The Syrian Crisis emerged in 2011 with widespread protests against the Bashar al-Assad regime, inspired by the Arab Spring, and swiftly escalated into a civil war. Initially marked by peaceful demonstrations in the city of Daraa, the regime’s disproportionate use of violence caused the movement to spread nationwide. Protesters’ demands for democracy, freedom, and economic reform were met with harsh repression, exacerbating the conflict through sectarian divisions and socioeconomic inequalities. Opposition groups rapidly organised, and the ensuing instability transformed Syria into a theatre of proxy war, inviting the intervention of foreign actors. In the process, countless lives were lost, and millions were displaced. After nearly 13 years of conflict, the crisis culminated in December 2024, when Bashar al-Assad, the final representative of the 61-year-old Arab Socialist Baath Party, fled to Russia following a mobilisation of anti-regime forces in late November.
The fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime has profound implications for both Syria’s domestic balance and regional security. The collapse of Baathist rule has opened the door to new strategic scenarios and potential crises at both the national and regional levels. Questions remain over how the post-regime order in Damascus will be shaped and how the transition process will unfold under opposition control. While the United States and other Western nations stress the need to prevent radical groups from dominating the country, Türkiye prioritises the preservation of Syria’s territorial integrity and the safe return of refugees. Türkiye aims to stabilise the region by facilitating refugee repatriation, but this ambition hinges on ending Syria’s internal conflict and establishing a new government. Consequently, Türkiye and other international actors are pursuing cautious diplomacy during this transitional period, striving to prevent the emerging power vacuum from triggering regional instability.
Amid these efforts by Türkiye and international stakeholders to guide Syria’s transition and the nation’s internal focus on rebuilding and navigating a post-Assad era, Israel launched coordinated air, sea, and land attacks on strategic targets near Damascus. These included military bases, arms production facilities, ports, and depots, with Israeli forces occupying key strategic regions. This invasive operation, named “Bashan Arrow” by Israel itself, raises critical questions.[1] Why did Israel escalate its attacks during Syria’s normalisation process? Does the regime change and transitional period in Syria constitute a security threat to Israel? What justification does Israel offer for targeting Syria’s military infrastructure and other strategic assets? Furthermore, what might be the strategic or symbolic significance of the operation’s name, “Bashan Arrow?”
Points of Israeli Attacks[2]
An analysis of Syria’s strategic map reveals that Israeli attacks are predominantly concentrated in and around the capital, Damascus. The targets of these operations include military bases, airports, weapons production facilities, and alleged chemical weapons storage sites. Israel’s offensive extends to areas such as Tartus and Latakia, where Russia maintains a significant military presence. By striking YPG-controlled ports and military installations, Israel aims to significantly degrade Syria’s military capacity. A particular objective has been the neutralisation of the Syrian navy and the destruction of Russian-manufactured military equipment, including helicopters. These moves not only target Syria’s internal security and defence systems but also convey a broader strategic message to other actors in the region.
While Israel justifies its actions as a means of preventing weapons in Syria from falling into the hands of radical groups, the broader pattern points to strategic expansionist objectives. This approach mirrors its strategy in Palestine and Lebanon, where Israel has pursued geopolitical advantages and territorial gains. A notable example is the Golan Heights, seized during the 1967 Six-Day War and formally annexed in 1981. By bolstering its military presence in the Golan and creating buffer zones, Israel enhanced its strategic depth and reinforced its security posture. Viewed through this lens, Israel’s northward incursions into Syria can be seen as part of a larger effort to establish control over new strategically significant territories.
Israeli attacks have been particularly concentrated in major Syrian cities such as Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo. These cities are strategic centres where Syria’s military bases, air defence systems and ammunition depots are located. By striking these targets, Israel aims to weaken the operational capacity of the Syrian army and neutralise its military infrastructure. Damascus, as the administrative heart of Syria, houses the regime’s central decision-making bodies. Hama and Homs serve as logistical and military transit hubs in Syria’s interior, while Aleppo, an industrial and military centre in the north, plays a pivotal role in the country’s military mobility. These regions are also key sites for Iran’s military presence and its logistical support for Hezbollah. By targeting these areas, Israel seeks to weaken the Syrian army’s operational capacity, dismantle its military infrastructure, and reduce Iranian influence within Syria.
