Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s absence from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Heads of State Summit held in Astana, Kazakhstan on July 3-4, 2024, and the participation at the ministerial level instead, has raised significant questions regarding India’s perspective on cooperation in Eurasia. Notably, two years prior, India hosted a meeting of the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) to address terrorist threats in Eurasia, particularly in Afghanistan. During this meeting, which included participation from Pakistan, both countries expressed their willingness to cooperate for the security of Eurasia. Additionally, a joint anti-terrorism exercise, “Manesar-Antiterror-2022,” was conducted at a military training base near New Delhi under the SCO framework.
Assuming the rotating presidency of the SCO at the Samarkand Summit on September 16, 2022, India hosted the SCO Heads of State Summit for the first time in July 2023. The virtual nature of this summit was also noteworthy. In 2023, India held the G20 presidency and hosted the G20 Leaders Summit in New Delhi on September 9-10, which saw the conspicuous absence of Chinese President Xi Jinping.
India’s policy of strategic autonomy has resonated among Global South countries while straining its ties with Eurasian partners. For instance, China did not appoint a new ambassador to India for 18 months after the previous ambassador’s tenure ended.[i] The only meeting between Xi and Modi in the past three years occurred on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Brazil in August 2023, where they agreed on “swift withdrawal and de-escalation” along the contested border.
Moreover, Xi did not send a congratulatory message to Modi for his election victory in June 2024, unlike in 2019 when Xi congratulated Modi on the day of his victory, calling India an “important neighbor of great significance.” [ii] However, Xi did congratulate the newly elected presidents of Mexico and Iceland during this period, highlighting the chilly atmosphere in China-India relations. This divergence from dialogue and cooperation could exacerbate regional tensions, and Modi’s absence from the 2024 SCO Summit could be seen as a stance against China, potentially having negative regional implications.
Many countries worldwide have begun to take a stance against China under U.S. pressure, increasing China’s need for actors advocating multipolarity. India, meanwhile, used the theme “One World, One Family, One Future” at the 2023 G20 Summit, delivering a strong message of unity. The ancient Indian concept of “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” (The World is One Family) reflects a global perspective that prioritizes world welfare over individual interests.
India’s strategic autonomy in foreign policy and its perspective on cooperation in Eurasia can be understood through this philosophy. While India shares a vision of a multipolar world similar to Russia and China, it opposes fragmentation and bloc formation. India’s messages of “multipolarity” and “one world” are inherently unifying. India also opposes using international platforms for bloc politics, as evidenced by its resistance to the marginalization of Russia and China at the G20 Summit and its opposition to the exclusion of Western countries from the BRICS platform. This stance is consistent with its view of the SCO, as New Delhi is not in favor of the SCO becoming part of any bloc.
The recent inclusion of Iran and Belarus as members of the SCO has led to claims that the organization is forming an axis against the West. India’s participation at the ministerial level in the latest SCO Summit in Astana could be seen as a protest against this notion. The SCO’s multi-member structure could slow decision-making processes and hinder anti-terrorism efforts, which are crucial to India’s interests in Central Asian security. Consequently, India’s interest in cooperation in Eurasia has waned, making it the most undecided member of the SCO.[iii]
Over the past decade, the Modi administration’s close collaborations with Western actors have increasingly positioned India as an “unreliable actor” in the eyes of major Eurasian powers like Russia and China. Modi’s attendance at the G7 Summit in Italy in June 2024, while skipping the SCO Summit in Kazakhstan, underscored the fragility of cooperation and harmony in Eurasia. Modi’s preference for cooperation with Western actors and Russia, rather than appearing alongside Pakistani and Chinese leaders at the SCO Summit, further illustrates this point. Unlike its relations with Beijing, New Delhi derives strategic benefits from its ties with Moscow.
In conclusion, India’s potential for collective cooperation with Russia and China within the SCO framework remains relatively low compared to the cooperation pursued through BRICS. Nevertheless, these three actors are competing for leadership in the Global South. India’s foreign policy is primarily driven by its national interests, signaling its strategic autonomy rather than a search for global political balance. India’s grand strategy is increasingly aligned with Western interests, indicating a further weakening of the cooperation process in Eurasia.
[i] “China names new ambassador to India after 18-month vacancy amid border dispute deadlock”, SCMP, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3262160/china-names-new-envoy-india-after-18-month-vacancy-amid-border-dispute-deadlock, (Date of Access: 20.07.2024).
[ii] “Election Results 2019: Xi Jinping Sends “Congratulations” To PM Modi As BJP Set For Massive Win”, NDTV, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/election-results-2019-xi-jinping-sends-congratulations-to-pm-narendra-modi-as-bjp-set-for-massive-wi-2041934, (Date of Access: 20.07.2024).
[iii] “China, Russia See SCO at Counterweight to NATO but India Is Ambivalent”, USIP, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/07/china-russia-see-sco-counterweight-nato-india-ambivalent, (Date of Access: 20.07.2024).
