Analysis

South Korea’s Rapprochement with NATO and Its Effects on the Region

South Korea’s ties with NATO could rapidly alter the security of the Asia-Pacific and the regional balance of power.
One of the important reasons for South Korea’s rapprochement with NATO is Russia’s deepening of its existing military cooperation with North Korea.
On May 14, 2024, discussions were held between NATO and South Korean military personnel in Brussels.

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The article titled “Forget the Asian NATO; Pacific Allies Could Join the Real NATO” published on Bloomberg on April 8, 2024, claimed that the alliance could expand to include South Korea, Japan, Australia, and others.[1] These actors, while actively contributing to security efforts in Europe, NATO has begun to show more interest in the security of the Asia-Pacific in return. The alliance has clearly stated its readiness to control North Korea’s missile and nuclear ambitions.[2]

At the NATO Organization meeting held in Brussels on April 5, 2024, South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul announced that his country would provide a $2.3 billion aid package to Ukraine and contribute an additional $12 million to the NATO Foundation Fund for Ukraine’s rehabilitation.[3] At the said meeting, besides South Korea, other Indo-Pacific partners of NATO, including Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, also participated. The cooperation format established by the alliance with these countries is referred to as the “Asia-Pacific 4 (AP4)”.

South Korea has come a long way in its policies towards NATO. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, South Korea implemented export controls on dual-use technologies, such as computers and semiconductors, sold to Russia. Similarly, South Korea joined the West in imposing additional sanctions on Russia following the start of the war in Ukraine in 2022. However, Seoul has so far refused to directly send heavy military weapons to Kiev. The reason for this is South Korea’s policy of not providing critical defense industry products to countries at war.

One significant reason for South Korea’s approach towards NATO is Russia’s deepening military cooperation with North Korea. Due to this partnership, Seoul may adopt a more radical-proactive stance in its foreign policy. Increased interest in Western defense organizations can be explained by this. However, Seoul has begun to turn a blind eye to redirecting its arms sales to Ukraine, NATO members. Additionally, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol has noted that they may consider directly sending weapons to Ukraine in the not-too-distant future.[4]

It is also important to emphasize that the AP4 countries have participated in NATO’s leadership summits in Madrid and Vilnius over the past two years. At the NATO summit held in Vilnius in 2023, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg adopted the Individually Tailored Partnership Program (ITPP), committing to deepen cooperation in 11 areas, ranging from preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to emerging technologies.[5] In February 2024, South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik met with General Christopher Cavoli, the Commander of the United States European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in Seoul. The parties agreed to strengthen military cooperation and emphasized NATO’s support in deterring provocations from North Korea.

While there is much to gain for both South Korea and NATO from cooperation, it must be implemented cautiously. This is because, along with opportunities, there are also risks in developing ties.

South Korea and NATO are aware of the necessity for closer collaboration to address common security issues in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. Inter-regional coordination is important to effectively deter and respond to North Korea’s increasing missile tests, nuclear threats, and cyber-attacks.

Indeed, NATO, in its 2023 Vilnius Summit Declaration, expressed its stance on North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic program by condemning it and calling for the abandonment of its nuclear weapons program. On the other hand, South Korea became the first Asian state to join NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) and participated in the Locked Shield military exercise in 2023.

Increasing interaction with NATO also enables South Korea to play a more proactive role in global affairs. Conversely, NATO member states can enhance their presence in the Indo-Pacific by establishing special connections with South Korea. This partnership can assist the West in diversifying its trade and investment partners and establishing a resilient supply chain for critical goods. Joint military training and exercise opportunities are also part of this collaboration.

As part of this solidarity, discussions between NATO and South Korean military personnel took place in Brussels on May 14, 2024. The meeting focused on building resilience and exploring future cooperation opportunities. Previous military personnel meetings were held on February 13-14, 2023, in Seoul. Launched in 2005, this collaboration encompasses joint efforts in various areas such as cybersecurity, capability development, new technologies, and hybrid threat mitigation. This year’s discussions primarily involved assessing the partnership program, defense against terrorism, resilience building, its implications for the military, as well as NATO’s relations with broader partners in the Indo-Pacific region.

In conclusion, South Korea’s ties with NATO have the potential to rapidly alter the security landscape of the Asia-Pacific region and regional power dynamics. In recent years, Western security activities in the Asia-Pacific have been increasing, leading to the emergence or expansion of new alliances in the region. South Korea’s political connections with Western allies based on democratic principles have paved the way for potentially risky military collaborations. Advocating for the region to remain free and open, Seoul has begun showing interest in defense-security alliances such as NATO and AUKUS to achieve this goal. Due to the precarious security environment, South Korea has focused on enhancing its military strategies. However, such moves could escalate threats in its vicinity.


[1] “Forget an ‘Asian NATO’ — Pacific Allies Could Join the Real One”, Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-04-08/nato-should-expand-to-japan-australia-south-korea-new-zealand, (Access Date: 23.05.2024).

[2] “South Korea and NATO. Friends with Benefits”, ISPI Online, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/south-korea-and-nato-friends-with-benefits-169261, (Access Date: 23.05.2024).

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] “What Does ROK-NATO Cooperation Mean for Relations on the Korean Peninsula?”, 38 North, https://www.38north.org/2024/04/what-does-rok-nato-cooperation-mean-for-relations-on-the-korean-peninsula/, (Access Date: 23.05.2024).

Dr. Cenk TAMER
Dr. Cenk TAMER
Dr. Cenk Tamer graduated from Sakarya University, Department of International Relations in 2014. In the same year, he started his master's degree at Gazi University, Department of Middle Eastern and African Studies. In 2016, Tamer completed his master's degree with his thesis titled "Iran's Iraq Policy after 1990", started working as a Research Assistant at ANKASAM in 2017 and was accepted to Gazi University International Relations PhD Program in the same year. Tamer, whose areas of specialization are Iran, Sects, Sufism, Mahdism, Identity Politics and Asia-Pacific and who speaks English fluently, completed his PhD education at Gazi University in 2022 with his thesis titled "Identity Construction Process and Mahdism in the Islamic Republic of Iran within the Framework of Social Constructionism Theory and Securitization Approach". He is currently working as an Asia-Pacific Specialist at ANKASAM.

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