In recent years, Central Asian countries have taken significant steps toward resolving historical border issues and deepening economic cooperation. In this process, policies aimed at increasing regional mobility are being reassessed not only in the areas of transportation or trade but also in multidimensional topics such as migration, security, and identity construction. Calls for a common visa system stand out as one of the symbolic and strategic reflections of this transformation.
The statement made by Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov on March 13, 2025, marked a significant turning point indicating a new phase of regional integration in Central Asia. The announcement that the Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan border issue—unsolved for 101 years—had been finally resolved has implications not only for bilateral relations between the two countries but also for the geopolitical balance of the entire region. Japarov’s declaration constitutes a historical threshold in that it proclaims the end of existing border disputes in Central Asia and demonstrates a strong political will asserting that the concept of regional integration and cooperation must now be concretized. In international relations literature, the resolution of border issues is regarded as a prerequisite for establishing regional security and stability. In this context, Japarov’s statement should be interpreted not only as a diplomatic success but also as the beginning of a new era in which Central Asia’s “unclosed files” have finally been settled.
Immediately following this development, Japarov’s call for visa-free travel among Central Asian countries and the establishment of a joint visa regime for third-country nationals shifted attention toward the institutionalization of regional integration.[1] Suggesting that a system similar to the Schengen model in Europe could be implemented in Central Asia, this proposal aims not only to facilitate intra-regional mobility but also to transition toward a new model of integration in terms of economic cooperation, diplomatic coordination, and the construction of a regional identity. The timing of this proposal is also highly strategic. With the resolution of border disputes, one of the region’s fundamental security problems has been eliminated, thus removing one of the major obstacles to structural integration.
President Japarov’s call is essentially an updated and more comprehensive version of an idea that had previously emerged in a similar form. Indeed, the initiative proposed in 2018 under the leadership of Kazakhstan, known as the “Silk Road Visa,” was recorded as one of the first serious steps toward establishing a common visa regime among Central Asian countries.[2] This initiative envisioned the possibility of free passage to other Central Asian countries with a visa issued by one state; Kazakhstan played an active role in this process, cooperated closely with Uzbekistan in the implementation phase, and Tajikistan prepared a proposal to present to its own government. It was expected that this topic would be raised at the CIS Tourism Council meeting planned in Samarkand in 2019; however, the process later stalled. This example shows that Japarov’s proposal, unlike previous initiatives, has been brought back to the agenda not only with the aim of promoting tourism but also with the broader goal of comprehensive regional integration.
The limited strength of regional passports also constitutes another structural indicator supporting this proposal. According to the 2025 Passport Index by Henley & Partners, Kyrgyz citizens were granted visa-free or visa-on-arrival access to only 63 countries, placing the country 77th globally and second within Central Asia after Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan ranked 64th with access to 76 countries, Uzbekistan 78th with 61 countries, Tajikistan 83rd with 56 countries, and Turkmenistan 88th with 49 countries.[3] This data reveals that the countries of the region have a limited sphere of mobility in global circulation. Therefore, Caparov’s proposal for a common visa system has taken shape not merely as a symbolic call but as a strategic foreign policy vision responding to a structural necessity.
However, the absence of a common regional approach to visa policies has been reflected not only in the internal regionalization efforts of Central Asia but also in Russia’s stance on visa policies toward the region. Indeed, while Russia has previously considered similar visa initiatives with Central Asian countries, it appears that such steps have been suspended in light of the current geopolitical and economic context. In a statement published on November 26, 2024, Russian Foreign Ministry official Aleksandr Sternik explicitly stated that Moscow does not plan to implement a visa regime with Central Asian countries; he emphasized that such rhetoric has only been voiced by certain political elites and that the Russian government has not made any fundamental changes to its migration policies.[4] Sternik remarked that labor migration is a mutual necessity both for Russia’s economic interests and for the employment capacities of Central Asian countries; he also stated that illegal migration constitutes a shared security threat for both sides. This statement revealed that Russia is determined to maintain an approach based not on visa restrictions, but on the regulation and integration of migrant labor in its relations with the region.
Two weeks after this statement, on December 10, 2024, a statement by Alisher Kadirov, a member of Uzbekistan’s Legislative Chamber, represented a departure from the regional common stance. Referring to the “anticipated instability” in Russia, Kadirov called for the implementation of a reciprocal visa regime not only with Russia but with all Central Asian countries, citing the influx of “relocants” into the country as a justification.[5] The term “relocant” here refers to a new migrant profile that has emerged from certain Russian companies moving their operations abroad to avoid sanctions. By portraying this group as a social and economic burden, Kadirov demonstrated that the issue of migration is being approached from the perspectives of national security and social stability. Furthermore, his emphasis on the need for all foreigners residing in the country to know Uzbek Turkish and its traditions brought public sensitivities regarding migration mobility to the forefront.
