Analysis

Russia’s Changing Nuclear Doctrine

Russia remains hopeful for a resolution under a Trump administration.
Russian officials, particularly Medvedev, have intensified their rhetoric in recent months.
On November 19, 2024, the 1000th day of the Russia-Ukraine War, Russia amended its nuclear doctrine.

Paylaş

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The New Cold War, initiated by the United States’ (US) withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, reached a more perilous stage with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2021. This escalation has prompted discussions among politicians, academics, media outlets, and commentators about the rapid approach toward a potential Third World War. Since the Cold War—and perhaps even since World War II—the likelihood of such a catastrophic conflict has never seemed more significant. The concept of nuclear deterrence is losing its relevance, and the belief that nuclear weapons could prevent global war diminishes with each passing day.

Both the US and Russia have intensified their efforts in nuclear armament. On March 1, 2018, Russia unveiled its new-generation nuclear weapons, accusing the US of instigating a nuclear arms race. Russia asserted that these advanced systems were developed in response to the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002 and the deployment of missile defense systems on US soil and near Russia’s borders.[1]

Just before its invasion of Ukraine, Russia enacted the “Basic Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence”[2] on June 8, 2020. This document emphasized the role of nuclear weapons as a deterrent and outlined the circumstances under which Russia might use them:

  • Reliable information of a ballistic missile launch targeting Russia or its allies.
  • An attack on Russia or its allies involving nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction.
  • An attack on critical Russian government or military facilities that undermines the nuclear response capability.
  • A conventional military attack on Russia that jeopardizes the survival of the state.

These principles were frequently reiterated by Russian officials throughout the Ukraine War. They warned, explicitly or implicitly, that Russia would use nuclear weapons if the West intervened in the conflict. Early in the war, on February 24, 2022, President Vladimir Putin cited US and NATO activities as threats to Russia’s national existence, indirectly referencing[3] one of the outlined conditions for nuclear weapon use. Subsequently, on February 27, 2022, Putin ordered an elevated alert status for Russia’s nuclear forces.[4] Within two months of the invasion, Russia tested the SARMAT (SATAN) missile, its most powerful new-generation nuclear weapon.[5]

On March 22, 2022, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov warned in an interview with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour that Russia might use nuclear weapons if its existence were threatened, referencing the 2020 policy document.[6] Over time, Russia’s rhetoric grew harsher, openly threatening states supporting Ukraine. For instance, Russian state media highlighted that the SARMAT missile could strike London within two minutes, effectively erasing the United Kingdom from the map.[7] Additionally, Russian media implied that one SARMAT missile could obliterate a region the size of Texas or all of France, signaling threats toward the US and France.[8]

Recently, Russian officials, particularly Dmitry Medvedev, have escalated the tone of these threats. For example, following the announcement of referendums in the Donbass region to join Russia, Putin declared a partial mobilization and accused the West of nuclear blackmail. He asserted that Russia would use all available means, including nuclear weapons, to defend its territorial integrity, explicitly stating that this was not a bluff.[9]

As Russia intensified its nuclear threats, Western support for Ukraine increased, testing the thresholds Russia considers its nuclear deterrence limits. The former Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, Czech General Pavel, described hybrid warfare as actions just below the threshold for invoking NATO’s Article 5. Western actions appear to approach the brink of nuclear conflict. Notably, the Biden administration, which will leave office in January 2025, approved Ukraine’s use of US-supplied ATACMS missiles against Russia. The United Kingdom supplied Storm Shadow missiles, which Ukraine soon used to attack Russian territory.[10]

Amid these developments, on November 19, 2024, the 1000th day of the Russia-Ukraine War, Russia revised its nuclear doctrine. The new policy lowered the threshold for nuclear weapon use, allowing for a nuclear response if a country attacked Russian territory with the support of another nuclear-armed state.[11] It also expanded the scope to include attacks by drones or warplanes. Additionally, an attack on Russia by a “member of an alliance” would warrant a nuclear response, with all member states of the attacking alliance considered parties to the conflict.[12]

Putin, while announcing the new doctrine, stated, “The aggression of a non-nuclear country, supported or joined by a nuclear-armed state, will be considered a joint attack.” Medvedev, interpreting the doctrine, remarked, “The use of NATO missiles against Russia could be deemed an attack by NATO members on Russia. This would justify retaliation with weapons of mass destruction against NATO elements, anywhere. This is Third World War.” Medvedev criticized the Biden administration for deliberately escalating tensions, adding provocatively, “Perhaps old Biden has decided to die gracefully, taking much of humanity with him.”

