Analysis

Russia’s Military Modernization: An Arms Race Against the West

Russia’s experiences in the Ukraine War enhance its potential to establish a new balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region through hypersonic weapons and nuclear submarines.
Record increases in defense budgets and modernization efforts highlight Moscow’s attempts to strengthen its position of strategic deterrence against NATO.
Russia’s reorientation of its defense industry toward an Asia-Pacific-centered power balance could accelerate the arms race in the region.

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The Russia-Ukraine War, which began on February 24, 2022, has evolved into a struggle reshaping Russia’s military power and strategic approach as it approaches its third year. By 2025, marking its third anniversary, this war has become not only a battlefield challenge for Russia but also an effort to transform its military capacity to respond to modern threats and strengthen its position of strategic deterrence against the NATO. Record increases in defense budgets, nuclear capability modernization, and attempts to expand regional military presence indicate Moscow’s efforts to shift the balance of power in its favor both on the battlefield and in the international arena.

However, economic sanctions, personnel shortages, and logistical challenges have constrained this transformation process, making Russia’s pursuit of its strategic objectives more complex. A report published by the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) provides a detailed analysis of these transformations, offering a broad perspective on Russia’s tactical adjustments necessitated by the war and its long-term deterrence strategies.

In November 2024, IFRI released a report by Yury Fedorov titled “The Personnel Structure of the Russian Army Two and a Half Years into the War in Ukraine”, which comprehensively analyzed the changes in Russia’s military structure, modernization efforts, and challenges encountered during the Ukraine War. Notably, Russia’s military reforms have not been limited to sustaining operations in Ukraine but have also aimed at enhancing its strategic deterrence against NATO.[1]

In the first year of the war, Russia adopted a military structure suited for short-term conflicts; however, as the war prolonged, it reorganized this structure to sustain long-term and large-scale conflict. The report highlights that the total number of military personnel is planned to increase by 50%, reaching 1.5 million, with motorized rifle and artillery brigades being transformed into larger military units. Additionally, strategic measures such as establishing a new corps along the Finnish border have been implemented. However, as the report indicates, structural issues such as personnel losses, a shortage of officers, and insufficient training durations have complicated the realization of these goals. Despite recruiting 30,000 new soldiers monthly, this number has proven insufficient to offset the losses incurred during the war. This situation has impacted not only Russia’s efforts to maintain effectiveness on the battlefield but also its position in the ongoing strategic rivalry with NATO.

Russia’s military modernization efforts have not been limited to conventional military power but have also included a focus on enhancing its nuclear capabilities. As of 2024, Russia has established a significant deterrent capacity against NATO and the United States with 1,710 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and between 1,000 and 2,000 non-strategic warheads. The SS-X-29 (Sarmat) and SS-27 Mod 2 (Yars) intercontinental ballistic missiles, along with Dolgorukiy-class ballistic missile submarines, form part of a strategy aimed at overcoming U.S. missile defense systems and ensuring retaliation capabilities after a first strike. Furthermore, the development of innovative technologies such as hypersonic glide vehicles and nuclear-powered cruise missiles has increased the flexibility of Russia’s nuclear doctrine. This doctrine extends beyond responding to a nuclear attack, encompassing operations against regional threats like Belarus and Ukraine. These modernization programs have profoundly affected both regional and global security dynamics.[2]

In 2024, Russia’s defense budget increased by 70%, reaching $157 billion, with projections indicating a further 25% increase by 2025. This growth underscores the significant reliance of Russia’s economic development on its defense industry. In the first half of 2023, the defense sector contributed 40% to the country’s economic growth, becoming the highest-performing sector. However, profitability issues in the defense industry have emerged due to sanctions and high interest rates exceeding 20%. It is anticipated that many defense companies will be unable to sustain operations without government support. These economic challenges have constrained Russia’s efforts to expand its defense industry but have not halted these endeavors.[3]

Despite economic challenges, Russia has supported its strategy of increasing military capacity with efforts to expand its regional influence. According to the TASS agency, known for its close ties to the Russian government, the most notable military innovations of 2024 include the medium-range ballistic missile “Oreshnik” and the high-powered aerial bomb FAB-3000. The first public mention of Oreshnik occurred on November 21, 2024, when the missile reached a military factory in Ukraine’s Dnipro region. Although this test launch did not involve a warhead, it heightened Western concerns about the missile’s perceived “unstoppable” nature. President Vladimir Putin’s call for a “technological duel” with NATO further demonstrated Russia’s confidence in the effectiveness of these systems. The FAB-3000, equipped with precision modules, has been deployed for operations targeting strategic points such as command centers and drone control stations. For instance, one attack reportedly neutralized 50 drone operators.[4]

