Latin America is a region that has been struggling for years with high crime rates, organized crime, corruption and economic inequality. In many countries where the state is weak, security problems have a direct impact on the daily lives of the population, and instability has hampered economic growth. In recent years, the tough security policies implemented by El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele have been cited as a model for dealing with such problems. However, the applicability and sustainability of this model across Latin America is questionable in terms of regional dynamics, human rights and economic impacts.
The cornerstone of Bukele’s security policies is a zero tolerance approach in the fight against organized crime. Under the state of emergency declared in 2022, tens of thousands of gang members were arrested, legal processes were accelerated and the country’s largest gang organizations were dismantled. A mega-prison called “CECOT” (Centro de Confinamiento del Terrorismo) was built to isolate criminals, and military and police patrols were increased throughout the country. As a result of these policies, homicide rates have fallen sharply and El Salvador, once one of the most dangerous countries in the world, is now one of the safest regions in Latin America.
Bukele’s policies have been interpreted internationally as an attempt to silence dissent and restrict fundamental freedoms. But is the Bukele model really sustainable? Are other countries in the region preparing to adopt this model?
Echoes of El Salvador’s security policies are increasingly being heard across Latin America. Colombian President Gustavo Petro has declared a state of emergency in certain regions due to the growing threat of terrorism and organized crime in his country.[1] While Petro refrained from replicating Bukele’s repressive security measures, he recognized the need to ensure strong state control against the rising tide of violence. This decision has sparked a new debate on whether other countries in the region should also adopt harsh security policies.
Colombia’s security challenges are intertwined with former guerrilla groups such as the FARC and ELN, as well as growing drug cartels and regional gang wars. Petro has stated that he aims to both increase security measures and introduce social reforms to help the state break out of the cycle of violence.[2] However, it remains to be seen how Bukele’s model, which seems successful in the short term but has been criticized in many ways, will have an impact in Colombia.
Adding a historical perspective to Latin America’s security policies can help to understand whether the Bukele model is unique. In Mexico, Felipe Calderón’s war against drug cartels between 2006 and 2012 demonstrated the negative consequences of the state’s direct use of violence in the fight against crime. Similarly, in Colombia, Álvaro Uribe’s tough security policies against guerrilla groups and criminal organizations between 2002 and 2010 were effective in the short term but led to social divisions in the long term.
The economic dimension of security policies is an often overlooked but critical element in terms of its long-term effects. While increased security measures can encourage foreign investment and strengthen economic stability, the effects on sectors such as tourism and trade are more complex.
Bukele’s security policies can create a positive climate of confidence for international investors, but undermining the rule of law can lead to long-term instability by reducing economic predictability. If security strategies are not supported by economic development and social welfare policies, criminal organizations may move their activities underground and social fragility may persist. The sustainability of security policies therefore depends not only on repression-based approaches, but also on structural reforms and inclusive economic policies.
If Latin American countries want to permanently reduce crime rates, they need to implement long-term economic and social reforms, not just repressive policies. Education and employment projects can deter young people from joining criminal organizations. Reforming police organizations can curb corruption. Drug policy reforms can weaken the criminal economy by breaking the economic power of cartels.
While new debates are emerging on the future of security policies in Latin America, the long-term effects of hard security practices on social dynamics should not be ignored. In particular, the potential spread of the Bukele model poses risks for democratic stability in the region. Harsh security measures backed by strong leaders may increase the sense of security among the population, but practices such as restrictions on individual freedoms and extrajudicial arrests may erode democratic values. Moreover, the lack of economic disparities and social reforms in the countries of the region may cause such policies to lose popular support and increase social tensions in the long run. Therefore, regional leaders need to develop more holistic and long-term solutions rather than relying solely on repressive policies.
The increasing number of states of emergency in Latin America raises the question of whether a new security model is being established across the region. While the success of Bukele’s methods may attract other heads of state, it remains to be seen how they will affect democratic balances in the long term. If security measures are not implemented within the rule of law, this model could lead to the strengthening of repressive regimes and the restriction of basic rights of the population.
Moreover, the long-term effects of these security policies in Latin America on the social structure should not be ignored. Strengthening state authority through harsh security measures may provide stability in the short term, but the possibility of repressed communities developing distrust of the state and the emergence of new areas of conflict should also be considered. When society’s need for security is not balanced with social justice and democratic rights, it can be difficult to find a sustainable solution.
[1] “Gustavo Petro: From ‘Total Peace’ to a State of Emergency.”, El País, english.elpais.com/international/2025-01-27/gustavo-petro-from-total-peace-to-a-state-of-emergency.html, (Accessed Date: 02.10.2025).
[2] Ibid.
