How Does the Central and Eastern European Countries Approach to the NATO Membership of Ukraine?

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On September 30, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed decrees approving the annexation of the Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Luhansk regions belonging to Ukraine.[1] Following this development, Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky stated that Kiev would apply to become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) through an accelerated procedure.[2]

On October 2, 2022, the heads of state of nine countries in Central and Eastern Europe issued a statement declaring that they will never recognize Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territory. These countries include the Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. In addition, the states stressed that they stand behind the decision taken by NATO fourteen years ago, which supports Ukraine’s desire to join the alliance in the upcoming years. In contrast, among the states not included in the declaration are Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovenia.[3]

One of the important points of the declaration is that all nine signatories are members of the NATO. It is also known that these countries are states in Central and Eastern Europe with a higher perception of threats to Russia.

It should be noted that it is not surprising that the nine countries have signed such a declaration. Because the Baltic and Eastern European countries are concerned that the turn may come to them after the attack launched by the Moscow administration against Ukraine on February 24, 2022.[4] In particular, the Baltic States are often at the forefront of decisions aimed at limiting Russia, both within NATO and the European Union (EU). So much so that these states have recently closed their borders to Russians and announced that they will not grant asylum even to Russian citizens fleeing from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s mobilization decision.[5] Therefore, it can be predicted that the Baltic countries will be the states that will most support Ukraine’s NATO membership.

Poland, the Czechia and Slovakia are among the nine countries that have signed the declaration. Considering that Poland is the center of Russophobia in Eastern Europe, it is quite usual for it to sign this declaration. It is seen that Poland and the Czechia have pursued a hawkish policy against the Moscow administration since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine War.

The administrations of Montenegro and North Macedonia also have signatures on the declaration.  First of all, these two countries are the newest NATO members. Podgorica joined the alliance in 2017, while Skopje became a member in 2020. Because of these characteristics, it can be suggested that both states are looking forward to NATO expansion and therefore Ukraine’s membership in the alliance.

On the other hand, the approach of the states that have not signed the declaration is as important as the countries that have signed the declaration. For example, President of Bulgaria Rumen Radev stated on September 4, 2022 that he opposes Ukraine’s membership in NATO until the war ends.[6] Following the overthrow of former Prime Minister Kirill Petkov in Bulgaria in June 2022 due to his failure to win a vote of confidence, Radev’s influence in Bulgarian politics has also increased.

During that period, there have been significant changes in Sofia’s policy towards Ukraine. Because the caretaker government has started gas negotiations with the Russian state-owned company Gazprom and wants to ensure energy security by maintaining natural gas supplies at least until the end of 2022 in accordance with the agreement valid until the end of the year. In particular, the approach of the winter months has caused decision-makers in Bulgaria to adopt a distant approach towards Kiev compared to Petkov. For example, it is known that on September 29, 2022, Ukraine requested heavy weapons from Bulgaria, but the interim government refused this request.[7] In addition, three different parties that are notable for their pro-Russian identity in the elections held on October 2, 2022,[8] their total 23-24% vote and whether they will take part in the new government in Bulgaria may also affect Sofia’s attitude towards Kiev’s NATO membership.

Another Eastern European country that does not have a signature on the declaration is Hungary. It can be stated that Budapest’s approach to Ukraine’s accelerated NATO membership will not be positive. This issue is related to Budapest’s disputes with Kiev rather than its relations with Moscow.

To clarify the situation, the government of Hungary is concerned about the policies applied by the Kiev administration to minority communities in Transcarpathia, which broke away from Hungary after the First World War and is currently a region of Ukraine. Already for this reason, Hungary was accused of trying to influence the outcome of the elections in the region in 2019, and Budapest blocked Ukraine’s NATO membership negotiations because of this dispute.[9] Therefore, it is possible that Hungary will raise this issue again regarding Ukraine’s membership.

It is seen that Croatia has not signed the declaration either. On August 8, 2022, Croatian President Zoran Milanovic stated that the sanctions against Russia are not working and stated that the sanctions are hurting Croatia.[10] Thus, Croatia has become the second EU and NATO member state after Hungary to express that sanctions against Russia are not working. Therefore, it can be said that it is not a surprise that the Zagreb administration did not sign the declaration.

