Georgia’s geopolitical position remains at the center of the global power struggle, as the United States (US)-China rivalry, disruptions in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) expansion process, and the Ukraine crisis within the European Union (EU) have placed Georgia in the crosshairs of regional and global actors. The US strategic pressure on China has expanded beyond the Indo-Pacific region to encompass a broader spectrum, including Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and the Black Sea. In this context, Georgia is perceived as a key logistical hub in the US-China trade competition. Projects such as the Anaklia Port have been highlighted as critical components of Washington’s global supply chain strategy.
However, the current Georgian government’s efforts to maintain balanced relations with Russia and China have led to a hardening of US and Western allies’ policies toward Georgia. Following the October 2024 parliamentary elections, in which the Georgian Dream Party (GD) secured a majority in parliament, the European Parliament refused to recognize the results, and several EU countries, particularly Latvia, imposed entry bans on more than 70 Georgian officials.[1] In response, the opposition intensified its diplomatic engagements to strengthen ties with the West. The Lelo – Strong Georgia Movement, after its meetings in Latvia, continued its discussions in Estonia, focusing on Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration, security policies, and cooperation with NATO. Opposition leaders Zurab Japaridze, Zurab Chiaberashvili, and Grigol Gegelia met with Marko Mihkelson, Chairman of the Estonian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and representatives of the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) to express their demands for accelerating Georgia’s integration with the West.[2]
Meanwhile, the Baltic countries’ sanctions against Georgian officials have been interpreted by the Georgian government as an attempt by the West to drag Georgia into conflict with Russia. Georgian Parliament Speaker Shalva Papuashvili and Chairman of the Regional Policy and Local Governance Committee Irakli Kadagishvili claimed that the Baltic states had previously supported political forces in Georgia that could have led to a recurrence of the 2008 war and that they sought to divert Russia’s aggressive policies from their own territories toward Georgia. Referring to EU statements on the sanctions, Kadagishvili argued that such measures were ineffective and that the Georgian people recognized the West’s double standards.[3] Similarly, Papuashvili alleged that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had previously supported the Saakashvili administration and were now pressuring the Georgian government under the pretext of “democratic backsliding.” Emphasizing that despite not being a NATO member, Georgia had contributed more to international security missions than the Baltic states, Papuashvili asserted that while the Baltic countries had refrained from sending troops to Ukraine, they were attempting to use Georgia as a tool against Russia.[4]
As the United States increases its pressure on Georgia, a post by US Congressman and Republican Party member Joe Wilson on the X platform on March 6, 2025, has clarified Washington’s stance on Georgia. Wilson claimed that the ruling GD, founded by Bidzina Ivanishvili, had canceled contracts with American companies and transferred Georgia’s strategic Black Sea port to companies affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). He asserted that while the Georgian people wished to trade with the US, Ivanishvili granted economic freedom to China, emphasizing that since 2020, all infrastructure projects exceeding 100 million dollars had been controlled by CCP-affiliated companies.[5] At this point, the Anaklia Port has emerged as a critical issue shaping not only Georgia’s economic but also its geopolitical future. Salome Samadashvili, a member of Strong Georgia, stated that the Anaklia Port could transform Georgia into a strategic transit hub connecting Central Asia to the West and described it as a strategic opportunity similar to the natural resource agreements the US has made with Ukraine. However, Samadashvili argued that Ivanishvili’s policies sidelined Western investors and aimed to transfer the port to China. Referring to a bill in the US Senate seeking to restrict China’s access to strategic ports, she contended that the Georgian government’s decision to open Anaklia to China posed a risk to the country’s security.[6]
Mamuka Khazaradze, leader of Lelo – Strong Georgia, emphasized the necessity of involving American companies in the Anaklia Port project, accusing the Georgian government of transferring the project to Chinese firms and arguing that missing this historic opportunity would be an act of betrayal against the country. Recalling the US Senate’s bill aimed at restricting China’s access to strategic ports, Khazaradze stressed that only with American investment could Anaklia turn Georgia into a central hub for major trade routes. He noted the growing US interest in natural resource and raw material supply chains and pointed out that Georgia represents the shortest transit route from Central Asia. However, he argued that the current government is incapable of capitalizing on this opportunity, emphasizing that the country’s economic future is a shared responsibility.[7]
These developments highlight how the power balance in the South Caucasus largely mirrors historical processes. During 1918–1921, alliances such as Ottoman-Azerbaijan, Germany-Georgia, and Armenia-Russia demonstrated how regional states pursued different orientations to secure advantages among great powers. Today, Georgia follows a similar balancing strategy by continuing its integration with the West while maintaining a level of engagement with Russia and China to ensure economic independence. However, this balancing act is becoming increasingly unsustainable due to both Western expectations regarding Georgia’s geopolitical trajectory and Russia’s reluctance to allow Georgia’s full alignment with the Western bloc. Georgia’s attempt to strike a balance between the Turkey-Azerbaijan axis and Armenia-EU relations is narrowing its diplomatic maneuvering space. The Georgian government seeks to avoid direct confrontation with Russia while also maintaining open avenues for potential peace negotiations regarding the territorial disputes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At the same time, its expanding economic ties with China are met with increased Western pressure, influencing domestic political dynamics. The opposition’s calls for accelerating Georgia’s integration with the West compel the government to adopt a more cautious approach in both domestic and foreign policy.
