The radical pro-Western orientation that became evident in Armenia’s foreign policy after 2020 is directly linked to the disruptions within the global security system. The rupture in transatlantic relations during the Trump era weakened the deterrent identity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while initiatives such as the European Defence Force -championed by France- paved the way for discussions on alternative security structures. In this context, Armenia shifted towards a Western-oriented foreign policy line following the Second Karabakh War in 2020, and attempted, at the level of discourse, to align with Western norms through transformations resembling the dynamics of color revolutions. However, the disintegration of NATO’s unity and the lack of strategic coherence within the European security concept undermined trust in the West in the South Caucasus. Within this environment, the Armenia–United States Strategic Partnership Charter, signed with the Biden administration on January 14, 2025, was suspended shortly thereafter, prompting the Yerevan administration to seek a more cautious, multipolar, and regionally balanced foreign policy.
One of the first concrete reflections of this foreign policy shift was the agreement reached in March 2025 between Armenia and Azerbaijan on a comprehensive peace treaty aimed at ending the Karabakh-centered conflict. Under the agreement, Armenia officially renounced its so-called historical sovereignty claims over Karabakh; consensus was also reached on matters such as the non-deployment of third-party troops in the border region and the withdrawal of international lawsuits.[1] On the other hand, Azerbaijan demanded constitutional-level changes from Armenia, bringing the possibility of a referendum onto the agenda. This process also indicated a growing strategic distance between Yerevan and Moscow.
Immediately following this development, on March 14, 2025, a phone conversation was held between Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Russian President Vladimir Putin at the request of Yerevan. During the call, Pashinyan conveyed that the text of the peace agreement was ready and that Armenia was prepared to sign. Putin, for his part, stated that Russia prioritizes peace, security, and development in the South Caucasus, emphasizing that both countries could rely on Moscow during this process.[2] Furthermore, Putin’s invitation to attend the 80th anniversary celebration of Victory Day on May 9 in Moscow was accepted by Pashinyan. This meeting indicates that Armenia is attempting to pursue a cautious and controlled policy of renewed rapprochement with Russia without completely severing ties.
Another development that reinforced these contacts was the meeting held on March 20, 2025, in Moscow between Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Yurevich Galuzin and Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Mnatsakan Arutyunovich Safaryan. These talks addressed issues of politics, security, economy, culture, and regional cooperation. Galuzin emphasized the need to deepen partnerships within Eurasian integration structures in light of the changing international conjuncture.[3] In particular, regional cooperation opportunities in the “3+3” format (involving Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, Iran, and Russia) were discussed, and an agreement was reached on maintaining dialogue between the foreign ministries. This diplomatic effort demonstrates that Armenia’s pursuit of a balanced platform for renewed engagement with Russia continues.
However, these tendencies of the Yerevan administration do not imply a complete alignment with Russia-centered security structures. On March 25, 2025, Parliament Speaker Alen Simonyan firmly rejected the possibility of returning to the “Azerbaijan-Armenia-Russia” trilateral format in a public statement and emphasized that the preference was for direct diplomatic dialogue with Baku.[4] Simonyan also criticized the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), stating, “There is nothing for us to reconsider; rather, the CSTO itself must engage in self-reflection,” thereby highlighting the organization’s ineffectiveness.[5] In the same statement, allegations that cooperation with Russia had been revived at the instruction of Prime Minister Pashinyan were denied, and it was emphasized that Armenia continues to protect its sovereignty and remains sensitive to unresolved issues from the 2021–2024 period.
In the European dimension of the Westward orientation, Deputy Foreign Minister of Armenia Paruyr Hovhannisyan shared details regarding ongoing engagements with the European Union (EU). Hovhannisyan noted that the withdrawal of the EU observation mission from the border line was under consideration, but civil cooperation with the EU would continue following the peace agreement.[6] It was also announced that a new round of visa liberalization negotiations with the EU would be held between April 7–11, 2025.
The domestic political reflection of this foreign policy transformation became evident with Prime Minister Pashinyan’s announcement that a constitutional referendum would be held in 2027. In the draft of the new constitution, it is planned to remove historical claims related to Karabakh as well as references to the Declaration of Independence. This indicates that normalization with Azerbaijan is intended not merely as a temporary step but as a constitutionally permanent arrangement.[7] The new constitutional structure being built around the discourse of the “Real Armenia” is considered both an effort to overcome the domestic legitimacy crisis and a component of a more pragmatic orientation in foreign policy.
Alongside all these political and diplomatic steps, Armenia has also established new Western-oriented partnerships in the field of security. As of March 2025, Armenia has significantly increased its military capacity through the acquisition of advanced defense technologies such as Bastion armored vehicles, Caesar howitzers, Pinaka multiple rocket launcher systems, Akash air defense systems, and Swathi radars, primarily from France and India.[8] These procurements are reported to serve not only defensive purposes but also preparations for a potential conflict.