In 2009, Democratic President Barack Obama articulated a vision of a nuclear-free world. By 2024, Democratic President Joe Biden acknowledged that the world was closer to nuclear war than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis. Meanwhile, Republican President Donald Trump has promised to end the Russia-Ukraine War. Intriguingly, during his previous tenure, Trump refrained from renewing the New START treaty, the last nuclear arms control agreement between the US and Russia. Biden, in one of his administration’s early actions, extended this treaty. Now, as Biden authorizes the use of ATACMS in Ukraine, some speculate whether he is retaliating against the chaotic legacy of Trump’s withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Russia views the potential resolution of the war with optimism regarding a Trump presidency. However, the prospect of Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO and the European Union remains a red line for Russia, representing a security threat significant enough to warrant the use of nuclear weapons. This expansion, encapsulating Russia within NATO and EU boundaries, especially in sensitive regions like the Caucasus and the Black Sea, constitutes a perceived existential threat.

Given this perspective, Russia’s reliance on nuclear deterrence and overt nuclear threats appears logical. In comparing NATO and Russia’s military capacities, nuclear deterrence becomes Russia’s only viable strategy, particularly as its conventional forces face setbacks in Ukraine. For instance, the US allocated $816 billion to its military budget in 2023, while Russia’s defense budget stood at $109 billion. Putin candidly acknowledged this disparity, stating, “Nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantee of our state and citizens’ security.”

As the US, UK, and NATO test the limits of Russia’s modern weapons, some speculate whether these actions aim to assess Russia’s second-strike capabilities. Could the US be preparing to test its European Phased Adaptive Approach, with radar systems like those in Kürecik, Turkey? Are Western powers emboldened enough to risk escalating a nuclear confrontation?


[1] “News”, Kremlin, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/page/286, (Date Accession: 30.11.2024).

[2] “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence”, Archive Mid,

https://t.ly/N-LI0, (Date Accession: 30.11.2024).

[3] “Read the fine print: Russia’s nuclear weapon use policy”, The Bulletin, https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/read-the-fine-print-russias-nuclear-weapon-use-policy/, (Date Accession: 30.11.2024).

[4] “Putin signals escalation as he puts Russia’s nuclear force on high alert”, The Guardian,

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/27/vladimir-putin-puts-russia-nuclear-deterrence-forces-on-high-alert-ukraine, (Date Accession: 30.11.2024).

[5] “Rusya’nın nükleer silah kullanma ihtimali arttı mı?”, Habertürk, https://www.haberturk.com/son-dakika-rusya-nin-nukleer-silah-kullanma-ihtimali-artti-mi-3415838, (Date Accession: 30.11.2024).

[6] “Putin spokesman refuses to rule out use of nuclear weapons if Russia faced an ‘existential threat’”, CNN, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/22/europe/amanpour-peskov-interview-ukraine-intl/index.html, (Date Accession: 30.11.2024).

[7] “Putin confirms Sarmat ballistic missile deployment – how powerful is the ‘Satan 2’ rocket?”, Express, https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1628895/putin-sarmat-ballistic-missile-deployment-powerful-evg, (Date Accession: 30.11.2024).

[8] “Russia is planning to flight test new missile with a range of 6,200 miles and capable of destroying an area the size of France”, Daily Mail, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9110579/Russia-planning-flight-test-new-missile-capable-destroying-area-size-France.html, (Date Accession: 30.11.2024).

[9] “Putin dras up to 300,000 reservists, backs annexation amid war losses”, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/21/putin-speech-annexation-ukraine-russia/, (Date Accession: 30.11.2024).

[10] “Ukraine fires UK-supplied Storm Shadow missiles at Russia for first time”, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4g704g051go, (Date Accession: 30.11.2024).

[11] “Rusya harekete geçirdi: NATO’dan olağanüstü toplantı kararı”, NTV, https://www.ntv.com.tr/dunya/rusya-harekete-gecirdi-natodan-olaganustu-toplanti-karari,mEKrO_-BnEC_J2tI5GuF1w, (Date Accession: 30.11.2024).

[12] “Putin, Rusya’nın yeni nükleer doktrinini onayladı: Nükleer silah kullanım koşulları genişliyor”, BBC,

https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/cn0egdwgnj1o, (Date Accession: 30.11.2024).

Prof. Dr. Şafak OĞUZ
Prof. Dr. Şafak OĞUZ
In 2019, Şafak OĞUZ received his Associate Professor title and retired in 2021 after 23 years of service in the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). Having worked for the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during his service, OĞUZ works on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Terrorism, International Security, International Organizations and Peace and Conflict Studies. OĞUZ is currently a faculty member at Cappadocia University, Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences, Department of International Relations. He is fluent in English and German.

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