The increasing competition along the East-West axis has turned Central Asia, along with many other regions, into a stage for geopolitical rivalry. The United States, China, and Russia, seeking to expand their influence in this region, have engaged in various diplomatic maneuvers, economic investments, and strategic partnerships to establish dominance. In particular, recent political developments and economic initiatives have not only impacted the existing balance in Central Asia but also have the potential to reshape the future orientations of regional actors. This situation has made the struggle for influence among major powers more complex while making it inevitable for Central Asian states to pursue multidimensional balancing policies.
On January 20, 2025, during an official ceremony, U.S. President Donald Trump took the oath of office and, upon assuming duty, immediately called on Russia to negotiate a settlement to end the war in Ukraine, warning that severe economic sanctions targeting trade would be imposed otherwise. In his statement on January 22, 2025, Trump emphasized the importance of diplomatic negotiations, stating that if Russia refused to engage in talks, stronger economic pressure measures would be implemented. He further remarked, “We can do this the easy way or the hard way – and the easy way is always better,” highlighting the priority of a diplomatic resolution. Trump, recalling his past good relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, asserted that ending the war was possible through diplomatic efforts supported by economic sanctions.[1]
In response to these remarks, on January 23, 2025, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia would never forget the assistance provided by the United States during World War II, referencing historical alliance ties and expressing an effort to establish a constructive dialogue within contemporary international relations.[2] At the same time, Peskov noted that U.S. President Donald Trump had a tendency to employ sanctions as a pressure tool, emphasizing that this approach had also been adopted during Trump’s first presidential term. He commented, “Donald Trump likes sanction pressure, at least he did during his first term,” providing an assessment of the current U.S. policies.[3] Additionally, Peskov stressed that no signals had yet been received from Washington regarding the initiation of dialogue between Russian and U.S. leaders, stating, “We are waiting for signals, but they have not arrived yet.”[4] He further added, “We are carefully monitoring all statements and recording every nuance meticulously,”[5] underscoring that Russia was ready for an equal and mutually respectful dialogue, a position that President Vladimir Putin had reiterated multiple times.
With Donald Trump’s assumption of office, while peace was initially expected to be swiftly established, emerging complexities have led to speculation that the Trump administration may adopt a different stance toward Russia and engage in strategic competition in regions where Russia holds influence. The South Caucasus, and particularly Central Asia, have been anticipated to emerge as focal points of this rivalry. Examples such as Georgia’s effort to maintain a balancing policy between the West while sustaining its diplomatic and strategic relations with Russia and China, and Armenia’s shift away from Russia toward a strategic partnership with the United States, indicate that Central Asia could also become a stage for similar strategic contests. The steps taken by the Trump administration in the region could lead to an increase in diplomatic and strategic initiatives in Central Asia, placing the region at the center of broader geopolitical struggles. This, in turn, raises questions about how the regional balance of power will be reshaped through U.S. economic and diplomatic maneuvers and how Russia will respond to these changes.
In this context, the recently signed military strategic partnership agreement between Russia and Uzbekistan can be seen as Moscow’s attempt to solidify its influence in Central Asia. While Uzbekistan has avoided direct involvement in the war in Ukraine, it continues to maintain military and economic ties with Russia, adhering to a strategy of strategic balance. Tashkent’s decision not to join alliances such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) reflects its desire to pursue an independent foreign policy. These developments offer insights into how Central Asia may position itself within the power struggle among the United States, Russia, and China.[6]
During the administration of former U.S. President Joe Biden, Washington adopted a cautious approach toward individuals and entities in Central Asia accused of violating sanctions against Russia, carefully applying its sanction policies while taking into account the region’s complex geopolitical situation. The business sector and elite groups in Central Asia have benefited from changes in Eurasian trade routes caused by the war; the West’s efforts to sideline Russia and shift toward alternative routes such as the Middle Corridor, while the region continues to play a key role in trade with Russia, have provided economic advantages for Central Asian economies. Although some Central Asian companies have faced secondary sanctions since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the region’s economies have largely remained unaffected by severe sanctions.[7] The Biden administration was careful to avoid negatively impacting relations with Central Asian governments while enforcing restrictions on Russia. However, under Donald Trump’s “America First” policy, a stricter and more trade-oriented approach may be adopted, which could lead to a shift from the balanced policies of the Biden era toward more rigid measures in U.S.-Central Asia relations.
