Haiti has been existing in a cycle of crises shaped by political instability, economic fragility, and natural disasters for a long time. The developments in 2025 have not only pushed the country close to a humanitarian disaster, but also turned into a complex security problem that threatens regional and global stability. In this context, the statements made by International Organization for Migration (IOM) Director General Amy Pope on April 16, 2025, in New York clearly reveal the urgency and multidimensional nature of the situation.
Pope’s statements show that the crisis in Haiti is not just about one country, but it also affects many areas like regional migration and cross-border security threats. Pope, stating that more than one million people are currently displaced in the country, emphasizes that Haiti lacks the institutional capacity to cope with such a scale of internal migration.[1] In an environment where armed groups control about 85% of the capital Port-au-Prince, it is getting harder and harder for people to access basic needs like safe shelter, health care, and food.
The growing effectiveness of these armed groups not only worsens the living conditions of the Haitian people but also leads to the dysfunction of state institutions. The police and courts not working properly is making the public administration collapse, and Haiti is now very close to becoming a “failed state.” This situation has the potential to create instability in the region and directly affects security policies in neighboring countries. Irregular migration waves from Haiti to surrounding countries create serious challenges in terms of border security, public health, and social cohesion policies.
Civilians fleeing from areas controlled by armed organizations often resort to human traffickers because they cannot find safe passage routes, which strengthens organized crime networks. At the same time, the uncertainty among the Haitian diaspora is causing political and social discussions, especially in the USA, Canada, and Latin America. Therefore, the security problem in Haiti can be considered not only as an internal issue but also as a regional and international security issue.
IOM’s activities in Haiti are currently being carried out at more than 50 displacement points, covering basic humanitarian aid areas such as shelter, protection, emergency hygiene, and camp management. However, as Pope also expressed, the sustainability of these efforts largely depends on financial resources.[2] The significant decrease in international aid to Haiti over the past year has led IOM to halt some of its operations. This situation directly affects both the basic living conditions of the Haitian people and disrupts efforts to control migration flows.
Another element that particularly needs attention is the deportation of approximately 200,000 Haitians from surrounding countries, especially the Dominican Republic, in the last year.[3] This increases the pressure on Haiti’s already fragile infrastructure and social support systems. The absence of a system where deported individuals can receive support for housing, livelihood, and social integration pushes them to migrate again or resort to illegal means. This creates a “migration cycle” in the region, and it keeps growing because there is no control.
The humanitarian observations conveyed by Amy Pope also reveal that the Haiti crisis cannot be reduced to just numbers. Pope’s account of a mother having to flee her home three times with her children within two months reflects the deep psychological and sociological effects of the crisis environment on individuals.[4]
The IOM, aiming for closer cooperation with Haiti on migration management, is trying to improve identification processes through legal documents and strengthen programs aimed at reintegrating returning Haitians into society. However, such structural solutions cannot be effective in the short term, and the current security environment also makes it difficult to implement such initiatives.
The vast majority of Haitian citizens live without official documents, which complicates both the delivery of humanitarian aid and the implementation of resettlement policies. Also, although the international community’s aid strategies include long-term institutional capacity building, the mismatch of these goals with the realities on the ground leads to various gaps in implementation.
International organizations often cannot make their interventions sustainable due to bureaucratic obstacles and security risks. At this point, strengthening local communities, supporting non-governmental organizations, and Haitian leaders taking more active roles would be a useful step. Otherwise, external support programs cannot go beyond short-term interventions, and the resilience capacity of the Haitian people cannot be sufficiently increased. All these factors lay the groundwork for the migration crisis to become permanent.
The Haiti crisis can be assessed as a multidimensional crisis beyond being merely a national issue, capable of producing regional and global consequences. Haiti, located at the intersection of migration routes from South America to North America, is becoming not only a transit point but also a center with high potential for producing vulnerability. The international community’s lack of interest in Haiti increases both humanitarian and geopolitical risks. As Pope also stated, “these people need support now,” and if these needs are not met, this crisis could threaten not only the Haitian people but also global stability.[5]
Therefore, restructuring humanitarian and structural support mechanisms for Haiti as soon as possible will be in the country’s interest. It is of great importance for international organizations, regional organizations, and donor countries to create a collective action plan for Haiti to limit the effects of the crisis. Otherwise, both the regional security balance is disrupted, and humanitarian disasters deepen.
Spot:
[1] “Haiti Crisis Could Impact Regional and Global Stability”, Global Issues, www.globalissues.org/news/2025/04/16/39630, (Date Accessed: 20.04.2025).
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