To counter Israel’s actions, the Syrian regime has reinforced its air defence systems, particularly around Damascus. However, Israel’s strategic objective is to neutralise these systems to facilitate future operations. The Golan Heights remains a focal point in this security equation, given its geopolitical significance to Israel. By conducting military activities around the Golan, Israel seeks to bolster its defensive posture against regional threats. Furthermore, Israeli strikes on Deir ez-Zor and Qamishli go beyond military targets to include Syria’s energy resources and logistics routes in the east. These operations signal Israel’s broader intent to weaken Syria’s economic and military capacities by asserting control over strategic resources in these areas.
By striking the ports of Tartus and Latakia, Israel aims to curtail Syria’s access to the Mediterranean Sea, thereby restricting Damascus’ capacity to receive external support in any anti-Israeli initiative. These attacks are designed to obstruct Syria’s ability to benefit from foreign aid, effectively limiting the strategic manoeuvring space available to anti-Israeli forces. By doing so, Israel seeks to consolidate its regional dominance while diminishing Syria’s reliance on external assistance.
Israel’s military operations in Syria are not solely tactical military manoeuvres; they are deeply rooted in historical, religious, and ideological considerations. The concept of the “Promised Land” plays a fundamental role in shaping Israel’s national identity and foreign policy objectives. The Golan Heights holds particular religious and strategic significance for Israel, with references to the region as “Bashan” in Jewish sacred texts being used to legitimise Israeli policies in the area. From a security standpoint, the Golan Heights is indispensable to Israel’s national defence strategy, as its elevation offers a commanding vantage point over the surrounding region. Israel’s security concerns and expansionist policies extend beyond Palestine, impacting the wider region, including Syria, Lebanon, and Türkiye. Against this backdrop, Israel’s interventions in Syria reflect a strategy driven by a confluence of historical, religious, and security imperatives.
Beneath Israel’s expansionist agenda lies not only the theological aspiration of the “Promised Land” but also broader strategic objectives linked to its regional ambitions. Central to this vision is the so-called “David Corridor,” a strategic concept underpinning Israel’s long-term regional strategy. The plan for the David Corridor is said to have influenced Israel’s policies and military actions since its inception. Corridor, as a broader geostrategic ambition, underscores Israel’s long-term interest in maintaining dominance over this vital route, which could serve both logistical and strategic military purposes.[3] Control over the Golan Heights is, in this context, a flashpoint of contention between Israel and Syria. While Israel annexed the Golan in 1981, the international community continues to recognise it as Syrian territory. The David corridor, which stretches from the Golan Heights through Suwayda and Deir ez-Zor, eventually reaches Iraq. It is envisioned as a route extending through Iraq, Syria, and Jordan to the Mediterranean Sea.
Israel plans to execute its strategy not through the direct deployment of its own soldiers, but rather by employing terrorist organisations such as the YPG/PYD and PKK. In this context, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar declared on 10 November 2024 that the Kurds are “natural allies” of Israel and that Israel should strengthen its ties with them. Saar, commenting on regional policies, asserted that “the minorities in the region must unite. Kurds are victims of the oppressive policies of Iran and Türkiye. Israel needs to strengthen its relations with these groups by increasing its communication with them.” Saar also referenced the Druze in Lebanon and Syria, remarking, “We are a minority community in the region, so it is inevitable that we establish natural alliance relations with other minorities.”[4] His remarks imply a shared experience of persecution, suggesting that “we have been persecuted like the Kurds, we understand them very well, so we have to develop our relations with them and build an alliance.” However, the “Kurds” referenced in this narrative are, in practice, terrorist organisations such as the PKK, PYD, and YPG, with which Israel seeks to establish this strategic alliance.
