The attack launched by Russia against Ukraine on February 24, 2022 has significantly affected Georgia’s foreign policy strategy. Georgian decision-makers have fundamentally followed a political course supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity. However, despite Western sanctions, they have not neglected to develop relations with Russia.
Tbilisi’s non-participation in Western sanctions against Russia has initiated a new process. In a statement made on February 25, 2022, the then – Prime Minister of Georgia, Irakli Garibashvili, stated that Tbilisi would not participate in international sanctions imposed on Russia. Garibashvili stated that “Georgia took this step by taking into account its national interests and the interests of its people” and clearly stated that “the sanctions will harm its country and people”.[1] This situation was actually evaluated as “disappointment” by many Western states. Because after the Russian intervention in 2008, which effectively eliminated Georgia’s territorial integrity, Tbilisi was forced to adopt a completely Western-oriented policy.
Although Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanashvili, who came to power in 2012, and the “Georgian Dream Party” he founded prioritized positive cooperation with Moscow, strategic cooperation mechanisms in relations with the West were largely maintained. However, Western states viewed Ivanashvili’s pragmatic foreign policy approach as a threat. Because Georgia’s pragmatic approach also included cooperation with Russia, especially in the economic field. In this context, the European Union (EU) was concerned that this approach would help strengthen Russia’s presence in the region.
It is possible to observe that the pragmatism that began to emerge during the Ivanashvili era continued after the Russian-Ukrainian War. In this context, the Garibashvili government tried to implement a foreign policy focused on national interests in order to stay out of the war. This foreign policy was of particular importance in terms of realizing Georgia’s economic interests in particular.
Georgia’s non-participation in Russian sanctions was soon “punished” by the EU, and Georgia was excluded from the candidate status process granted to Ukraine and Moldova in June 2022. This process once again revealed that EU institutions act entirely with geopolitical motives. The Georgian administration argued that it did not want to fight Russia for EU membership and that this was against its national interests. In this context, the attempt to open a new front against Russia in Georgia in return for the “EU membership reward” failed.
Another important tool of the EU’s intervention in Georgian politics is French-born Salome Zurabashvili, who has been serving as the President of Georgia since 2018. Zurabashvili has been increasingly prominent as a balancing element by the EU, especially in recent times. Zurabashvili, who was appointed as the French Ambassador to Tbilisi in 2003, left Georgia after the Bolshevik invasion and settled in France. Zurabashvili, who had good relations with Mikhail Saakashvili and accepted Georgian citizenship in 2004, began his duties as Minister of Foreign Affairs the same year. Zurabashvili, who was elected President of Georgia in 2018, has become a symbol of pro-Western policies. Zurabashvili argues that the Georgian Dream Party is pro-Russian and describes it as the “Russian Dream” in this context.
Georgia-EU relations have become even more tense, especially after the introduction of the law “On Transparency of Foreign Influence” to the parliament. The bill submitted to the Georgian parliament by the “People’s Power” faction in February 2023 stipulated that organizations whose income is 20% from foreign funds will be considered as organizations that promote the interests of a foreign power. According to the bill, organizations that meet these criteria must submit annual financial statements. Otherwise, these organizations will be subject to fines.
The ruling Georgian Dream Party supported the bill, while opposition and Western politicians opposed it. The opposition and Western states considered the bill to be “pro-Russian” and considered it to be similar to a law previously passed in Russia. The drafters claimed that they were inspired by the Foreign Agents Registration Act, passed in the United States in 1938.
The Western-backed United National Movement began organizing protests against the bill in the capital Tbilisi and other major cities. Western powers also supported these protests. President Zurabashvili, in particular, sided with the protesters and tried to strengthen his position in Georgian politics. The bill caused the already tense Georgia-EU relations to deteriorate even further. The US and the EU threatened Georgia with sanctions. According to Western states, the bill was alienating Georgia from the West. Unable to withstand the pressure, the Georgian government withdrew the bill.
Following Garibashvili’s resignation on January 29, 2024, the ruling Georgian Dream Party nominated Irakli Kohabidze as the new Prime Minister. Kohabidze, who received the parliament’s vote of confidence on February 8, 2024, took office as Prime Minister.
On April 3, 2024, the “foreign agent” bill was brought up again. The phrase “agent of foreign influence” in the first bill was changed to “an organization supporting the interests of a foreign power.” On May 14, 2024, the Georgian parliament adopted the bill and submitted it to President Zurabashvili for approval. On May 15, the foreign ministers of Iceland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia visited Tbilisi to discuss the bill and reiterated their support. On May 18, President Zurabashvili vetoed the bill. The US and the EU emphasize that Georgia is in a strategic deviation with the adoption of the bill and the economic and political consequences of this situation. Despite the threats of sanctions, the Georgian administration has not yet backed down. In this context, they state that they will not oppose their own country and will act in the interests of protecting sovereignty and national interests.
Georgia-EU relations, which have been on a bad course, have reached a different level with the EU suspending Georgia’s membership process. In addition, the freezing of EU financial aid of 30 million euros for 2024 is a sign that relations are heading towards a dead end.
This entire process deeply affects the geopolitical goals of the EU and the West in general in the South Caucasus. In this context, the role of Armenia, the West’s new favorite in the region, and the extent to which regional stability will be affected by this role will determine the agenda. The parliamentary elections to be held in Georgia on October 25, 2024 and the dynamics that these elections will reveal will be an important clue in terms of shaping the process.
[1] “Georgia Won’t Join Russia Sanctions, PM Says, Civil Georgia”, Civil, https://civil.ge/archives/475153, (Date Access: 08.09.2024).
