The February 24, 2022 Russia-Ukraine War led to the isolation of the Moscow regime from the international community, and both the United States of America (USA) and the European Union (EU) countries imposed various sanctions with the aim of crippling the Russian economy. In this process, the energy sector, Russia’s most important source of income, was particularly targeted. The EU countries have moved towards eliminating their dependence on Russia for natural gas and have implemented price ceilings for oil. At this point, Moscow’s closest ally is China, which claims to compete with the US-centered international order.
Although Beijing has maintained its neutrality from the beginning of the war, experts characterize China’s position as a “neutrality close to Russia”. US officials have even suggested that China is preparing to supply arms to Russia.[1] Nevertheless, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the war, on February 24, 2023, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement expressing its willingness to mediate between Moscow and Kiev Indeed, in the first article of the declaration, Beijing emphasized the need to respect the territorial integrity of states.[2]
Following this declaration, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Moscow on March 20-22, 2023. Two issues came to the fore during this visit. The first is China’s desire to mediate between Russia and Ukraine. In fact, this is the expectation of European actors, particularly France. The second issue has been the search for a multipolar world, which constitutes the basic dynamic of China-Russia relations. Already during his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Xi said, “Changes are taking place in the world that have not happened for 100 years. We will manage this change together.”[3]
Following Xi’s visit to Moscow, it was suggested that he might also visit Kiev, but no such visit has taken place yet. In addition, on April 26, 2023, Xi held an hour-long telephone conversation with Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky. Following the meeting, Zelenski posted the following on his official account on the social media site Twitter:[4]
“I had a long and meaningful phone call with President Xi Jinping. I believe that this call and the appointment of the Ukrainian Ambassador to China will give a strong impetus to the development of our bilateral relations.”
As it can be understood, the Shiite administration has been in contact with Russia on the one hand and Ukraine on the other and has been trying to mediate. Beijing considers it in its own interests to end the conflict as soon as possible. This is because the war is increasing the sense of solidarity in trans-Atlantic relations due to the perception of the Russian threat and is turning into an “open-ended” war of attrition.
However, Beijing-Moscow relations are not limited to the war in Ukraine and China’s mediation diplomacy in this context. The two countries have an allied relationship through structures such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. Indeed, the SCO and BRICS are the platforms that Beijing and Moscow have effectively used to articulate their desire for a multipolar world. There are also energy-based relations between the parties. This is because Russia’s main source of income is energy, while China is an energy-dependent country due to its advanced industry and dense population. Therefore, the energy factor also plays a decisive role in the relations between the parties. The two countries also cooperate in the field of defense-security through joint exercises.
Moreover, it is known that on February 4, 20 days before the start of the Russian-Ukrainian War, on February 4, 2022, Putin visited China to attend the opening ceremony of the Winter Olympics and signed a declaration of “unlimited friendship” during his meeting with Xi. At its most basic level, the declaration symbolizes a challenge to American hegemony.[5] Of course, one dimension of this objection is represented by the search for cooperation in the Asia-Pacific and Arctic geographies.
A recent development reflecting the search for cooperation between the two sides is the announcement by Kremlin spokesman Dmitri Peskov that Putin’s visit to Beijing is planned for July 12, 2023. “Of course, Putin’s visit to China is on the agenda. He will decide on the timing and we will inform the media when the exact date is set.”[6]
It should be noted that Putin’s visit was on the agenda during Xi’s visit to Moscow on March 20-22, 2023 and the Chinese President invited his Russian counterpart to Beijing. Undoubtedly, Xi’s visit to Russia and his invitation to Putin can be interpreted as China’s effort to show its alliance relations with Russia in the competition against the US leadership. It can also be stated that the parties want to increase coordination in international organizations, desire to advance military-security-based cooperation and seek to deepen energy cooperation. The Russian leader’s acceptance of this visit and Peskov’s raising the issue on July 12, 2023 stem from Moscow’s desire to tell the world “I still have friends.”
[1] “China May Be on Brink of Supplying Arms to Russia, Says Blinken”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/19/china-may-be-on-brink-of-supplying-arms-to-russia-says-blinken, (Date of Accession: 13.07.2023).
[2] “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis”, FMPRC, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230224_11030713.html, (Date of Accession: 13.07.2023).
[3] “China’s Xi Stresses Close Ties with ‘Dear Friend’ Putin During His First Visit to Russia Since Ukraine Invasion”, CNN, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/20/europe/xi-putin-china-russia-visit-monday-intl-hnk/index.html, (Date of Accession: 13.07.2023).
[4] @ZelenskyyUa, “I had a long and meaningful phone call with 🇨🇳 President Xi Jinping. I believe that this call, as well as the appointment of Ukraine’s ambassador to China, will give a powerful impetus to the development of our bilateral relations.”, Twitter, https://twitter.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1651184756623802368, (Date of Accession: 13.07.2023).
[5] Sabir Askeroğlu, “Russian-Chinese Entente Against Collective Western Alliance”, ANKASAM, ankasam.org/russian-chinese-entente-against-collective-western-alliance/?lang=en, (Date of Accession:13.07.2023).
[6] “Песков: визит Путина в Китай – на повестке дня”, Vesti, https://www.vesti.ru/article/3449432,(Date of Accession: 13.07.2023).
