Analysis

NATO and Russia-China Competition in the Arctic

Russia has more military bases in the Arctic than NATO.
NATO and Russia competition in the poles, which is a strategic region due to its energy resources and location, is becoming increasingly contentious.
China supports Russia with economic investments in the region because its involvement in the conflict in the poles may pose an additional security problem.

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The Arctic has recently emerged as a new arena for the longstanding tensions between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Due to its strategic importance in terms of energy resources and location, competition between NATO and Russia in the Arctic is becoming increasingly contentious, with China’s cooperation and investment in the region alongside Russia further intensifying the situation. Neither side has yet succeeded in establishing full dominance, but the positioning of bases and centers suggests that a Cold War-like rivalry in the Arctic may be possible in the future.

Russia’s ambitions in the Arctic can be traced back to the era of the Soviet Union (USSR) and even earlier. The USSR was aware that it could leverage the region for economic gains, yet challenging economic conditions and insufficient technology prevented it from establishing control. After the 2000s, however, the situation shifted, and Russia began reshaping its Arctic policies, intensifying its rivalry with NATO. Since 2005, Russia has reopened and modernized former Soviet-era military bases. Additionally, it has developed new hypersonic missiles designed to evade U.S. sensors and defense systems.[i]

During the Cold War, despite NATO’s limited technological capabilities, its presence in the region was seen as a challenge to Russia’s strategic interests. Today, NATO’s presence continues to serve as a balancing factor in the ongoing Arctic competition. Within the framework of the Arctic Council, the presence of eight countries in the Arctic is evident, with the United States being one of the member nations. However, according to some experts, it may take the West at least ten years to catch up with Russia’s military presence in the Arctic.[ii] As a matter of fact, Russia currently has more military bases in the Arctic than NATO.

The poles have a rich potential as an energy source. As a matter of fact, it is estimated that there are 90 billion barrels of oil and 1,669 trillion cubic meters of natural gas.[iii] Given that the energy sector, particularly oil and natural gas, makes up a large portion of Russia’s economy, the Arctic represents a significant economic resource for the country. Considering the limitations of Russia’s economy and the potential depletion of its current oil and gas reserves, access to these resources in the Arctic could enable future economic growth for Russia. Furthermore, this access could even allow Russia to rival major oil powers such as Saudi Arabia, the Caucasus, and Norway in the future. 

Russia’s access to these resources could be seen as a potential threat for NATO. In this respect, NATO’s dominance in the region could pose a risk to the future of Russia’s economy. It seems unlikely that European countries will remain unaffected by this rivalry. Indeed, Russian dominance in the Arctic could exert pressure on European nations, especially those close to the Arctic, such as Norway, Finland, and Iceland.

Another potential in the Arctic lies within the transportation sector. The faster melting of Arctic ice is bringing significant changes to the Northern Sea Route. According to some analysts, this melting has highlighted the commercial viability of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), as shipping distances could be reduced by up to 40% with this route.[iv] Indeed, Russia’s increased control in the Arctic could mean significant influence over the Northern Sea Route. Given the growing importance of this route, China’s investment in the Arctic alongside Russia can be seen as a strategic move to strengthen its position in international trade.

Militarily, the Arctic holds strategic importance for Russia. The primary objective is to secure the second-strike capability of the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force stationed on the Kola Peninsula in the event of a potential conflict with NATO. This area hosts seven of the Russian Navy’s eleven ballistic missile submarines. Another critical objective is to maintain Russia’s ability to conduct operations in the North Atlantic and European Arctic regions in a potential NATO conflict.[v] From here it can be seen that the tensions with NATO have an important place in shaping Russia’s policy in the poles. 

NATO, however, does not appear likely to back down in response to Russia’s military presence. Recently, Admiral Rob Bauer, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, made a statement affirming that NATO would protect the interests of its allies in the region.[vi] It seems highly likely that NATO will increase the number of its military bases in the Arctic in the future, as Russia continues to invest in its military presence in the region. However, the strain imposed by the Russia-Ukraine War on the Russian economy and military should not be underestimated. This could impact Russia’s Arctic projects, at least until the war concludes.

China emerges as another superpower positioned alongside Russia in this rivalry. Due to the potential for additional security concerns arising from involvement in the Arctic struggle, China supports Russia economically in the region through investments. This strategy aims to alleviate security issues in the surrounding area while seeking to profit from cooperation with Russia in resource extraction and infrastructure development.[vii] In this context, it appears that China does not wish to jeopardize its relations with NATO countries while seeking to advance its cooperation with Russia. Moreover, China’s presence in a resource-rich area where both NATO and Russia are already established serves as an indication of its determination to solidify its status as a superpower.  

A significant part of China’s investments in the Arctic focuses on digitalization. In this context, China aims to digitalize the Northern Sea Route using fiber optic cables. Furthermore, China is positioning polar satellites in the region, allowing it to monitor sea and ice movements and track shipping routes. However, China’s satellite coverage in the Arctic now exceeds that of Russia, leading to an increased reliance of Russia on Chinese data for its activities in the region.[viii]

The diversification of Chinese investments across various sectors and its data dependence on Russia has the potential to increase China’s dominance in the region in the future. However, at present, it appears that China prefers to remain in the background of the Russia-NATO tensions. Indeed, there is a significant volume of trade between China and NATO member countries, and China is avoiding actions that could jeopardize this relationship. 


[i] Kawoosa, V. M. (2022, November 16). Russia has more Arctic military bases than NATO – why it matters. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/graphics/ARCTIC-SECURITY/zgvobmblrpd/, (Access Date:25.10.2024).

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] McVey, R. A. (2022). Russian Strategic Interest in Arctic Heats Up as Ice Melts. LSE IDEAS. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep45246, (Access Date: 25.10.2024).

[iv] Ibid.

[v] Rumer, E., Sokolsky, R., & Stronski, P. (2021, March 29). Russia in the Arctic—A critical examination. Carnegie  Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved October 25, 2024, from https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/03/russia-in-the-arctica-critical-examination?lang=en, (Access Date: 25.10.2024).

[vi] “NATO will defend Allied interests in the Arctic” says Chair of NATO Military Committee. (2024, October 21). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_229940.htm, (Access Data: 25.10.2024).

[vii] Odgaard, L. (2024, August 5). Russian-Chinese cooperation in the Arctic: Will NATO step up to the challenge? The Asan Forum. https://theasanforum.org/russian-chinese-cooperation-in-the-arctic-will-nato-step-up-to-the-challenge/, (Access Date: 25.10.2024).

[viii] Ibid.

Itır BOZDAĞ
Itır BOZDAĞ
Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi (ODTÜ) Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyoloji Bölümü

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