Is Normalization Possible in Russian-Greek Relations?

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After Russia started the intervention against Ukraine, which it called “Special Military Operation” on February 24, 2022, Greece, like other European Union (EU) member states, joined the sanctions targeting the Kremlin administration. As can be expected, the situation in question adversely affected the relations on the Moscow-Athens line. As a matter of fact, the Kremlin has included Greece in the “Russia’s Non-Friendly Countries List”.

Moreover, not only the Athenian administration’s position on the war in Ukraine; it is seen that the general foreign policy understanding is in harmony with the United States of America (USA), especially in recent years. In a sense, Greece is becoming a country where the United States is stockpiling weapons. The situation in Alexandroupoli confirms this. It is possible to argue that the increase in the military presence of the USA in the region is worrying for Russia.

In addition to all these, Greece is experiencing an armament frenzy and, in this context, imports from countries such as France and Germany, as well as the USA, for land, air and naval forces. This means that Athens is trying to get the military support of the West by instrumentalizing its military modernization discourses. The aforementioned situation is confirmed by the military exercises carried out with the participation of the Greek Army and Western states.

At this point, Greece-Western relations are not only related to the EU; It can also be claimed to be important in terms of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) dimension. Because the majority of the actors participating in the exercises in question consist of NATO member countries. The Moscow administration, on the other hand, thinks that NATO is besieging it, and most fundamentally believes that the Russia-Ukraine War is the “Russia-Western War”. Therefore, Greece is an important part of the collective West. As a matter of fact, the Athenian administration, like other Western states, provides military aid to Ukraine. This creates discomfort in the Kremlin.

On the other hand, with the projects like East-Med, which are not expected to be successful due to the fact that Greece is not rational, and the alliance relations it has developed, Greece tries to bring itself to the forefront in the face of the energy crisis, and tries to become a supplier country in the context of the Eastern Mediterranean, and where other suppliers are in Europe. positioning as a route country in energy export towards Turkey; in other words, it seems that it wants to become an energy hub. Russia, whose most important source of income is energy exports, is at the forefront of the issues that Russia is uncomfortable with regarding the war in Ukraine, and the end of its energy-based relations with the EU. Therefore, the efforts of Athens on this issue also cause unrest in Moscow.

As can be understood, from the perspective of Russia, Greece is a country that has internalized the Atlanticist line. This makes it extremely difficult to repair the relations on the Moscow-Athens line. Because Greece acts with the aim of turning the Russia-Ukraine War into an opportunity in order to gain maximum gain in the conflicts in its immediate surroundings and carries out appropriate cooperation processes. This can also be called crisis opportunism.

As a reflection of the situation in question, in a statement to Rossiya 24 TV on 9 June 2023, Russian Ambassador to Athens Andrey Maslov stated that his country does not expect any improvement in its relations with Greece anytime soon.[1] Claiming that Athens destroyed its relations with Moscow on its own will, Maslov emphasized that Greece was acting on the EU line.[2]

The main goal of this policy, which enables Greece to gain gains in military relations and energy, is to support the theses that are against international law, which it defends in its immediate surroundings, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean, with the support of the West. On the other hand, the positioning of Athens as part of the anti-Moscow front has some costs for Greece. For example, in 2022, Greece hosted around 40 thousand Russian tourists. This figure is 83 percent less than in 2021 and 94.8 percent less than before 2019.[3]

Despite the aforementioned data, it can be said that Greece finds its current positioning in terms of military and political goals and energy geopolitics more suitable for its own interests. Of course, this situation also complicates the recovery of relations on the Moscow-Athens line. As a matter of fact, Maslov’s statements mentioned above also point to this.

As a result, after the Russo-Ukrainian War, Greece was positioned as part of the collective West. Moreover, Athens has been one of the actors who most eagerly defended the ceiling price tariff applied to Russia for oil. It is seen that Athens, which provides military aid to Ukraine and is included in the sanctions targeting the Moscow administration, wants to maximize its own interests in many areas from energy geopolitics to military modernization through this strategy. But Athens’ policies are causing discomfort in Moscow. Therefore, as Maslov stated, a significant improvement is not expected in the relations on the Moscow-Athens line, at least in the short term.


[1] “Rusya: Yunanistan ile Aramızın Düzelmesini Beklemiyoruz”, Aydınlık, https://www.aydinlik.com.tr/haber/rusya-yunanistan-ile-aramizin-duzelmesini-beklemiyoruz-395120, (Date of Accession: 09.06.2023).

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

Dr. Doğacan BAŞARAN
Dr. Doğacan BAŞARAN
Dr. Doğacan BAŞARAN, 2014 yılında Gazi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü’nden mezun olmuştur. Yüksek lisans derecesini, 2017 yılında Giresun Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı’nda sunduğu ‘’Uluslararası Güç İlişkileri Bağlamında İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrası Hegemonik Mücadelelerin İncelenmesi’’ başlıklı teziyle almıştır. Doktora derecesini ise 2021 yılında Trakya Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı‘nda hazırladığı “İmparatorluk Düşüncesinin İran Dış Politikasına Yansımaları ve Milliyetçilik” başlıklı teziyle alan Başaran’ın başlıca çalışma alanları Uluslararası ilişkiler kuramları, Amerikan dış politikası, İran araştırmaları ve Afganistan çalışmalarıdır. Başaran iyi derecede İngilizce ve temel düzeyde Farsça bilmektedir.

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