The Ukraine Crisis that broke out in 2022 and the process of geopolitical restructuring, which gained momentum with Donald Trump’s return to the Presidency of the United States (USA) on January 20, 2025, have led to significant transformations in the foreign policy priorities of the Central Asian Turkic republics, along with critical turning points in the European Union (EU)-centered West and the global context.
The USA’s strategic preferences to contain China and avoid direct confrontation with Russia have led the EU to become a more proactive actor in multilateral crises; in this context, the EU has developed a balancing policy against China’s influence over the Middle Corridor and has directly turned toward Central Asia. The most concrete reflection of this strategic orientation was seen at the EU-Central Asia Summit, held in the city of Samarkand, Uzbekistan, on April 3-4, 2025, which carried the character of the first official political-level summit between the EU and the Central Asian countries.[1] Within the framework of the summit, cooperation and investment-oriented projects in sectors such as energy, pharmaceuticals, textiles, logistics, and infrastructure came to the agenda, and the emphasis on the Trans-Caspian trade corridor demonstrated that the EU’s strategic interest toward the region had deepened not only economically but also geopolitically.
Within the scope of this foreign policy opening, the orientation of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan toward institutionalizing their diplomatic relations with the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) should be evaluated, on the one hand, as aiming to accelerate the integration process with the EU, and on the other hand, as part of their realistic and multidimensional foreign policy pursuits to diversify their own regional interests. On December 19, 2024, Uzbekistan accredited its Rome-based ambassador Abat Fayzullayev to the GCASC, thus becoming the first Turkic state to appoint an ambassador to this country.[2] Subsequently, during the visit of Kazakhistan Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu to Nicosia on March 6, 2025, the trade volume for the year 2024 was recorded as 7.1 million dollars (6.2 million dollars in exports, 949 thousand dollars in imports), the amount of direct investment was recorded as 227.6 million dollars, and the total investment of the GCASC in Kazakhstan exceeded 4.8 billion dollars.[3] On March 31, 2025, the Rome-based ambassador of Turkmenistan, T. Komekov, presented his letter of credence to GCASC President Nikos Christodoulides.[4]
These developments show that these three countries, which are members of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), are acting based on their own foreign policy priorities rather than developing a collective diplomatic stance regarding the Cyprus issue. This orientation should be read not from a critical perspective but based on rational interests. The deepening economic relations of the countries in question with the EU and their desire for direct access to European markets have turned the steps taken toward institutionalizing diplomatic relations with the GCASC into a realistic foreign policy practice.
On the other hand, it should not be overlooked that Russia—although no longer as influential in the post-Soviet geography as it once was but still relatively present in Central Asia—has played an indirect role in these preferences through its influence in Cyprus. According to some sources, Russia’s influence on the island has largely been shaped through the GCASC, with the southern part of the island functioning as a hub for money laundering, evading sanctions, and accessing the European financial system. Under the “golden passport” program, which was in effect between 2007 and 2020, 2,869 Russian citizens reportedly obtained EU citizenship, and oligarchs close to Moscow (for example, Viktor Vekselberg and some former KGB-linked figures) assumed influential positions in financial institutions such as the “Bank of Cyprus.”[5] It has been stated that this structure continued to exist despite EU interventions following the 2013 financial crisis, and that the GCASC has remained a priority financial and geopolitical sphere of influence for Russia. In this context, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) has been viewed as a secondary position more suitable for sanctions evasion and grey-zone activities due to its unregulated structure.
This strategic picture has further underscored the increasing geopolitical and financial importance of Cyprus within the international system. Following security threats emanating from Russia, it has been reported that the United Kingdom has tightened its security measures concerning its military presence in the GCASC, particularly considering overseas bases such as Akrotiri as potential targets.[6] The official visit of British Prime Minister Keir Starmer to the GCASC on December 10, 2024, aimed to block illicit Russian financial flows and to ensure a closer strategic alignment with the West within the Euro-Atlantic alliance axis. However, the fact that contacts were limited only to the GCASC led to criticism from the TRNC, which is located in the northern part of the island and is one of the principal parties to the Cyprus issue, and also disrupted the search for diplomatic balance on the island.[7]
In contrast, at a time when the Central Asian Turkic republics have been shaping their foreign policies primarily based on national interests, the developing relations between the TRNC and Azerbaijan have presented an exceptional diplomatic tendency within the Turkic World, showing that principles of solidarity based on historical and cultural ties can still be effective. During the visit of the Azerbaijani National Assembly delegation to the TRNC between March 19-23, 2025, cooperation potential in the fields of energy, tourism, and education was emphasized in the meeting with President Ersin Tatar; Tatar stated, “The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Azerbaijan have significant cooperation potential, especially in the field of energy.”[8]
The increasing geopolitical competition on a global scale, the deepening of multipolarity, and the transformation of regional power centers have significantly shaped the foreign policy reflexes of the Turkic World. In this context, the Cyprus issue presents a distinct fault line in the production of a common foreign policy under the umbrella of the OTS. In particular, the steps taken by the Central Asian Turkic republics to establish diplomatic relations with the GCASC show that these countries have prioritized their economic and political integration processes with the EU and repositioned their foreign policies by taking into account the opportunities of the multipolar system. This orientation is also related to efforts to balance China’s pressure over the Middle Corridor and to establish equilibrium in the Russia-EU rivalry. Although these steps do not directly target the status of the TRNC, they weaken the potential of the Turkic World to form a common diplomatic discourse and make it more difficult to collectively defend the Cyprus cause –which has historical and political significance– at the diplomatic level.
