Since November 2023, Houthi attacks off the coast of Yemen, targeting Israeli-flagged or owned commercial vessels transiting the region and carrying cargo to Israeli ports, have had negative impacts on global maritime trade, such as increases in freight and insurance rates, as well as other negative impacts. The choice of major shipping/oil companies to access Europe from Asia via the Cape of Good Hope in southern Africa instead of the Suez route, which is the shortest route after the Arctic route, due to security risks, leads to delays in delivery time as well as cost and a corresponding increase in fuel and carbon emissions.[1] Furthermore, although there have been no casualties among the crew members of the attacked ships, it is considered that this situation could change if the attacks continue with such frequency.
The contribution of Operation Welfare Guard to preventing Houthi attacks by Operation Welfare Guard, which will be commanded by Combined Task Force 153 (CTF-153), which was established in 2022 under the leadership of the United States and whose mission was expanded to “focus on international maritime security and capacity-building efforts in the Red Sea, Bab el Mendeb, and Gulf of Aden”[2] and the number of participating countries was increased; will be limited due to the vastness of the region, the fact that the number of ships to conduct patrols will not be sufficient to shield all commercial vessels passing through the region against Houthi attacks, and the fact that the air defense capabilities of all of them are not as advanced as those of US ships. [3]
Regarding the matter, retired U.S. Admiral Stavridis, who commanded the European Allied Forces Joint Headquarters and led NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield against Somali piracy from 2009 to 2013, has mentioned four key elements for the Welfare Guardian Operation to prevent attacks in his statements to Bloomberg.
The first element he mentioned is to understand the underlying motivation behind the attacks, which he explained as “increasing pressure on Israel to benefit Iran by causing a rise in oil prices and preventing Western attacks on Gaza.” In this context, he noted that the approach of the U.S. and its allies is to conduct counter-attacks (offensive) against Houthi infrastructure using Tomahawk missiles, targeting land-based objectives. He also suggested using attack aircraft from the USS Eisenhower aircraft carrier patrolling the Gulf of Oman and, if that did not yield sufficient results, strikes against Iran’s infrastructure in the northern Indian Ocean and the Gulf, such as oil and gas platforms and ports.
Secondly, the Admiral stated that a fully integrated intelligence picture should be ensured and for this purpose, the task force command center at the headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet in Manama, Bahrain, which is considered to be the center of operations with the data collected through the use of drones in reconnaissance surveillance activities, should be fed, and thirdly, he emphasized the importance of working to expand the circle of US allies and partners, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Fourthly, considering that the targets are primarily commercial shipping, the Admiral has emphasized the importance of the United States coordinating more comprehensively with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and shipping companies to deploy armed private security personnel on ships. Finally, the Admiral noted that the Guardians of Welfare Operation is a step in the right direction, utilizing lessons from the fight against piracy in Somalia and updating them in the context of new threats.[4]
However, it should be noted that there are some other considerations to take into account. Firstly, the difference between piracy attacks, which were most prevalent off the coast of Somalia between 2008 and 2011, and Houthi attacks lies in the fact that the former were driven by financial gain, while the latter has political objectives. Deterring groups motivated by political goals is much more challenging than deterring pirates driven by monetary incentives. The Houthis’ main goal is to disrupt global maritime trade by attacking as many ships as possible that will sail from the Babel Mandep strait through the Red Sea via the Red Sea to the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal, and to increase pressure on Israel to stop its attacks on Palestine, and such attacks can be expected to continue as long as the Houthis continue to receive arms support from Iran.
Another aspect is that this situation is considered to be unfavorable news for the Pacific front, as it will represent a new crisis and deployment area for the U.S. Navy.[5] The US’s insistent request to Australia for ships to be deployed in the region is considered to be the result of its unwillingness to weaken its hand in the Pacific. While naval elements of participating countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France have advanced capabilities in terms of air defense systems against drones, ships from other naval forces may not have the same ability to stop drone attacks from long distances. This situation not only reduces the reaction time of the ships but also increases the risk they face. In addition, experts believe that the Allies lack experience in high-intensity maritime warfare and that it is not sustainable to intercept low-cost drones with million-dollar missiles.[6]
Finally, the expansion of the United States’ war, including Iran, is assessed not to be a preferred situation. This would undermine the peace between some Arab states and Israel, which has been achieved through the Ibrahim agreements, and the conflict has the potential to shift the balance in the Middle East to the West’s detriment.
[1] Gökçay Balcı, “How Red Sea attacks on cargo ships could disrupt deliveries and push up prices – a logistics expert explains”, The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/how-red-sea-attacks-on-cargo-ships-could-disrupt-deliveries-and-push-up-prices-a-logistics-expert-explains-220110?utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=bylinelinkedinbutton, (Date Accesion: 23.12.2023).
[2] Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), CTF 153: Red Sea Maritime Security, https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-153-red-sea-maritime-security/, (Date Accesion: 23.12.2023).
[3] Brad Lendon, “How US warships are shooting down Houthi drones in the Red Sea, and what might come next”, CNN, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/20/middleeast/us-destroyers-houthi-drones-red-sea-intl-hnk-ml/index.html, (Date Accesion: 23.12.2023).
[4] James Stavridis, “US-Led Naval Force Might Not End Houthi Ship Attacks”, Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-12-19/can-us-led-naval-force-protect-ships-oil-in-red-sea-persian-gulf, (Date Accesion: 23.12.2023).
[5] Cem Gürdeniz, “Yeni dünya düzeninde denizaltıların yeri”, Veryansıntv, https://www.veryansintv.com/yazar/cem-gurdeniz/kose-yazisi/yeni-dunya-duzeninde-denizaltilarin-yeri/, (Date Accesion: 23.12.2023).
[6] Gonzalo Vázquez, “NATO Must Be Ready for High-Intensity Naval Conflict”, CEPA, https://cepa.org/article/nato-must-be-ready-for-high-intensity-naval-conflict/, (Date Accesion: 23.12.2023).
