According to the latest findings, the Arctic region contains 90 billion barrels of oil and 47.3 trillion cubic metres of natural gas.[1] In addition to this immense energy potential, the Northern Sea Route (NSR), where melting ice due to climate change currently permits partial passage and is expected to allow year-round navigation after 2030, significantly shortens maritime transport between Asia and Europe.[2]
However, Arctic waters are particularly sensitive and vulnerable to oil spills from ship accidents. The absence of adequate infrastructure and the remoteness of the region mean it can take days or even weeks to respond to a spill. This risk is further compounded by the anticipated increase in transport activities in the area. The Arctic Council, established by the Ottawa Declaration in 1996, is a consensus-based intergovernmental forum addressing Arctic issues. It comprises eight permanent member states (the United States, Russia, Canada, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Denmark), six indigenous organisation members, and 13 observer countries.[3]
The Council operates on a rotating chairmanship system, with each of the eight Arctic states holding the position for two years. It has played a crucial role in fostering scientific cooperation and sustainable development, particularly on environmental challenges, including climate change. The Council’s work has been instrumental in maintaining peaceful relations in the Arctic region in the post-Cold War era.[4] While military matters fall outside its mandate, the cooperative activities facilitated by the Council provide a platform for Arctic states to engage in constructive dialogue, mitigating potential conflicts or misunderstandings.
Even during periods of geopolitical tension, such as the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Syrian Civil War, the Council continued its cooperative initiatives. These included research projects and the establishment of regulations on critical issues such as fisheries, transport, search and rescue operations, and environmental impact assessments. However, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the remaining seven members temporarily suspended the Council’s activities. This decision froze ongoing projects on scientific cooperation, including those addressing emergencies like oil spills, biodiversity preservation, marine debris reduction, resource-saving technologies, and the protection of indigenous cultural and historical heritage. By June 2022, some project work had resumed without Russian participation.
The absence of Russia, which possesses over half of the Arctic coastline, has diminished the scope and effectiveness of the Council, jeopardising its ability to achieve its objectives. The isolation of Russia from Council activities has also hindered cooperation by restricting access to Russian climate and environmental research. Consequently, Russia has sought alliances with non-Arctic countries, organising events with its so-called ‘friendly countries’, including China, Brazil, Mongolia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Russia has also sought partnerships with organisations and regions such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Latin America, the Middle East, the Gulf States, Turkey,[5] and Thailand.[6]
China, identifying itself as a ‘Near Arctic State’ in its 2018 Arctic Policy White Paper and holding observer status in the Council, may view this crisis as an opportunity to expand Arctic governance to the international community and enhance its influence. Additionally, Russia’s exclusion from the Council could lead it to accelerate its ongoing armament and infrastructure development activities in the region.
Efforts are underway to find a resolution. Norway, currently holding the Presidency of the Council, has been negotiating with Russia to address the issue.[7] Notably, Russia participated in a virtual exercise among the Arctic states in March 2024, simulating a major oil spill off Norway’s northern coast.[8] Despite these steps, a return to the previous cooperative spirit appears unlikely while the Ukraine War persists. Nevertheless, limited collaboration in the Arctic continues, even amid heightened tensions.
Consequently, the permanent loss of this forum, which assists in vital policy work as a result of the further erosion of political co-operation between the Arctic States, would make it more difficult for the West to control Russian activities in the region, while at the same time exacerbating the effects of climate change for the entire world. While Russia has stated that it does not intend to create an alternative forum to the Arctic Council and will remain in the Council—provided its right to participate in its meetings and work is respected—it is believed that continued isolationist efforts could undermine the ‘core circumpolar vision’ at the centre of the Arctic Council. In light of these considerations, the power of diplomacy is needed in this area more than ever to preserve the Council’s capacity to address the shared challenges facing the Arctic region.
[1] Güçyetmez, F., 2024, Introduction to Arctic Geopolitics, Güçyetmez, F., Dmello, J. R., Arctic 8 Policy Reassessing International Relations, s.4-13, Transnational Press.
[2] “DoD Announces Publication of 2024 Arctic Strategy”, US Department of Defense, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/-1/0/DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY-2024.PDF, (Retrieved: 19.12.2024).
[3] Arktik Konseyi Resmi Web Sitesi, https://arctic-council.org/, (Retrieved: 19.12.2024).
[4] Dyck, C., On thin ice: The Arctic Council’s uncertain future, Marine Policy 163 (2024) 106060
[5] Kalfaoğlu, R., Viakhivera, N., Turkey Plans to Earn Recognition in the Arctic by Developing Its Scientific Competencies, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/interview/turkey-plans-to-earn-recognition-in-the-arctic-by-developing-its-scientific-competencies/?ysclid=m4scamkmzc956722664, (Retrieved: 19.12.2024).
[6] Edvardsen, A., Light at the End of the Tunnel for the Arctic Council, High North News, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/massive-russian-mobilization-arctic-high-north-news-overview-shows, (Retrieved: 19.12.2024).
[7] Canova, E., Pic, P., The Arctic Council in Transition: Challenges and Perspectives for the new Norwegian Chairship, The Arctic Institute, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/arctic-council-transition-challenges-perspectives-new-norwegian-chairship/, (Retrieved: 19.12.2024).
[8] Fouche, G., Dickie, G., West, Russia manage limited cooperation in Arctic despite chill in ties, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/west-russia-manage-limited-cooperation-arctic-despite-chill-ties-2024-05-14/, (Retrieved: 19.12.2024).
