Last January 15th marked a significant diplomatic shift for Niger as Prime Minister Ali Mahaman Lamine Zeine and his delegation embarked on a visit to Moscow. The primary objective of this meeting was to fortify economic and diplomatic ties between Niger and Russia. However, beneath the surface, it served as a pivotal moment in Niger’s emerging anti-Western foreign policy, a stance triggered by the radical turn initiated by the July coup d’état. The ousting of President Mr. Bazoum, a crucial Western ally, precipitated a swift decline in French influence within the country, sparking nationwide protests over troop withdrawals and the departure of the French ambassador.
The Moscow rendezvous highlighted the pragmatic approach of Niger’s new leadership in cultivating diverse partnerships. During this diplomatic engagement, the Prime Minister and his delegation participated in discussions with Russian Vice Prime Minister Alexéi Overchuk. This dialogue underscored the clear intent to broaden commercial, economic, and investment ties, illustrating a concerted effort by Niger to diversify its diplomatic relationships and explore alternative avenues for collaboration.
Notably, these deliberations signify a strategic reorientation in the nation’s foreign policy post-coup. Additionally, it is worth mentioning that the Prime Minister is scheduled to visit Turkey and Iran, further underscoring Niger’s commitment to exploring a range of diplomatic possibilities.[1] Simultaneously, the anti-French sentiment in Niger, underscored by the expulsion of French troops and the denunciation of military cooperation agreements, forms a critical backdrop. The junta’s decisions to discard security agreements with the European Union and criticize French involvement highlight a deliberate effort to distance Niger from its former Western allies
Amidst the geopolitical shifts in Niger’s foreign policy, concerns are mounting over the future of the country’s crucial uranium industry, a resource that lies at the heart of the Sahel state. The recent upheaval following the military junta’s rise to power has cast a shadow over the stability of the uranium supply to global markets. Adding to the complexity, an alliance of civil society groups known as M62 is now urging Niger to cease its uranium dealings with France, amplifying the uncertainty surrounding the country’s strategic resources.
France, heavily dependent on nuclear power, faces a precarious situation as approximately two-thirds of its electricity is sourced from nuclear power plants, with a significant portion relying on uranium from Niger.[2] This vulnerability is exacerbated by France’s export of electricity to European nations without nuclear capabilities of their own. The long-standing presence of the French nuclear conglomerate Orano (formerly Areva) in Niger, responsible for mining uranium for fuel rods used in France’s extensive nuclear power infrastructure, further underscores the intricacies of this economic and strategic entanglement. For over four decades, Niger has been subject to exploitation by the French nuclear fuel cycle group Orano. Despite the coup, the multinational, presently 90% owned by the French state,[3] has declared its intent to persist in mining activities in Niger.
Amidst these complexities, compounded by over four decades of French exploitation of Niger’s uranium resources, the potential disruption in uranium supply chains emerges as a pivotal threat not only to Niger’s economic stability but also as a direct challenge to France’s energy security.
France’s diminishing influence in the region becomes increasingly evident as its forces face expulsion from neighbouring Mali and Burkina Faso following coups in those countries. This marks a significant reduction in France’s role in the region-wide fight against armed groups, with potential implications for security dynamics in the area. Mahamat Deby of Chad, the last ally of Macron in the Sahel, recently arrived in Moscow to meet with Vladimir Putin, showcasing a subtle attempt by the Chadian leader to distance himself further from France. This move aligns with a broader trend in the Sahel, where leaders like Deby are navigating towards a multipolar paradigm, potentially leaving France struggling to maintain its historical influence in the face of evolving regional dynamics. Finally, Niger’s post-coup anti-Western pivot, visible in engagements with Moscow and growing anti-French sentiment, raises concerns about France’s energy security.
[1] “Níger rechaza a Europa y busca nuevas alianzas en Rusia, Irán y Turquía”, La Razón, https://www.larazon.es/internacional/niger-rechaza-europa-busca-nuevas-alianzas-rusia-iran-turquia_2024011765a7c82fcf867300019cbc1e.html, (Date of Accession: 24.01.2024).
[2] “Are Niger’s uranium supplies to France under scrutiny?”, DW, https://www.dw.com/en/are-nigers-uranium-supplies-to-france-under-scrutiny/a-66711717, (Date of Accession: 24.01.2024).
[3] “How Dependent Is France on Niger’s Uranium?”, Le Monde, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/les-decodeurs/article/2023/08/04/how-dependent-is-france-on-niger-s-uranium_6080772_8.html, (Date of Accession: 24.01.2024).