Although Donald Trump made claims during his election campaign about ending the war in Ukraine, he did not present a concrete strategy and instead argued that NATO and Asia-Pacific allies should assume a greater share of the security burden. As a reflection of this approach on U.S.-Central Asia relations, the Trump administration may demand that regional countries take on greater responsibility in their relations with Russia. If negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv fail, Trump is expected to call on Central Asian countries to adopt a stronger stance against Russia. This situation could complicate efforts to maintain the region’s existing geopolitical balance.
At the Global Gateway Investors Forum held in Brussels on January 29-30, 2024, the European Union and international financial institutions committed to investing €10 billion in the development of transportation links in Central Asia. This investment increased the EU’s interest in the Middle Corridor as an alternative route bypassing Russia following the war in Ukraine and highlighted the necessity of infrastructure improvements for the modernization of this route. It was noted that the EU is the region’s largest foreign direct investor and second-largest trading partner, with the goal of transforming the Middle Corridor into a sustainable route that connects Europe and Asia within 15 days. The decisions made at the forum demonstrated the West’s commitment—beyond the United States—to strengthening the EU’s presence in Central Asia.[8]
In the first 11 months of 2024, the freight volume transported via the Middle Corridor increased by 63%, reaching 4.1 million tons, while container transportation surged 2.6 times to 50,500 TEUs. With the annual transport capacity projected to reach 6 million tons and container capacity expected to grow to 100,000 TEUs, the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor Coordination Center, which became operational in 2024, aims to reduce delivery times between Europe and Asia to 15 days. This corridor has gained increasing strategic significance in global trade with the participation of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and China. Kazakhstan has planned to establish 220 automated weighing stations by 2025 to mitigate the impact of heavy vehicles on road infrastructure, with 45 already operational. These systems are expected to help preserve transport infrastructure by monitoring compliance with vehicle weight and size standards.[9]
In 2025, as geopolitical competition in the Caspian and Central Asian regions intensified, Russia and Iran benefited from trade along the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), while Baku emerged as a key transit hub for Russia’s energy exports and sanctions evasion efforts during the war in Ukraine. The decline in water levels in the Caspian Basin posed challenges for Russia’s large vessels, whereas Kazakhstan’s expansion of a fleet adapted to shallow waters altered the balance of power. Turkey’s military support to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan strengthened their defense capabilities, further increasing the strategic significance of the Middle Corridor. At the Conference of the Parties to the Tehran Convention, it was announced that environmental issues would be addressed; however, Russia and Iran were expected to continue their efforts to maintain their veto rights. These developments have confronted regional states with new challenges in infrastructure and security.
Donald Trump’s inauguration coincided with the 10th anniversary of the C5+1 format, a key milestone in U.S.-Central Asia relations. The bipartisan support for Central Asia cooperation, long upheld by both Republicans and Democrats, has fostered expectations of deeper strategic ties following Trump’s re-election. While regional countries have adopted an optimistic stance, U.S. officials have emphasized Central Asia’s geopolitical importance and the necessity of strengthening bilateral relations. Discussions have focused on utilizing the C5+1 format more effectively and increasing trade, while U.S. presidential visits and high-level engagements have been proposed to deepen cooperation in security, energy, and transportation.[10] These developments signal the beginning of a new era in U.S. policy toward Central Asia.
New opportunities for cooperation between the Trump administration and Central Asia have emerged, and increasing high-level political dialogue is expected to contribute to the ability of regional countries to defend their shared interests on the international stage. A potential visit by the U.S. President to the region could serve as a sign of strategic commitment. In the transportation sector, the expansion of the Middle Corridor’s routes through Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, along with projects such as the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railway, has strengthened regional integration. These projects have enhanced logistical efficiency, transforming the region into a critical hub along east-west and north-south trade routes. Additionally, the increase in private sector investments from the U.S. in digital economy, critical minerals, and the financial sector has supported regional development. In the security domain, the U.S. is expected to play a more active role in counterterrorism and border security, and under the Trump administration, Central Asian states have the potential to establish more robust economic and strategic cooperation with the U.S. through joint projects.