As a complement to this process, a delegation from Armenia conducted a two-day visit to India’s elite Shatrujeet Brigade. During this engagement, information was exchanged on advanced military tactics, modern defense technologies, and operational readiness; mutual political will was expressed toward institutionalizing strategic cooperation in the field of defense.[9]
Armenia’s evolution from a radically pro-Western stance in foreign policy toward a more rational and balancing approach is set to directly shape both the prospects for regional conflicts and the impact of great power competition in the South Caucasus in the coming period. In this context, Armenia’s continuation of relations with key actors such as France and Belgium without severing ties with the EU, while simultaneously moving towards a cautious rapprochement with Moscow in response to the growing systemic risk posed by China and the divergence of the United States from the EU, demonstrates the adoption of a multi-directional yet cautious foreign policy strategy. This pursuit of strategic balance is aimed not only at managing relations between major powers but also at establishing peace-oriented relations with neighboring countries. However, without the realization of the constitutional referendum planned for 2027, the signing of a final and lasting peace agreement on the Karabakh issue appears highly unlikely within the Armenian legal framework. Therefore, the temporary agreements between the parties rest on fragile grounds of limited consensus that could collapse at any moment.
The area where this fragility is most clearly observed is military preparedness. The defense systems acquired by Armenia from France and India following the Second Karabakh War are intended not only for deterrence but also as preparation for limited-scale conflict. In the Azerbaijani media, this situation is interpreted as a sign of a “possible final armed encounter,” with increasing concern that, particularly during the peace process, the risk of renewed conflict could rise due to an unexpected provocation or the involvement of regional external actors. In this context, Azerbaijan’s enhancement of its strategic cooperation with Israel and the temporary tolerance of this alignment by the United States has brought to the agenda the potential model of an “Israel-Azerbaijan-U.S. trilateral alliance.” Such an alliance could receive tacit approval from the West, both as a means of limiting Iranian influence and as a way of ensuring that Russia maintains its effectiveness in the South Caucasus despite possible failures on the Ukrainian front. In such a scenario, the U.S. could continue its presence in the region through Israel, while Russia might attempt to preserve its regional prestige through diplomatic channels.
In this multi-actor balance environment, the positions of Turkey and Georgia will be decisive. Both countries have refrained from adopting overtly radical positions against Russia and have maintained balanced relations with both Azerbaijan and Armenia, thereby narrowing Yerevan’s maneuvering space. Turkey’s peaceful initiatives, its soft power practices conducted through economic diplomacy, and its willingness to continue its mediating role along the Baku-Yerevan axis have prevented Armenia from drifting into a one-sided foreign policy orientation. At the same time, Georgia’s domestic political situation and its multi-vector foreign policy approach have pushed Armenia toward a more moderate and realistic path out of fear of regional isolation. This situation demonstrates that Armenia is now beginning to favor a flexible balance policy based on pragmatic interests rather than radical blocs, aiming to develop a new regional vision that maintains ties with the West while also taking into account mutual interdependence with Russia.
[1] “Armenia, Azerbaijan Announce Agreement to Sign Peace Deal”, France24, https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20250314-armenia-azerbaijan-announce-agreement-to-sign-peace-deal, (Access Date: 25.03.2025).
[2] “Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan”, Presiden of Russia, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76457, (Access Date: 25.03.2025).
[3] “O Konsultatsiyakh Zamestitelya Ministra İnostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii M.YU.Galuzina i Zamestitelya Ministra İnostrannykh del Respubliki Armeniya M.A.Safaryana”, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2004219, (Access Date: 25.03.2025).
[4] “Yerevan ne Vernetsya v Format s Moskvoy i Baku po Razblokirovaniyu Kommunikatsiy”, TASS, https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23492681, (Access Date: 25.03.2025).
[5] “Armeniya ne Budet Peresmatrivat Svoyu Pozitsiyu v Otnoshenii ODKB”, TASS, https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23492123, (Access Date: 25.03.2025).
[6] “Yerevan Sobirayetsya Sotrudnichat s Grazhdanskoy Missiyey YES i Posle Podpisaniya Mirnogo Dogovora s Baku”, Report, https://report.az/ru/v-regione/erevan-sobiraetsya-sotrudnichat-s-grazhdanskoj-missiej-es-i-posle-podpisaniya-mirnogo-dogovora-s-baku, (Access Date: 25.03.2025).
[7] Anton Demidov, “Pashinyan Nazval Srok Provedeniya Golosovaniya po Prinyatiyu Novoy Konstitutsii Armenii”, Gazeta, https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2025/03/21/25367684.shtml, (Access Date: 25.03.2025).
[8] “Armeniya Aktivno Gotovitsya k Voyne s Azerbaydzhanom: Novyye Fakty”, Caliber, https://caliber.az/post/armeniya-aktivno-gotovitsya-k-vojne-s-azerbajdzhanom-novye-fakty, (Access Date: 25.03.2025).
[9] “Armenia and India Strengthen Defence Ties Through Military Exchange Visit”, SSBCrack, https://ssbcrackexams.com/armenia-and-india-strengthen-defence-ties-through-military-exchange-visit, (Access Date: 25.03.2025).