In this framework, ambassadorial appointments to the GCASC should not be interpreted as attempts by OTS member states to oppose Türkiye, but rather as realistic foreign policy preferences shaped by the prioritization of their own national interests and the pursuit of strategic autonomy within a multipolar international system. In particular, the increase in the EU’s economic and diplomatic interest toward the region, efforts to balance China’s influence over the Middle Corridor, and the access advantages derived from the GCASC’s EU membership have prompted countries such as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan to take steps in this direction. Despite Türkiye’s determined stance on the political equality and recognition of the TRNC, the fact that this sensitivity has not been transformed into a common diplomatic line within the OTS –combined with balancing yet cautious approaches, such as Azerbaijan refraining from establishing official relations with the GCASC while still not recognizing the TRNC– has made the divergences in positions within the organization more visible. Therefore, if Türkiye shows a willingness to reframe the Cyprus cause as a common political issue of the Turkic World through constructive dialogue and diplomatic coordination in light of these developments, and convenes an extraordinary summit within the OTS toward this goal, it would constitute a strategic step both for softening existing differences and for building a common foreign policy vision that would enhance the TRNC’s international visibility.
At the same time, the success of a possible extraordinary summit to be held within the OTS under Türkiye’s leadership depends not only on diplomatic coordination among the Turkic states but also on the careful management of the current international pressure environment. The United Nations’ (UN) non-recognition of the TRNC and the political and economic support the EU provides to the GCASC create both direct and indirect pressures on the OTS member states; this situation leads these countries to take more cautious steps so as not to jeopardize their integration processes with Europe. In this context, instead of rigid approaches such as direct recognition, strengthening cultural, economic, academic, and parliamentary diplomacy channels that would increase the international visibility of the TRNC could offer a shared diplomatic ground that can be supported by all OTS members. Such an approach could emerge as a foreign policy model that both preserves the historical principle of solidarity within the Turkic World without conflicting with national interests and, in the long term, strengthens the institutionalization of Turkic World diplomacy, strategic coherence in foreign policy, and the capacity to produce collective reflexes.
[1] “Samarkand EU–Central Asia Summit: A New Chapter in Economic Partnership”, EIN,https://www.einpresswire.com/article/799419171/samarkand-eu-central-asia-summit-a-new-chapter-in-economic-partnership, (Access Date: 09.04.2025).
[2] “Uzbekistan Accredits First Ambassador to Republic of Cyprus”, Gazeta, https://www.gazeta.uz/en/2024/12/20/cyprus, (Access Date: 09.04.2025).
[3] Arailym Temirgaliyeva, “Kazakhstan, Cyprus Aim to Boost Bilateral Cooperation”, Qazinform, https://qazinform.com/news/kazakhstan-cyprus-aim-to-boost-bilateral-cooperation-84ef7a, (Access Date: 09.04.2025).
[4] “Ambassador of Turkmenistan Presented Credentials to the President of the Republic of Cyprus”, Turkmenistan Golden Age, https://turkmenistan.gov.tm/en/post/93531/ambassador-turkmenistan-presented-credentials-president-republic-cyprus, (Access Date: 09.04.2025).
[5] Aynur Kerimu, “Cyprus: Hub for Russian Influence, Money Laundering, and Sanctions Evasion”, Jamestown, https://jamestown.org/program/cyprus-hub-for-russian-influence-money-laundering-and-sanctions-evasion, (Access Date: 09.04.2025).
[6] Camilla Turner, “Defence Chiefs Hold Emergency Talks Over Russian Threat to Cyprus and Gibraltar Bases”, Telegraph, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/12/05/defence-chiefs-emergency-talks-russia-cyprus-gibraltar, (Access Date: 09.04.2025).
[7] “Britain and Cyprus Team up to Stop İllicit Russian Cash Flow”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/britains-starmer-cyprus-vow-boost-ties-2024-12-10, (Access Date: 09.04.2025).
[8] “Ersin Tatar TRSK i Azerbaidzhan Mogut Aktivno Sotrudnichat v Sferah Energetiki i Turizma”, Azertag, https://azertag.az/ru/xeber/ersin_tatar_trsk_i_azerbaidzhan_mogut_aktivno_sotrudnichat_v_sferah_energetiki_i_turizma-3473695, (Access Date: 09.04.2025).
