Uzbekistan’s foreign policy is based on a carefully conducted multidimensional and strategic approach at a time when competition among global powers is becoming increasingly intense. Located at the heart of Central Asia, the Tashkent administration pursues a balanced cooperation policy with major powers to sustain its economic development and ensure regional stability.
Throughout history, Uzbekistan has been one of the most crucial crossroads of Eurasia, and today, it seeks to balance China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the United States’ (US) Central Asia strategy, and Russia’s Eurasian integration policies. In this period of global geopolitical transformation, Uzbekistan attracts the attention of major powers not only due to its geographical location but also because of its natural resources and economic potential. Economic collaborations, particularly in energy and infrastructure projects, have intensified global competition in the region and expanded Uzbekistan’s strategic maneuvering space. The Tashkent administration has been persistent in maintaining an independent foreign policy that safeguards national interests without becoming entirely dependent on any major power. Recent developments indicate that Uzbekistan has adopted an approach that prioritizes national interests while meticulously balancing between the US, Russia, and China and striving to act independently among global powers.
In the context of relations with the US, a meeting held on February 21, 2025, between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Uzbekistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bakhtiyar Saidov, underscored Washington’s commitment to increasing its influence in Central Asia. During the meeting, the US emphasized the significance of the C5+1 mechanism and its objective of making this platform more effective. According to a statement released by the US Department of State, discussions focused on cooperation aimed at ensuring stability in Central Asia and promoting economic development.[1]Following the meeting, Foreign Minister Saidov stressed the necessity of strengthening relations with the US in all areas, highlighting the importance of deepening economic cooperation and increasing bilateral trade volume.[2] The US’s willingness to collaborate with Uzbekistan within the framework of a strategic partnership in critical minerals and American civil nuclear energy technologies demonstrates Washington’s effort to strengthen its presence in Central Asia not only diplomatically but also economically.
The US’s interest in Central Asia has not been limited to diplomatic and economic matters. Following Donald Trump’s inauguration as US President for a second term on January 20, 2025, a military cooperation ceremony was held at the Uzbek Embassy in the US on January 31, 2025, revealing Washington’s accelerated strategic moves toward the region. This ceremony indicated that US initiatives to expand its influence in Central Asia are advancing within a more radical policy framework aimed at isolating China. During the ceremony on January 31, Uzbekistan’s Ambassador to the US, Furkat Sidikov, emphasized that the partnership between Uzbekistan and the US is not confined to bilateral objectives but also holds critical significance for the security and stability of the entire Central Asian region. At the core of the US’s interest in Central Asia lies not only the region’s reserves of oil and natural gas but also its wealth of rare earth elements and minerals, which are of critical importance for high technology, clean energy, and the defense industry. Washington has embarked on efforts to deepen its ties with regional countries in order to counter China’s dominance in these sectors.[3]
While strengthening its relations with the US, Uzbekistan continues to pursue a balanced foreign policy with both Russia and China. This stance was once again demonstrated when the Tashkent administration abstained from voting during the United Nations General Assembly resolution on February 24, 2025, regarding the third anniversary of the Russia-Ukraine War. The resolution, drafted by Ukraine and European countries, called for Russia’s “immediate, complete, and unconditional” withdrawal from Ukrainian territories. However, Uzbekistan opted for a neutral position by abstaining, avoiding provoking reactions from any party.[4] This decision was interpreted as a reflection of Uzbekistan’s objective to maintain its relations with Russia while continuing its cooperation with the US.
Meanwhile, China’s influence in Central Asia is steadily increasing. During the G20 Summit held in South Africa on February 21, 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that Beijing supports all peace initiatives, including agreements reached between the US and Russia, and expressed China’s willingness to play a “constructive role” in this process.[5] However, from a realist and strategic perspective, many experts evaluate these statements as part of Beijing’s cautious effort to balance its economic ties with Russia to prevent a rupture in the Beijing-Moscow axis, given China’s dependence on the European market.
For Uzbekistan, cooperation with China holds significant importance, particularly in the context of infrastructure projects. On February 19, 2025, Kyrgyzstan’s Ambassador to Switzerland, Omarkul Sultankulov, visited the Swiss-based railway technology company Schwihag AG, signaling the potential involvement of European firms in the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway project.[6] As China continues to expand its infrastructure investments in Central Asia, Europe’s increasing involvement in this process has further highlighted the region’s significance in global power competition.