The efforts of Türkiye, the Syrian National Army, and opposition forces to clear Syria of terrorist organisations have unsettled the YPG and PKK, compelling them to seek assistance from the United States and Israel. This unease has been particularly acute following the removal of YPG and PKK elements from Deir ez-Zor by the Syrian National Army and the opposition. This development has caused considerable disquiet for Israel, as Deir ez-Zor occupies a critical position in the broader framework of the “David Slingshot” (also named as “David Wall”) strategy, which envisions the establishment of a satellite state in the region. The military successes achieved by the Syrian National Army and opposition forces, with Türkiye’s support, have delivered a significant setback to Israel’s strategic designs. Consequently, Israel and influential pro-Israel lobbies in the United States have intensified pressure to impose economic and diplomatic sanctions on Türkiye’s regional manoeuvres.
Evidently, Israel’s regional strategy is a multidimensional policy aimed at more than neutralising threats from Iran; it also seeks to counterbalance Türkiye’s expanding influence in the Middle East. The completion of the David Corridor would confer critical military and economic advantages upon Israel. This strategic route, extending from the Golan Heights to Iraq, would not only mitigate Israel’s security concerns but also bolster its capacity to control vital energy and trade routes by ensuring access to the Eastern Mediterranean. Such access would facilitate the consolidation of Israel’s regional power and enhance its control over energy resources.
Thus, the matter at hand is not limited to the so-called “Bashan Arrow Region” carved out within Syria. It also encompasses the broader aim of constructing a sustainable geopolitical corridor under the David Corridor framework. This corridor, which stretches from Iraq’s Sulaymaniyah through Syria to Israel and opens to the Mediterranean Sea, is envisioned by Neocon Atlanticist and Zionist circles as a means to secure control over vital economic and strategic assets. The successful establishment of this project would place energy resources, oil and natural gas pipelines, trade routes, and access to the Mediterranean firmly in the hands of Israel and the United States. Simultaneously, Türkiye would be effectively isolated from the Middle East by the erection of a geopolitical wall along its border. Furthermore, Türkiye and Iran would be encircled and rendered neutral, with Syria’s internal fault lines exploited to provoke large-scale conflicts both within Syria and across the broader region. Such destabilisation would serve to sustain the presence and influence of the United States and Israel in the region. Central to this strategy is the YPG/PKK terrorist organisation, whose role is pivotal in advancing these objectives. It follows, therefore, that the removal of such groups from this scenario is imperative. For over 40 years, Türkiye has waged an arduous struggle against terrorism. Tens of thousands of the Mehmetçik (Turkish soldiers) have been martyred, and trillions of dollars have been expended in the fight against terrorism. At this juncture, Türkiye’s struggle will either culminate in decisive victory or be thwarted by the alliance between the United States and Israel. From this point forward, the course of action hinges upon the decisions made by the Republic of Türkiye and the valiant actions of the heroic Turkish Army.
May their path be clear, and may no stone touch their feet…
[1] Süheyla Demir, “İsrail’in Suriye’ye Saldırısının Perde Arkası Ortaya Çıktı! Netanyahu’nun Hayali Suya Düştü”, Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eVyrrShAGcs, (Retrievedi: 13.11.2024).
[2] “İsrail, 2024’te Suriye’deki İran destekli gruplara en az 43 hava saldırısı düzenledi”, Anadolu Haber Ajansı, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/israil-2024te-suriyedeki-iran-destekli-gruplara-en-az-43-hava-saldirisiduzenledi/33272 09, (Retrieved: 12.11.2024).
[3] Map of the David Corridor; News Global, Image taken from the video titled “Israil’in Suriye’ye Saldırısının Perde Arkası Ortaya Çıktı! Netanyahu’nun Hayali Suya Düştü”. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eVyrrShAGcs, (Retrieved: 10.11.2024).
[4] “İsrail’den Kürtlere ittifak çağrısı: “Onlar bizim doğal müttefikimiz”, Medyascope, https://medyascope.tv/2024/11/11/israilden-kurtlere-ittifak-cagrisi-onlar-bizim-dogal-muttefikimiz/, (Retrieved: 11.11.2024).