Within the Western bloc, the ongoing strategic competition between the U.S. and EU on one side and Russia and China on the other could turn Central Asia into a far more critical geopolitical battleground in the coming period. Under the Trump administration, efforts to enhance U.S. economic and diplomatic influence in the region may become more pronounced through platforms such as the Trans-Caspian Transport Route and C5+1. However, these efforts may prompt China to accelerate infrastructure investments and economic partnerships within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, while Russia could take more aggressive steps to consolidate its traditional influence in the region. This situation will push Central Asian states toward greater multilateral cooperation and efforts to maintain their independence amid the growing influence of major powers.
As regional countries seek to balance the influence of the three major powers, they may attempt to diversify their cooperation with the U.S., Russia, and China across different sectors to sustain economic growth. For instance, Chinese investments and infrastructure projects, Russia’s security-based partnerships, and U.S. financial support could enhance Central Asia’s economic and strategic flexibility. However, this balancing policy may also further intensify great power competition in the region, leading to a more complex geopolitical equation in Central Asia in the long term.
[1] Donald Trump, “I’m not looking to hurt Russia. I love the Russian people, and always had a very good relationship with President Putin…”, Truth, https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/113872782548137314, (Access Date: 27.01.2025).
[2] “Peskov: RF nikogda ne zabudet pomoshch’ SSHA vo vremya Vtoroy mirovoy”, TASS, https://tass.ru/politika/22950777, (Access Date: 27.01.2025).
[3] “Peskov: Trampu nravyatsya metody sanktsionnogo davleniya”, TASS, https://tass.ru/politika/22950813, (Access Date: 27.01.2025).
[4] “Peskov: signalov ob organizatsii kontaktov Putina i Trampa vse yeshche ne postupalo”, TASS, https://tass.ru/politika/22950695, (Access Date: 27.01.2025).
[5] “Peskov: RF fiksiruyet vse nyuansy ritoriki SSHA”, TASS, https://tass.ru/politika/22950727, (Access Date: 27.01.2025).
[6] “Russia and Uzbekistan Sign Strategic Partnership Programme in Military Field for 2026–2030 Period”, MoD Russia – Telegram, https://t.me/mod_russia_en/19005, (Access Date: 27.01.2025).
[7] Janel Jaketova, “Pod Sanktsii SSHA Popali Yeshche dve Kazakhstanskiye Kompanii, Svyazannyye s Rossiyey”, Kursiv, https://kz.kursiv.media/2025-01-10/zhzh-usasanctrionsgazpromneft, (Access Date: 27.01.2025).; “‘Poluchayet stanki iz Yevropy, a Zatem Otpravlyayet ikh v KNR dlya dostavki v RF’. Yeshche Odna Uzbekistanskaya Kompaniya Popala Pod Sanktsii SSHA”, Radio Ozodlik, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/33181113.html, (Access Date: 27.01.2025).
[8] Toghrul Ali, “European and International Financial Institutions to Invest $10 Billion in the Middle Corridor”, Caspian Policy Center, https://www.caspianpolicy.org/research/economy/european-and-international-financial-institutions-to-invest-10-billion-in-the-middle-corridor, (Access Date: 27.01.2025).
[9] Saniya Sakenova, “Cargo Transport via Middle Corridor Surges to 4.1 Million Tons in 11 Months”, Astana Times, https://astanatimes.com/2024/12/cargo-transport-via-middle-corridor-surges-to-4-1-million-tons-in-11-months, (Access Date: 27.01.2025).
[10] Javlon Vakhabov, “Renewed Horizons: Strengthening Central Asia-US Relations under the Trump Administration”, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2025/01/renewed-horizons-strengthening-central-asia-us-relations-under-the-trump-administration, (Access Date: 27.01.2025).