In discussions held within the US Congress, it was emphasized that Iran, Russia, and China are developing alternative systems within the BRICS framework to shield themselves from US economic influence. Democratic Party representative Adam Smith argued that the US should act more cautiously in this context, stating, “We must establish strong ties and implement policies that safeguard the interests of our partners,” advocating for a reassessment of Washington’s strategy in the region.[7]
Uzbekistan’s foreign policy follows a pragmatic course amid this great power competition. Regarding allegations that 31 mining sites in Navoi were purchased by Chinese companies, Uzbekistan’s Subsoil Resources Utilization Center issued a statement clarifying that the sales were made only to 12 companies registered in Uzbekistan and that no foreign-funded company had acquired direct rights. Additionally, in the sites granted a three-year usage permit, ownership rights were not recognized, and at least 70% of the workforce was required to be Uzbek citizens.[8] These developments have reaffirmed that Uzbekistan is pursuing an independent strategy in the face of global power rivalries and prioritizing its national interests above all else.
As the competition among major powers in the region becomes increasingly pronounced, Uzbekistan will need to effectively manage both economic and geopolitical risks to maintain its diplomatic maneuvering space. In the coming period, the Tashkent administration is expected to continue deepening its strategic cooperation with the US while simultaneously preserving its economic and security relations with Russia and China. It is a strong possibility that the US will offer increased investment in Uzbekistan as part of its efforts to expand its presence in Central Asia, including financing critical infrastructure projects. In particular, the support of the American private sector for Tashkent’s reforms in mining, energy, and digital infrastructure will be part of Washington’s broader efforts to establish an alternative economic partnership to counter China. However, Uzbekistan is aware that in exchange for economic support and technology transfer, Washington may demand greater cooperation in defense and security. Within the framework of US efforts to expand and institutionalize the C5+1 mechanism, Uzbekistan could be offered a regional leadership role in Central Asia. However, Tashkent is expected to approach this proposal cautiously, maintaining its balance with Russia and China.
In this context, rather than weakening its economic ties with China, Uzbekistan is likely to diversify them. Large-scale infrastructure initiatives such as the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway project will continue to be one of the key instruments consolidating Beijing’s economic influence in Central Asia. It is possible that Uzbekistan will pursue a strategy of strengthening its global economic connections by supporting this project not only with Chinese capital but also with alternative financing from Europe. In this regard, regulatory measures encouraging increased European investment in Uzbekistan’s infrastructure projects may be implemented. At the same time, the Tashkent administration may maintain its military and security cooperation with Moscow at a minimal level, taking into account Russia’s strategic interests in the region. However, given that Russia is under significant international pressure due to the ongoing war in Ukraine, Tashkent will need to carefully reassess its relationship with Moscow. Uzbekistan is expected to adopt a pragmatic approach by continuing economic cooperation with Moscow while avoiding direct political and military engagements. Ultimately, Uzbekistan will continue to safeguard its national interests through multidimensional diplomacy, refraining from aligning itself with any single bloc amid the global power struggle for influence in Central Asia.
[1] “Secretary Rubio’s Call with Uzbekistan Foreign Minister Saidov”, U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/secretary-rubios-call-with-uzbekistan-foreign-minister-saidov, (Access Date: 26.02.2026).
[2] Novbahor Imamova, “US, Uzbekistan Reaffirm Commitment to Central Asia Security”, VOA, https://www.voanews.com/a/us-uzbekistan-reaffirm-commitment-to-central-asia-security/7984698.html, (Access Date: 26.02.2026).
[3] Ana Swanson, “Trump’s New Crackdown on China Is Just Beginning”, New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/26/us/politics/trump-china-crackdown.html, (Access Date: 26.02.2026).
[4] “Uzbekistan abstains as UN adopts Ukraine-backed resolution on Russia-Ukraine war”, Daryo, https://daryo.uz/en/2025/02/25/uzbekistan-abstains-as-un-adopts-ukraine-backed-resolution-on-russia-ukraine-war, (Access Date: 26.02.2026).
[5] “Wáng yì Chūxí Èrshí Guó Jítuán Wàizhǎng Huì”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs The People’s Republic of China, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202502/t20250221_11559792.shtml, (Access Date: 26.02.2026).
[6] “Shveytsarskuyu Kompaniyu Khotyat Privlech k Stroitelstvu zh/d Kitay – Kyrgyzstan – Uzbekistan”, Kaktus Media, https://kaktus.media/doc/518470_shveycarskyu_kompaniu_hotiat_privlech_k_stroitelstvy_jd_kitay_kyrgyzstan_yzbekistan.html, (Access Date: 26.02.2026).
[7] Novbahor Imamova, “Kongressmen Smit: Markaziy Osiyoda İshonchli, Kuchli Sheriklar Kerak”, VOA, https://www.amerikaovozi.com/a/7595093.html, (Access Date: 26.02.2026).
[8] “Navoiydagi 31 Bitta Kon Hitoyliklarga Sotildi, Degan Ahborotni Rad Etamiz”, Yer Qaridan Foydalanish Markazi – Telegram, DMhttps://t.me/yerqaridanfoydalanishmarkazi/1220, (Access Date: 26.02.2026).