US-Georgia relations have entered a new dynamic as Washington shifts its global priorities. During Trump’s second term, the US has reduced its support for NATO expansion and the EU’s regional influence, instead pursuing a foreign policy directly aligned with national interests. This marks a critical juncture for Georgia, as the weakening of Western alliances forces the country to shape its own security architecture. The US policy toward Georgia is no longer centered on NATO and EU integration; rather, Washington aims to curb China’s economic influence in the region while using Georgia as a counterbalance against Russia. In this context, the Anaklia Port issue has become a key component of US strategic interests in Georgia and has been addressed by members of Congress. In this scenario, the Georgian government is striving to maintain internal stability by preserving its economic ties with Russia and China, while the opposition advocates for balancing pro-Western policies through a more regionally focused geopolitical and strategic outlook. However, rather than directly supporting Georgia’s opposition, Washington is expected to concentrate on expanding its economic influence to counterbalance China’s presence in the region.
Russia-Georgia relations are progressing within a delicate balance due to Moscow’s efforts to maintain its influence in the South Caucasus. As Russia perceives a decreasing likelihood of Georgia joining NATO, it prefers to keep Georgia as a regional stability factor rather than intensifying economic and political pressure directly. At this point, Moscow does not view Georgia’s economic ties with China as an immediate threat but opposes the transfer of strategic projects like the Anaklia Port to Western control. While the Georgian government avoids direct opposition to Russia, it seeks to create greater maneuvering space in response to Western pressure on the country. For Russia, unlike Ukraine, Georgia is considered a region where direct military intervention is unnecessary but where preserving its sphere of influence remains crucial. In such a scenario, the Georgian government aims to maintain diplomatic relations with Russia to preserve internal political stability and mitigate Western economic pressure. However, Washington’s new strategy in the region and NATO’s lack of a clear policy toward Georgia create uncertainty regarding the country’s long-term security guarantees. This situation forces Georgia to pursue a multi-directional balancing policy between the West, Russia, and China, making its domestic political stability even more fragile.
During Trump’s second term, the Georgian government has adopted policies that largely align with the conservative wave reshaping the US, exhibiting a shift away from the Western liberal axis in both domestic and foreign policy. Policies such as emphasizing biological sex, preserving the traditional family structure, and increasing oversight of Western-funded civil society organizations parallel those implemented by the Trump administration within the US While Georgia moves away from the concept of “gender diversity” and adopts a policy based on the biological male-female distinction, it frames this approach within the context of protecting national identity and cultural values, positioning itself ideologically against progressive Western policies. As the Trump administration prioritizes the “protection of the traditional family structure” in US domestic politics, Georgia has similarly intensified control over LGBT+ movements and foreign-funded NGOs, introducing legislation such as the Foreign Agents Law to curb Western-backed institutions’ influence. This development has further complicated Georgia’s relations with the West while fostering a shared political platform with right-wing conservative leaders in Europe. In an attempt to reduce tensions with the Western liberal order, the Georgian government is seeking closer ties with the Republican administration in the US; however, this process carries geopolitical risks regarding Georgia’s positioning against Russia and China. The EU’s expectations for adherence to democratic standards and Georgia’s ambiguous political alignment with the Trump administration could, in the long term, require the country to sustain a balancing policy by leveraging internal fractures within the West. Within this framework, Georgia’s chosen path is not merely an ideological shift but also a strategic maneuver shaped by the geopolitical interests of major global powers.
[1] Iryna Perepechko, “Lithuania and Latvia Ban Entry of Dozens More Georgian Officials”, Babel, https://babel.ua/en/news/115907-lithuania-and-latvia-ban-entry-of-dozens-more-georgian-officials, (Access Date: 07.03.2024).
[2] “Lelo Dzlieri Sakartvelo Sakartvelos Demokratiuli Dzalebis Delegaciis Ertoblivi Viziti Latviis Shemdeg Estonetshi Grzeldeba”, InterPressNews, https://www.interpressnews.ge/ka/article/832269-lelo-zlieri-sakartvelo-sakartvelos-demokratiuli-zalebis-delegaciis-ertoblivi-viziti-latviis-shemdeg-estonetshi-grzeldeba, (Access Date: 07.03.2024).
[3] “İrakli Kadagishvili Baltiispiretis Kveqnebis Motivi Aris Ertaderti…”, InterPressNews, https://www.interpressnews.ge/ka/article/832161-irakli-kadagishvili-baltiispiretis-kveqnebis-motivi-aris-ertaderti-shesazlo-rusuli-agresia-ramenairad-ar-cavides-mati-mimartulebit-da-is-gadmoceuli-iqos-kavkasiis-sakartvelosken-sankciebs-pasi-ar-akvs, (Access Date: 07.03.2024).
[4] Shalva Papuashvili, “Sami Ghopili Sabjota Respublikis…”, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1247358184062613, (Access Date: 07.03.2024).
[5] Joe Wilson, “Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream Regime Cancelled bids by American Companies…”, X, https://x.com/RepJoeWilson/status/1897463874892472743, (Access Date: 07.03.2024).
[6] “Salome Samadashvili: Sakartvelos Sheizleba Ar Akvs Tsiagiseulis Mdidari Resursebi…”, InterPressNews, https://www.interpressnews.ge/ka/article/832241-salome-samadashvili-sakartvelos-sheizleba-ar-akvs-ciagiseulis-mdidari-resursebi-magram-gvakvs-satranzito-shesazleblobebi-ramac-sheizleba-daainteresos-ashsh-gadaitvirtos-strategiuli-urtiertobebi, (Access Date: 07.03.2024).
[7] “Mamuka Kharadze: Anakliis Proektshi Unda Dabrundnen Amerikuli Kompaniebi…”, InterPressNews, https://www.interpressnews.ge/ka/article/832195-mamuka-xazaraze-anakliis-proektshi-unda-dabrundnen-amerikuli-kompaniebi-am-istoriuli-shansis-xelidan-gashveba-kveqnis-galatis-tolpasi-kmedebaa, (Access Date: 07.03.2024).
