South Korea has reached a critical decision point in in response to North Korea’s increasingly growing nuclear capabilities. The serious imbalance between North Korea’s nuclear power and South Korea’s conventional military capabilities has led to a strengthening trend that has led South Korea to re-evaluate its current stance on nuclear armament. In this context, South Korea faces public pressure to develop its own nuclear weapon.
A large part of the population in South Korea has begun to adopt the view that the country should develop its own nuclear weapons rather than relying on the United States (US) for its defense.[i] Although this approach has been officially rejected by the South Korean government, it is increasingly at the center of mainstream political debate.[ii] This demand is a sign of a radical change that has emerged as a result of the uncertainty created by the presidential elections to be held in the United States (US) in November 2024 and the questioning of the confidence in the extended deterrence strategy reliant on the US.
There is growing concern in South Korea that the US might delay or hesitate in responding to a potential nuclear attack by North Korea. The direct and unorthodox diplomatic approaches followed by the Trump administration with North Korea in the past have created uncertainties regarding the sustainability and predictability of the US’s security commitments for South Korea. It is thought that there may be dramatic changes in US policy towards North Korea, especially considering Trump’s recent statements that Seoul should pay more for the presence of US forces in South Korea. In this context, considering the possibility of re-election of Donald Trump, one of the leading candidates in the upcoming US presidential elections in November, concerns are rising that relying on the current US protection strategy may not be sufficient to ensure South Korea’s security.
Kim Young-sik, the former regional president of Yeonpyeong Island, stated that if Trump becomes president of the United States, the need to possess nuclear weapons will increase, adding, “I am concerned that US will avoid taking any steps that could harm its own interests”.[iii] This concern is a reflection of the anxieties that all American allies could face under a president who pursues an ‘America First’ policy.
On August 16, 2024, South Korea’s Defense Minister candidate Kim Yong-hyun stated that “it is standard to respond on the basis of expanded deterrence and nuclear umbrella” against North Korea’s increasing nuclear threats, but if these strategies are insufficient, “all means and methods will be used.” He stated that “the issue is on the table” and emphasized that they are open to different options.[iv] Kim’s statements are significant as they came in response to questions regarding the possibility of South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons. In this context, the statements are directly related to domestic political pressures, by demands for nuclear armament to deter North Korea.
As a reminder, following the historic agreement signed between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on June 19, 2024, which could foresee Moscow providing advanced weapons technology to Pyongyang, the South Korean government-funded Korea National Security Strategy Institute (INSS) called for South Korea to seriously consider its own nuclear armament process and the acquisition of potential nuclear capabilities.[v] INSS has emphasized that the rights to uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel processing, which are restricted within the framework of the US-South Korea Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, should be gained.[vi]
Despite traditional suggestions such as the redeployment of US tactical nuclear weapons in response to North Korea’s nuclear threats or a defense system similar to NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements, the INSS’s proposal for independent nuclear proliferation and reprocessing rights is a major part of the North Korea-Russia summit. It shows that the perceived threat to South Korea’s national security has become more apparent.
The latest survey conducted by the state-linked Korea National Unification Institute revealed that 66% of participants either “support” or “strongly support” an independent nuclear deterrent.[vii] This support rate indicates an increase of 6 points compared to last year. When asked to choose, the percentage who preferred Seoul to develop its own nuclear weapons increased by nearly 11 points compared to last year, for the first time, surpassed support for the US military presence on the Korean Peninsula.[viii] Survey results reveal that the South Korean public believes the country should have more control over its security future. It is thought that acquiring nuclear weapons is considered a more effective deterrent against North Korea’s threats and can reduce South Korea’s dependence on the decision-making processes of external actors in times of crisis.
This new trend of South Korea towards nuclear armament can be seen as a significant deviation from the country’s traditional defense strategy. As it is known, South Korea has relied on the US nuclear umbrella to deter North Korea for many years. However, the changing nature of threats and dynamics in the region have led to broad questioning whether this strategy is still effective. These concerns have become even stronger as North Korea has developed intercontinental nuclear weapons that can reach the United States and with the support of Russia. Increasing doubts about the US security commitments are encouraging South Korea to develop a more independent defense policy.
However, South Korea faces several obstacles in its pursuit of nuclear weapons development. One of these is the “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” which prohibits either Korea from developing or possessing nuclear weapons. In order for South Korea to make progress on nuclear armament, this agreement will need to be reconsidered or terminated. Similarly, South Korea signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which includes a commitment not to develop nuclear weapons. If Seoul wants to continue on the path of nuclear armament, it will be inevitable to withdraw from this agreement.
Such a move could have serious diplomatic and economic consequences for the international community. In particular, China is extremely sensitive to nuclear armament activities on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea’s move towards nuclear armament could lead to serious tensions in its relations with China and disrupt regional security balances.
Such an approach has the potential to to damage the US-South Korea alliance. As is known, Washington has been opposing South Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons since the end of the Korean War (1950-53).If South Korea takes formal steps to develop indigenous nuclear weapons rather than persuade the United States to redeploy its nuclear weapons on its territory, Seoul risks losing its status as one of the US’s key allies in Asia. As a result, North Korea’s increasing nuclear threats and uncertainties regarding the US’s security commitments force South Korea to reassess its defense policies. South Korea’s desire to develop nuclear weapons could deeply affect traditional alliance relations and regional balances. South Korea’s decision to develop nuclear weapons will redefine its relations not only with North Korea but also with regional actors such as China and Russia. China’s response to this situation could narrow South Korea’s economic and diplomatic maneuvering space. Additionally, there is a risk of weakening the alliance with the US, as South Korea’s shift towards nuclear armament could lead to unexpected changes in the US’s security strategy in Asia. In this context, it is critical for South Korea to establish a balance in its security strategies in terms of both ensuring its own security and pursuing alignment with the international community.
[i] “Doubting America’s ‘Nuclear Umbrella,’ Some South Koreans Want Their Own”, The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/17/world/asia/south-korea-nuclear-arsenal.html, (Date Accesed: 17.08.2024).
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] “What if South Korea got a nuclear bomb?”, The Economist, https://www.economist.com/asia/2024/08/15/what-if-south-korea-got-a-nuclear-bomb, (Date Accesed: 16.08.2024).
[iv] “Defense minister nominee says open to all means to NK threats”, The Korea Times, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/08/205_380677.html, (Date Accesed: 16.08.2024).
[v] “South Korea should consider nuclear armament amid North Korea threat”, The Chosun Daily, https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2024/06/25/WBM7V5ASYBGRTFAJUVN6SUZ7A4/, (Date Accesed: 17.08.2024).
[vi] Ibid.
[vii] “More South Koreans want Seoul to have its own nuclear weapons”, Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/0a7b8855-5682-4fbf-be42-156811d4d578, (Date Accesed: 17.08.2024).
[viii] Ibid.