Although initiatives for the establishment of a common visa system in Central Asia were brought back into the spotlight with the call made by Kyrgyz President Sadyr Caparov in March 2025, considering the region’s political structure, security sensitivities, and the lack of intergovernmental coordination, the implementation of this proposal in its ideal form in the short term appears unlikely. Looking at current practices in the region, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan seem to be advancing along a more integrationist line thanks to their relatively open visa policies and e-visa infrastructures, while Turkmenistan presents strong resistance to the process with its strict isolationist policies and the application of visa requirements to nearly all foreigners. Moreover, the domestic political concerns of the countries and public anti-immigrant reflexes—as seen particularly in the “relocant” debates in Uzbekistan—make it difficult to advance the process within the framework of common security and migration policies. Therefore, from a realist perspective, it is more plausible that the common visa system will first take shape on a gradual, limited, and mutually trust-based platform among countries that are technically compatible and politically willing.
Within this framework, the possible scenarios that may emerge in the upcoming period point to a multi-centered structure. The first and most probable scenario is that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and partially Uzbekistan initiate a pilot visa integration through mutual agreements. In this model, a narrowly scoped “Central Asia Visa” that initially does not cover third-country nationals and regulates only intra-regional travel may be implemented. Such an initiative could partially alleviate the global mobility disadvantages of regional countries, which rank low in the 2025 Passport Index by Henley & Partners, and provide limited but functional vitality in the regional tourism, trade, and service sectors. A second scenario involves the emergence of a structure in which fragmented integration deepens further, but Turkmenistan remains entirely outside the process. In this case, the digitalization of regional visas, the implementation of biometric control systems at border crossings, and the establishment of security mechanisms based on data sharing among certain countries may be expected. However, even such a structure would require not only technical compatibility but also political will and mutual trust, thus necessitating a complex diplomatic process.
On the other hand, the Schengen experience in Europe also demonstrates that establishing a free movement area is not only about abolishing visas but also requires the joint protection of external borders, the management of migration flows, and the creation of common regulatory frameworks. From this perspective, the significant differences in current migration, security, and customs policies among Central Asian countries indicate that the process faces not only technical but also structural and political challenges. For instance, Russia’s firm stance on its visa policy toward the region—as seen in the statement dated November 26, 2024—frames migration not as a matter of security but as an economic necessity and directly opposes the idea of a visa regime. This situation reveals the necessity for regional countries to establish a new balance in both foreign policy and migration strategy that neither excludes nor becomes dependent on the Russian factor. In conclusion, the common visa system proposed by Caparov should be approached not as an idealistic regionalism project but as a “controlled harmonization process” that must be carefully constructed. Otherwise, there is a risk that it may remain a symbolic proposal under the weight of internal contradictions and external pressures.
In conclusion, the proposal for a common visa system stands out as a strategic step toward regional integration within the framework of the “Central Asia-2040” vision. The security foundation created by the resolution of the Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan border conflict opens the space for such initiatives, and visa integration is considered a tool that can support both internal coherence and external openness. However, given the structural differences and security priorities among the regional countries, the construction of a gradual and digitally based model appears more realistic than comprehensive integration. In this context, Caparov’s call should be interpreted not only as an ideal objective but also as a strategic initiative that tests the boundaries of regional cohesion.
[1] Sayragul Sadıkovna, “Urmattuu Kırgızstandıktar!”, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/share/p/16CiK91BrM, (Access Date: 21.03.2025).
[2] “Silk Road Visas Under Consideration in CIS”, Belta, https://eng.belta.by/society/view/silk-road-visas-under-consideration-in-cis-113948-2018, (Access Date: 21.03.2025).
[3] “Kyrgyzstan Zanyal Vtoroye Mesto v Tsentralnoy Azii po Sile Pasporta”, Akchabar, https://www.akchabar.kg/ru/news/kirgizstan-zanyal-vtoroe-mesto-v-tsentralnoj-azii-po-sile-pasporta-dywkaadpetwtylzw, (Access Date: 21.03.2025).
[4] Kirill Kukhmar, “V MID Rossii zayavili, Chto Vvodit Vizy so Stranami Sredney Azii ne Planiruyetsya”, RTVI, https://rtvi.com/news/v-mid-rossii-zayavili-chto-vvodit-vizy-so-stranami-strednej-azii-ne-planiruetsya, (Access Date: 21.03.2025).
[5] “V Uzbekistane Vystupili za Vizovyy Rezhim s Rossiyey”, Dzen, https://dzen.ru/b/Z1iJB0jJLmYx3h51, (Access Date: 21.03.2025).
