France’s secondary role in Syria and limited engagement in Libya significantly disrupted its regional foreign policy. Yet, the most significant developments occurred in Africa, considered France’s “backyard.” France initially faced tactical losses, followed by strategic setbacks in Africa’s competitive environment.
Macron’s underperformance in foreign policy became more pronounced during his second presidential term. This period witnessed a decline in France’s status in the realm of foreign policy.
The new American administration under President Biden categorically rejected any attempt at strategic autonomy within Europe. Merkel’s departure from office in 2021 marked a turning point. Macron perceived himself as the most suitable candidate for European leadership post-Merkel. Seizing the opportunity, Macron attempted to take the initiative in resolving the Ukraine issue, engaging in mediation efforts and holding talks with Putin in the Kremlin before the outbreak of war. For Macron, the Ukraine issue was crucial for European leadership aspirations. Although unable to persuade Putin to refrain from intervention in Ukraine, Macron achieved certain gains in terms of European leadership ambitions. However, Macron’s enthusiasm was short-lived, as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine significantly undermined Europe’s strategic autonomy.
Overall, Macron’s foreign policy failures are notably evident in Europe, Africa, and the South Caucasus. It’s worth examining Macron’s policies towards these regions within this framework.
Competition between France and Germany in Europe has never truly ceased. Differences exist in the geopolitical visions and projects proposed by France and Germany regarding the future of Europe. For instance, the Mediterranean Union Initiative by France and the Eastern Partnership Initiative by Germany underscore these differences. It can be argued that this competition is taking place under the shadow of American hegemony due to the Russia-Ukraine War. The role assigned to Germany by the established liberal order in the Russia-Ukraine War undermines Macron’s ambition for European leadership. Seeking to avoid being overshadowed by Germany, France made a new move by proposing to deploy troops to Ukraine. This move can be interpreted from three perspectives. Firstly, it’s directly related to France’s struggle for European leadership. Secondly, it’s linked to the stalling of American assistance in the House of Representatives. Macron, through this move, indirectly indicated the challenges Europe would face in financing the Russia-Ukraine War without American military and financial assistance. Lastly, it’s related to Russia’s presence in Africa.
Depending on the course of the Russia-Ukraine War, it’s expected that Macron will once again consider “strategic autonomy.” Germany’s excessive engagement in the war presents some opportunities for France. In this context, Macron may assume a “peacemaker role” parallel to Russia’s successes in the field. This could lead to a different dimension of French-German competition.
In Africa, France has lost its status as a key player. This strategic setback in Africa compels Macron to seek visibility in different regions worldwide. Military coups in former French colonies such as Mali, Chad, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Gabon underscore the decline in France’s control over the region. The increasing military presence of Russia and economic presence of China in these countries urge France to take more initiatives in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Moreover, the significant change in Africa is not limited to France alone. The continent’s awakening is generally grounded in anti-Western sentiments. Consequently, countries in the region are seeking new alliances, thus exploring various strategic options.
The South Caucasus region is one of France’s main foreign policy targets. France’s historical support for Armenia and the presence of a strong Armenian diaspora in the country are among the fundamental instruments of this policy. Following strategic losses in Africa, France has openly sought to establish itself unilaterally in the South Caucasus post-2020. This situation deeply affects diplomatic and political relations between Azerbaijan and France. France, by refraining from arming Azerbaijan, attempts to play the role of Armenia’s “new patron,” thereby compensating for its loss of strategic autonomy in Europe and, most importantly, its strategic setbacks in Africa.
Azerbaijan’s mutually trusting relations with both Ankara and Moscow reflect positively on the geopolitical atmosphere in the region. Dissatisfied with Turkey’s increasing presence in the region, Greece is also attempting to sabotage the current situation. Recently, India has also exhibited a pro-Armenian stance, similar to France and Greece, citing the strategic rapprochement between Pakistan and Azerbaijan as a pretext.
Tensions escalated when Azerbaijan expelled two French diplomats in December of last year. In April 2024, France recalled its Ambassador to Baku, Ann Buayo, for “consultations,” accusing Azerbaijan of “damaging bilateral relations.” Azerbaijan, in turn, accused France of engaging in “destructive activities” and using “threatening and coercive language.” Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Ayhan Hacizade stated that the French government had been trying to sabotage normalization between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the past 3.5 years. He emphasized that the attack on the Azerbaijani Embassy in France in September 2022 and the vandalism of the bust of the famous Azerbaijani poetess Hurshudbanu Natavan in the city of Evian-les-Bains were part of France’s anti-Azerbaijani policies.[1]
Attributing Macron’s unilateral steps in South Caucasus solely to the presence of the Armenian diaspora in France is insufficient. These policies also reflect France’s strategic losses in Africa and its attempts to compensate for them. Macron’s biggest geopolitical dilemma lies in the erosion of his pragmatic approach. While attempting to act akin to Napoleon on one hand, he ignores the new realities emerging in the international system on the other. This process triggers inconsistency in France’s foreign policy steps and leads to a conceptual deadlock.
[1] “Ayhan Hacızade: It is baseless for France to characterize Azerbaijan in different steps”, Serq Qapisi, https://serqqapisi.gov.az/xeberler/ayxan-hacizade-fransanin-azerbaycani-birterefli-addimlarda-teqsirlendirmesi-esassizdir, (Date of Access: 26.04.2024).
