On April 12, 2023, Kazakhstan Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Murat Nurtleu visited Moscow and the messages given during the visit once again and it revealed that the relations on the Astana-Moscow line are in a trend of expansion and deepening. This has turned the attention of researchers following the regional agenda and even of the international public, in terms of energy-related messages, to Kazakhstan-Russia relations.
To explain the importance of Nurtleu’s visit to Moscow, first of all, it is necessary to address the issues discussed in the meeting. At the meeting, where the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan met with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov, the economic, political and cultural relations between the two countries were discussed. In this context, Nurtleu said, “Russia has been Kazakhstan’s strategic and important economic partner. Both countries have long-term close and strong relations based on friendship and good neighborliness.” found in the statement
[1]. Therefore, it can be stated that some of the conflicts observed after the Russia-Ukraine War are left behind in the relations between the parties. As an indicator of this, Nurtleu announced that Russian President Vladimir Putin is preparing to visit the city of Kostanay in the north of Kazakhstan in the autumn of 2023[2]. Therefore, it is possible to state that Kazakhstan-Russia relations tend to expand and deepen.
It should not be forgotten that; the basic principle in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is to act with a multi-vector and multi-dimensional foreign policy understanding that considers the balances between power centers within the framework of mutual respect and interest. As a matter of fact, the Astana administration is involved in important infrastructure projects, especially the Middle Corridor, within the framework of China’s Belt and Road Initiative; on the other hand, it liberalizes especially in parallel with the reform processes it implements and in this context, it turns to the West. While doing all this, it is possible to talk about a Kazakhstan administration that does not ignore the Russian factor.
On the other hand, Russia wants to maintain its influence on the countries in the post-Soviet space within the framework of the “Near Environment Doctrine”, also known as the Primakov Doctrine. As might be expected, Central Asia is not independent of this goal either. Therefore, while Astana attaches importance to relations with Russia due to its multi-vector foreign policy understanding; Moscow sees developing constructive relations with Central Asia, which it sees as its close circle, as an important part of its security policies, and considers Kazakhstan as an important partner for this purpose.
As can be seen, the development of relations between the parties is in line with the basic expectations of both countries. In this context, Kazakhstan made an important offer to Russia on the occasion of Nurtleu’s visit, in accordance with its multi-vector foreign policy understanding. The proposal in question includes the construction of a new international natural gas pipeline, which will pass through the territory of Kazakhstan and connect to China[3]. Because the capacity of the existing line is quite low.
Moreover, the aforementioned proposal will also serve to deliver natural gas to the eastern regions of Kazakhstan[4]. In other words, if this offer is accepted by the parties, it will be easier for Russia to reach the Asian market, which it has turned to after the war in Ukraine, and in this context, China, which is Asia’s main energy importer; in Kazakhstan, it will both increase its geopolitical and geoeconomic importance in the context of energy corridors, and will also provide for the elimination of a deficiency within the country. In this sense, it can be stated that a win-win based energy cooperation project has come to the fore. Moreover, Beijing is the world’s most important natural gas importer. For this reason, it can be argued that China will approach the aforementioned project warmly, both for the industrial sector, which is the driving force of its growing economic capacity, and in order to meet the main needs of its 1.4 billion population[5].
This natural gas pipeline proposal, which came to the agenda with Nurtleu’s visit to Moscow and will connect Russia and China, may open the door to a profitable process for all parties. Of course, this situation will reduce conflicts as it will increase mutual dependencies and will open the door to the establishment of a relationship style centered on win-win cooperation.
In addition, there is another dimension of Astana’s offer to Moscow that should not be ignored. As it will be remembered, Russia allowed Kazakhstan to export natural gas to Germany via the Druzhba Pipeline, despite the sanctions imposed on it by the European Union (EU)[6]. Therefore, Kazakhstan’s proposal can be read as a reflection of the process carried out within the framework of the Druzhba Pipeline. In short, Kazakh gas goes to EU countries; through a move that will direct Russian gas to China, a formula suitable for the benefit of all parties may have been found in a way to find a solution to the global energy crisis, or at least a search for this could be mentioned.
Within the framework of the developments experienced, it can be stated that after the start of the war in Ukraine, some problems in Kazakhstan-Russia relations were overcome and the parties focused on developing their cooperation within the framework of the principle of good neighborliness and mutual benefit. The announcement that Putin will visit Kazakhstan in the autumn of 2023 confirms this. On the other hand, Kazakhstan’s proposal for the construction of a pipeline that will carry Russian natural gas to China reveals that energy will continue to be the driving force in the relations between the parties.
[1] “Kazakh, Russian Foreign Ministers Meet in Moscow”, Azernews, https://www.azernews.az/region/208618.html, (Date of Accession: 14.04.2023).
[2] “President Putin to Visit Kazakhstan in Autumn 2023”, AKI Press, https://akipress.com/news:701673:President_Putin_to_visit_Kazakhstan_in_autumn_2023/, (Date of Accession: 14.04.2023).
[3] Nuray Alekberli-Museyibova, “Kazakhstan Proposes Gas Pipeline Project Connecting Russia and China Publication: Eu”, The Jamestown Foundation, https://jamestown.org/program/kazakhstan-proposes-gas-pipeline-project-connecting-russia-and-china/, (Date of Accession: 14.04.2023).
[4] Ibid.
[5] “China Population”, Worldometers, https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/china-population/, (Date of Accession: 14.04.2023).
[6] Emrah Kaya, “Russia’s Purposes for Authorizing the Use of Druzhba”, ANKASAM, https://www.ankasam.org/russias-purposes-for-authorizing-the-use-of-druzhba/?lang=en, (Date of Accession: 14.04.2023)
