Referring to the notion of “Great Game” used to characterize the power struggle of the great nations in Central Asia in the second half of the nineteenth century, the power struggle that resumed in the same region after the Cold War was dubbed the “New Great Game” in the literature. The main actors of this game were Russia, China and the United States of America (USA). Western actors tried to fill the power gap left by Russia in the Central Asian countries, which gained their independence with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia and China, on the other hand, saw limiting Western influence as a common interest.
After the USA invaded Afghanistan in 2001, the influence of the Washington administration in Central Asia increased. The USA, which needed local logistical support to carry out its military operations in Afghanistan, used military bases of countries in the region. Furthermore, the Washington administration sought to access the region’s energy resources and reach the European market by bypassing Russia and Iran, indicating that it prioritized its own economic interests. The pro-Western opposition movements that arose in the region during these periods are also worth mentioning.
The growing American presence in Central Asia became the common security concern of Russia and China. As a result, in the New Great Game, Russia and China pursued parallel regional policies. However, after 2013, this harmony began to deteriorate. As a matter of fact, the New Great Game is becoming a competition between Russia and China rather than a competition between Western states and non-Western actors. In this respect, the basic dynamics of the New Great Game are changing.
The first important development after 2013 is that China started to increase its regional influence by announcing the Belt Road Initiative. Beijing’s economic interest in Central Asia is increasing. On the one hand, the region’s energy resources play an important role for China’s increasing energy needs. On the other hand, Central Asia is in a strategic position on China’s trade route to Europe. In the economic field, there is a noticeable disparity between Russia and China. Therefore, China becomes the region’s economic leader, displacing Russia.
The second important development is the USA’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. Although the interests of the USA in Central Asia have not ended, it now has a more limited scope. The need to balance the USA in the new Great Game is diminishing. As common security concerns decrease, disputes between Russia and China come to the fore. Moreover, there is instability and uncertainty in Afghanistan, where the Taliban is in power. This is no longer a concern for the USA, but for Russia and China.
The last significant development is the tense relations between Russia and the West following the Ukraine Crisis in 2014. This crisis, which eventually turned into a war, is important in two aspects. First of all, this crisis causes Russia’s foreign policy to shift to relations with the West and negatively affects its influence in Central Asia. In addition, Russia could not find the support it hoped for from China in this crisis. On the contrary, China is increasing its effectiveness in Central Asia by taking advantage of the process. Russia, on the other hand, is turning into a security partner who does not inspire trust in Central Asian countries as a result of its aggressive behavior in Ukraine. Central Asian countries seek an independent foreign policy from Russia. In this pursuit, China emerges as a balancing power, while Western actors provide an additional balancing opportunity.
After 2001, Russia and China’s increased collaboration in Central Asia has given way to rivalry. But this increasingly fierce rivalry is not the only possible scenario. The two countries may potentially agree to share regional hegemony. This compromise can only be possible by limiting the regional interests of the two countries. For example, Russia may limit its interests to the security by recognizing China as the region’s main economic actor. In return, China can focus its own interests on the economic sphere and stay away from its goal of replacing Russia as the main security provider. In such a compromise, Russia will protect its security interests in Central Asia, which it defines as its immediate environment. China, on the other hand, will expand its influence by focusing on commercial relations and infrastructure investments.
It is difficult to determine which scenario is more likely. An important variable is how Russia and China will interact not just in the context of Central Asia, but also in terms of balances in world politics. Another variable is whether Western countries will play a more decisive role in Central Asia in the future. It is also vital to see how Central Asian countries will establish a course against regional competitiveness and how skilled their diplomacy will be in balancing the great powers. Whatever happens, the New Great Game is now becoming a game between Russia and China, with the USA and other Western actors participating at a lesser level.