These comprehensive military modernization efforts by Russia have not only shaped the course of the war in Ukraine but also played a decisive role in its strategic competition with NATO. Russia’s initiatives to enhance military deterrence at both regional and global levels have prompted NATO to reassess its defense policies and strategic balances. While NATO aims to increase its defense capacity to counter these new threats, the EU has taken steps to strengthen its defense industry. In 2023, the EU enacted the “Ammunition Production Support Act” to meet Ukraine’s wartime needs; however, this initiative was not fully successful in 2024. The EU’s plan to reach an annual production capacity of 2 million munitions by 2025 indicates that regional military strategies are increasingly oriented toward long-term objectives. Meanwhile, Ukraine invested €7 billion in its defense industry in 2023, aiming to triple this budget by 2025. These initiatives have been considered critical steps in countering Russia’s growing military capacity.

Within the framework of the anticipated conciliatory policy of the Trump administration, Russia is projected to elevate its military development to a new phase. This policy approach, offering a less confrontational ground compared to the Biden era, could facilitate Moscow’s transfer of experiences gained from the Ukraine War to the Asia-Pacific region. In this context, Russia is expected to further promote new weapons programs based on advanced capabilities such as hypersonic missile technology, unmanned aerial vehicles, and advanced air defense systems. Increased defense cooperation with regional actors like China and India could support the proliferation of these weapon systems. Particularly in the Asia-Pacific, Russia is likely to continue developing nuclear submarines and long-range missile platforms, intensifying the competition for naval and aerial supremacy in the region. This shift could prompt NATO to redirect its current focus from Europe to the Asia-Pacific, paving the way for a global strategic transformation.

Nevertheless, Russia’s reorientation of its defense industry toward an Asia-Pacific-centered balance of power could accelerate the regional arms race. Moscow is expected to enhance technology sharing with Beijing and deepen new defense partnerships within the frameworks of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or BRICS. In this process, efforts to make Russia’s military-industrial complex a more influential actor in the global market are anticipated. However, these initiatives are expected to cause concern in the West, compelling NATO countries to allocate both economic and military resources to the Asia-Pacific. Russia’s strategic moves hold the potential not only to complicate the race for military superiority but also to intensify U.S.-China competition. In this regard, it is likely that Moscow will leverage the anticipated conciliatory policy to reshape its defense infrastructure within a broader strategic framework.


[1] Yury Fedorov, Russian Military Manpower After Two and a Half Years of War in Ukraine, IFRI Studies, no. 48, November 2024, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/2024-11/ifri_fedorov_russian_military_manpower_rer48_nov2024.pdf, (Access Date: 25.12.2024).

[2] “Report to Congress on Russia’s Nuclear Weapons”, USNI News, https://news.usni.org/2024/12/04/report-to-congress-on-russias-nuclear-weapons-2, (Access Date: 25.12.2024).

[3] John T Psaropoulos, “Russia races ahead of NATO in weapons production for Ukraine war: SIPRI”, AlJazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/2/russia-races-ahead-of-nato-in-weapons-production-for-ukraine-war-sipri, (Access Date: 25.12.2024).

[4] Anton Valagin, “TASS nazval samyye yarkiye voyennyye prem’yery 2024 goda”, Russiskaya Gazeta, https://rg.ru/2024/12/25/tass-nazval-samye-iarkie-voennye-premery-2024-goda.html, (Access Date: 25.12.2024).

Ergün MAMEDOV
Ergün MAMEDOV
Ergün Mamedov completed his education in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Kütahya Dumlupınar University, from 2016 to 2020. In the same year, he was admitted to the thesis-based Master’s program in International Relations at the Institute of Postgraduate Education of Kütahya Dumlupınar University and successfully defended his thesis, graduating in 2022. He is currently continuing his education as a doctoral student in the Department of International Relations at the Institute of Postgraduate Education of Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, where he began his studies in 2022. A citizen of Georgia, Ergün Mamedov is proficient in Georgian, intermediate in English, and has a basic knowledge of Russian. His main areas of interest include contemporary diplomacy and political history, focusing on the South Caucasus and the Turkic world.

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