Since its inception, the Russia-Ukraine War has been shaped as a conflict that is not only limited to the borders of the two countries, but has also deeply affected international balances. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s strategic moves towards Ukraine have reverberated not only on the military front but also on the diplomatic and economic fronts. In this process, Moscow’s policies to turn the course of the war in its favor played a critical role in Russia’s domestic politics and international relations. In particular, the clashes in the Kursk region and the strategic moves towards this region revealed Russia’s tendency to take more cautious and calculated steps instead of a large-scale military mobilization.
A small group arguing for a complete Russian victory in Ukraine supported the annexation of large areas of Ukraine or the establishment of a pro-Russian administration in Kiev. The vast majority, however, want an early ceasefire to end the war along the existing front lines and believe that the Ukrainian Army will not be able to cross them.
According to common wisdom, Ukraine’s military offensive against the Russian Kursk region has not caused any significant change in Russia’s strategic calculations and perspectives. This is understandable, especially as Russian military forces continue to make significant advances in the east[i], i.e. in the Donbas region, approaching strategically important towns such as Pokrovsk.
The intervention in Kursk was seen as a serious loss of prestige for the Putin administration. It demonstrated a weakening of confidence in Putin’s military leadership, but a recognition of his economic successes in resisting Western sanctions. Putin’s response to the Kursk Crisis was to blame the West, putting the responsibility on his subordinates and establishing a volunteer unit called “BARS-Kursk” to ensure security in the region.[ii]
It was stated that Russia is aiming to realize some initiatives on the East-West axis to bring peace in the region. It was reported that some institutional sectors in Russia are seriously considering the difficult question of how to secure a peace agreement with Ukraine without official Western military guarantees and supplies. In this context, the idea of a peace treaty to be ratified by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and BRICS, as well as the creation of large demilitarized zones to be secured by a UN force, were among the most intensively discussed proposals.
The effort to achieve a peace agreement through international organizations such as the UNSC and BRICS under the name of “Peace Treaty and Demilitarized Zones” or an alternative name could be considered a realistic diplomatic solution. However, this requires the parties to sit down at the negotiating table and reach a compromise. Such an agreement is possible within the framework of the current international relations dynamics.
A Russian security expert assessed the situation as follows: “Ukraine’s attack on Kursk may have the potential to give them more favorable terms in negotiations. But it cannot be characterized as a real victory…They will have to withdraw from Kursk sooner or later, but our withdrawal from Crimea and Donbas is out of the question,” the expert said, emphasizing Russia’s determination in these regions.[iii]
As mentioned earlier, the Ukrainian intervention in Kursk was seen as a serious loss of prestige for the Putin administration. It was seen as the latest in a series of Russian military operations that began with poor planning and continued with a series of failures. Respect for Russian President Vladimir Putin as a military leader has been limited, especially among the Russian elite. However, his economic achievements in resisting Western sanctions and adapting Russian industry to war conditions were more widely recognized.
Six days after his first intervention in the Kursk Crisis, Putin took charge of the situation, blaming the West and putting the responsibility on his subordinates, and ordered an extra 15,000 rubles (145 euros) in compensation for those who had to withdraw from Kursk. This did not provoke a negative reaction from the local population; on the contrary, many Kursk residents continued to see Putin not as the source of their problems, but as the key to their solution.
Underlying this attitude was a belief that a massive new wave of conscription and mobilization would be needed for Russia to achieve a complete victory. However, taking such a step could potentially trigger a large-scale popular resistance of the kind currently seen in Ukraine. It will be recalled that in the past the Russian government has avoided recruiting people from big cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg and has tried to balance the balance by paying high salaries to soldiers from poorer regions.[iv]
Some have argued that it is not possible for Russia to withdraw[v] from the four Ukrainian regions it claims to have annexed, but that some territories, such as Kharkiv, could be returned in exchange for Ukraine’s disarmament. This approach could solidify the ceasefire and allow Putin to claim that he has secured Russian regions. On the other hand, some more optimistic Russians have suggested that territory in Kharkiv could be exchanged for territory in four Ukrainian regions that are not yet fully under control.
Despite the current economic sanctions, Russia will be able to sustain its war economy with support from countries such as China, Iran and North Korea. However, China’s focus on the European market and potentially changing political attitudes and dynamics in Iran make the sustainability of this support uncertain. It is likely that China will not continue to procure from Russian energy companies at the same level as it did in the early years of the Russian-Ukrainian War.
Although Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has created the image that “the Zelenski administration is getting stronger”, the West’s support and war of attrition are undoubtedly behind these successes. The West’s new military aid to Ukraine was thought to be aimed at blocking Russia’s advances and bringing Russia to the negotiating table.
With the prolongation of the war in Ukraine, Russia has entered a “vicious circle” on both the internal and external fronts. Putin’s focus on volunteer troops and limited military actions, avoiding large-scale military mobilization, has made it increasingly difficult for Russia to sustain the war. As the pressure on Moscow has increased due to economic sanctions, the strategy of weakening Western support has not yielded the expected results. This has created a stalemate in which Russia is struggling to achieve its strategic objectives and may face greater challenges in the long run.
In addition, the protracted nature of the war over so many years, coupled with a protracted stalemate, led the West to push Ukraine to negotiations. However, such negotiations may require Ukraine to give up some of its territory. This could lead to massive domestic resistance, turmoil and even the possibility of a Zelenski administration that could be toppled.
At the same time, Putin could pursue a long-term strategy to reduce Western, especially US, support for Ukraine. Rather than a direct and large-scale military response, this strategy could aim to question the West’s support for Ukraine through careful diplomatic steps in the international arena. This approach could be based on both the energy, intra-EU turmoil and economic crisis in the West, as well as the expectation that domestic political developments, such as the 2024 US elections, could weaken support for Ukraine. This strategy can be seen as a diplomatic maneuver aimed at weakening the West’s commitment to Ukraine due to domestic political pressures. This could be seen as a way for Russia to turn the conflict to its advantage in the long run.
[i] James Holmes, “The Greats Agree: Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive Is Strategic Malpractice”, The National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/greats-agree-ukraines-kursk-offensive-strategic-malpractice-212455, (Date of access: 31.08.2024).
[ii] Aleksey Smirnov, “Provol Soveshchaniye s Chlenami Pravitelstva Kurskoy Oblasti i Glavami Rayonov, Gde Obsudili Sozdaniye Dobrovolcheskogo Otryada «BARS-Kursk»”, Telegram, https://t.me/gubernator_46/8169, (Date of access: 31.08.2024).
[iii] Anatol Lieven, “How the Russian Establishment Really Sees the War Ending”, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/27/russia-establishment-ukraine-war-end-ceasefire/, (Date of access: 31.08.2024).
[iv] Isabelle Khurshudyan ve Kostiantyn Khudov, “As Mobilization Rules Kick in, Some Ukrainian Men Pay to Flee, Dodging Draft”, The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/07/17/ukraine-mobilization-draft-dodgers-russia/, (Date of access: 31.08.2024).
[v] “West condemns Russia’s ‘illegal’ annexation of Ukraine provinces”, Aljazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/30/west-condemns-russia-illegal-annexation-of-ukrainian-provinces, (Date of access: 31.08.2024).