Consequently, it should be emphasized that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are not in a consensus on Ukraine’s NATO membership. In this case, the size of the threat perceived by the countries from Russia and the energy factor may be effective. Due to the structure of NATO, every decision to be taken must be approved by all member states. This situation, on the other hand, may lead to the fact that Ukraine’s membership remains protracted.


[1] “Putin Signs Decrees Paving Way for Annexing Ukraine Territories of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/29/putin-to-sign-treaty-annexing-territories-in-ukraine-kremlin-says, (Date of Accession:04.10.2022).

[2] “Zelenskyy is Pushing for Fast-Track NATO Membership. Does Ukraine Have a Fighting Chance to Join the Club?”, Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/zelenskyy-is-pushing-for-fast-track-nato-membership-does-ukraine-have-a-fighting-chance-to-join-the-club/, (Date of Accession:04.10.2022).

[3] “Presidents of 9 NATO Countries Condemn Russian Annexations in Ukraine”, Al Arabiya English, https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2022/10/02/Presidents-of-9-NATO-countries-condemn-Russian-annexations-in-Ukraine, (Date of Accession:04.10.2022).

[4] Cenk Tamer, “NATO’nun Rusya’yla Mücadelesinde “Bölünme” ya da İşbirliği”, ANKASAM, https://www.ankasam.org/natonun-rusyayla-mucadelesinde-bolunme-ya-da-isbirligi/, (Date of Accession:05.10.2022).

[5] “Baltic States Say They Will Not Grant Asylum to Russians Fleeing Military Mobilisation”, Schengen News, https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/baltic-states-say-they-will-not-grant-asylum-to-russians-fleeing-military-mobilisation/, (Date of Accession:04.10.2022).

[6] “Bulgarian President Against Ukraine’s Membership in NATO”, Euractiv, https://www.euractiv.com/section/all/short_news/bulgarian-president-against-ukraines-membership-in-nato/, (Date of Accession:04.10.2022).

[7] “Ukraine Asked Bulgaria for Heavy Weapons- the Caretaker Government Refused”, Novinite, https://www.novinite.com/articles/216910/Ukraine+asked+Bulgaria+for+Heavy+Weapons+-+the+Caretaker+Government+Refused, (Date of Accession: 05.10.2022).

[8] These parties, according to the percentage of votes they received respectively, are as follows: the Revival Party (Vazrazhdane) has 10.17%, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) has 9.30% and the Bulgarian Rise Party (BV) has 4.62%. For detailed information on the topic, see.“Elections in Bulgaria: Can a Government be Formed? Lowest Voter Activity in 32 Years”, Novinite, https://www.novinite.com/articles/216951/Elections+in+Bulgaria%3A+Can+a+Government+be+Formed%3F+Lowest+Voter+Activity+in+32+years, (Date of Accession: 05.10.2022).

[9] William Natrass, “Hungary’s ‘Pro-Russia’ Stance was İnevitable”, Politico, https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-pro-russia-stance-inevitable/, (Date of Accession: 05.10.2022).

[10] “Croatian President Says Western Sanctions Aren’t Working”, BNE Intellinews, https://www.intellinews.com/croatian-president-says-western-sanctions-aren-t-working-252879/, (Date of Accession: 05.10.2022).

Cemal Ege ÖZKAN
Cemal Ege ÖZKAN
Cemal Ege Özkan, 2019 yılında Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Tarih Bölümü’nden mezun olmuştur. Yüksek lisans derecesini, 2022 senesinde aynı üniversitenin Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Anabilim Dalı’nda hazırladığı “Türk Siyasi Hayatında Selim Rauf Sarper ve Faaliyetleri” başlıklı teziyle almıştır. Hâlihazırda aynı enstitüde doktora eğitimine devam etmektedir. 2020-2021 yılları arasında Türk Tarih Kurumu Yüksek Lisans Bursiyeri olan Özkan, iyi derecede İngilizce bilmektedir.

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