The 2020s have brought four years of internal crises for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Domestic disturbance, West’s oppressive policies and sanctions, unexpected death of the President Raisi in a helicopter crash, and the unexpected rise of a new actor in the elections have, once again, drawn international attention to Iran.
After the first and second rounds of presidential elections held in June and July 2024, victory of “Principled-Reformist” presidential candidate Masoud Pezeshkian has sparked curiosity regarding whether it will pave the way for possible changes in Iran and how it will have effects on the regional balances.
During the Pezeshkian era, it is expected that relations with the West will be reevaluated. Nevertheless, this is anticipated to occur not through EU-centered West mechanism but through governments where the far-right is on the rise. Essentially, Iran’s attitude, which is not expected to compromise on the tension in Iran-Israel relations, is more likely to be supported by the EU member states that exhibit an anti-Israel attitude.
On Sunday, July 28, 2024, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei officially approved Masoud Pezeshkian as president the president of the state.[1] After this point, it can be said that a new era has begun in Iran. The policy that Iran will follow addresses the “balance” policy that regional states have recently leaned towards. The main reasons for instability within the country and societal discontent are the persistent economic crisis and the suppression of women’s and minority rights, which may bring about a possible period of détente. Considering the serious issues faced by the country, which is at the center of Western sanctions, it is foreseen that a new chapter in EU-Iran relations will open. This situation is expected to leverage Iran’s geopolitical position, which connects the East with the West and the North with the South.
Iran’s regional policies must first be examined through the lens of the South Caucasus. As it is remembered, in recent periods, the arrest and detention of Iranian intelligence agents in Azerbaijan were met with strong reactions from both the public and the Azerbaijani government. These events have significant negative impacts on Azerbaijan-Iran relations. Considering the sensitivity of the dynamics within Iran, the increasing influence of Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus has the potential to retrigger internal issues within Iran.
While it is anticipated that Pezeshkian will take steps to reduce tensions with Azerbaijan in regional policies and relations with the South Caucasus, it can also be asserted that cooperation and relations with Armenia will continue. In this context, there may be some disputes within the administration regarding the decision-making process related to the Zangezur corridor. In evaluating Pezeshkian’s regional stance, he will not be able to act based entirely on his own initiative and will remain committed to Iran’s national interests.
Regarding the relations with the West, some foreign media outlets indicate that a brand-new era will begin for Iran. This era speaks of an Iran that maintains good relations with the West. However, as mentioned above, a radical change in Iran’s foreign policy is not expected. It can be said that Iran will continue its policies during the Pezeshkian era, aiming to position itself between both the East and the West with a balanced policy approach. This is evident from the meeting held by Iran’s Foreign Minister, Ali Bagheri, with China’s Ambassador to Tehran, Cong Peiwu, in July 2024, where they discussed the latest developments in bilateral relations and the most important issues related to regional and international cooperation areas. [2]
It can be stated that the issue of regulating Iran’s relations with the West will be entirely limited to Continental Europe. Although Pezeshkian expressed during the second round of the presidential elections that he wanted to work with the U.S. to lift sanctions and was open to returning to the 2015 Nuclear Agreement to revive Iran’s struggling economy[3], this scenario is unlikely soon due to the close strategic partnership with China and Supreme Leader Khamenei’s hardline stance against Israel suggests that significant progress in this direction will not be possible for an extended period.
As recalled, the Iranian Supreme Leader stated that the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran would not go “unpunished,” referring to Israel.[4] In relations with the West, many far-right-centered governments in Europe will take a stance against Israel. This is because alternative corridors opened by China to the West will serve as a “lifeline” for the European market during its crisis periods. Indeed, some far-right European governments that side with the Palestinians in the Israel-Palestine issue are expected to be open to cooperation with Iran, seeking to alleviate their current economic crises to some extent.
[1] “Reformist formally takes over as Iran’s president after supreme leader offers endorsement”, VOA, https://www.voanews.com/a/reformist-formally-takes-over-as-iran-s-president-after-supreme-leader-offers-endorsement-/7715851.html, (Accessed: July 31, 2024).
[2] “Iran acting FM China envoy meet discuss ties intl. Developments”, Islamic Respublic of Iran Ministry of Foreign Affairs, https://en.mfa.ir/portal/newsview/750375, (Accessed: July 31, 2024).
[3] Philip Loft, “What might Iran’s new president mean for foreign policy?”, UK Parliament, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/what-might-irans-new-president-mean-for-foreign-policy/, (Accessed: July 31, 2024).
[4] “Live: Hezbollah confirms killing of top commander in Israeli strike on Beirut”, France24, https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20240731-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-hamas-political-leader-ismail-haniyeh-assassinated-in-iran-in-israeli-airstrike, (Accessed: July 31, 2024).
