Myanmar Junta Leader Min Aung Hlaing paid his first official visit to China on November 6, 2024. This visit reveals the efforts of the new Myanmar administration, which began with the coup in 2021, to deepen its close relations and strategic alignment with China. The timing of these contacts is quite remarkable given the geopolitical balances in Asia and the effects of internal conflicts in Myanmar’s border regions. Myanmar’s internal instability and economic challenges also necessitate different strategies in China’s approach to this neighbor.
After the 2021 coup, Myanmar has been plagued by internal security problems and widespread economic woes. The junta government’s inability to maintain its central authority has led to a greater show of resistance by ethnic groups and democratic movements in the country. For China, this situation posed a significant threat to both border security and the security of trade routes in the region. Since Myanmar’s ethnic minorities are located on China’s border, China needs to take different measures to stabilize these conflict zones.
China’s foreign policy towards Myanmar is guided by the same principle of “non-interference in internal affairs” as its foreign policy towards other countries. The complete destabilization of Myanmar has raised both security and economic concerns for China. In order to maintain economic cooperation with Myanmar, China has not imposed any open sanctions against the post-coup government, but has continued its projects in Myanmar. These projects include China’s large investments in Myanmar’s infrastructure as part of the “Belt and Road Initiative”. China’s focus on infrastructure projects, especially in the border regions, directly aims to ensure security and stability.[1]
One of the main objectives of Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to Kunming is to strengthen Myanmar’s role in regional projects by participating in economic cooperation summits. The China-led Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) and Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) meetings aim to develop regional infrastructure. The ACMECS and GMS are large-scale projects aimed at strengthening economic integration in Asia and envisage joint cooperation with China, particularly in infrastructural areas such as logistics, energy and trade corridors. In this context, Myanmar’s participation in these meetings contributes to consolidating China’s economic and political influence in Southeast Asia.[2]
China wants to increase its investments in Myanmar, especially due to the country’s strategic location to the Indian Ocean. The fact that Myanmar is seen as “China’s gateway to South Asia” makes economic cooperation between the two countries even more imperative. In particular, China’s investments, such as the Kyaukphyu Port Project, aim to diversify and secure oil and gas transportation routes in the region. Thus, China aims to ensure energy security by reducing risks in the South China Sea.
China and Myanmar have centuries-old historical ties. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were strained at times, especially during the Cold War, but China’s interest in Myanmar continued through economic development projects. Although ethnic conflicts and military coups in Myanmar have limited China’s economic activities in Myanmar, China has generally preferred to maintain diplomatic relations even in times of instability.
China’s support for Myanmar has led the relationship between the two countries to be described as a model of “development-oriented cooperation”. This relationship model allows China to contribute to regional security and stability through direct investments. China’s quest for stability and economic cooperation efforts in Myanmar could have a decisive impact on the balance of power in the Asia Pacific. China’s increased engagement with Myanmar as part of its strategy to strengthen its relations with ASEAN countries is in competition with the United States’ (US) “Indo-Pacific Strategy” in the region. The US aims to reduce Chinese influence in the region by increasing its investments in Southeast Asian countries. Therefore, Myanmar’s cooperation with China is seen as a worrying development by the West.[3]
Myanmar Junta Leader Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to China for the first time since the coup in 2021 is an important development in terms of regional dynamics and relations between the two countries. When evaluated in the context of Myanmar’s domestic political situation, China’s strategic interests in the region, and international reactions, this visit is noteworthy for its various dimensions. These contacts are a test not only for bilateral relations but also for regional geopolitical balances. This reinforces China’s stance of pursuing economic cooperation in Myanmar and its efforts to increase its strategic importance in the region. Thus, it can be argued that in the future, China’s relations with Myanmar will continue on an economic, security and strategic axis.
[1] “Myanmar military government chief on first visit to ally China since coup”, Aljazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/5/myanmar-military-government-chief-on-first-visit-to-ally-china-since-coup, (Accessed: 09.11.2024).
[2] “Myanmar junta chief to make first China visit since seizing power”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-junta-chief-make-first-china-visit-since-seizing-power-2024-11-04/?utm_source=chatgpt.com, (Accessed: 05.11.2024).
[3] “Head of Myanmar’s military government Gen. Min Aung Hlaing visits China for first time since taking power”, The Hindu, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/head-of-myanmars-military-government-gen-min-aung-hlaing-visits-china-for-first-time-since-taking-power/article68831499.ece, (Accessed: 09.11.2024).
