EU Naval Operation in the Red Sea: “Aspides”

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In mid-February, the media reported that the European Union (EU) had reached an agreement in principle to launch a military operation to prevent Houthi attacks on merchant ships in the Red Sea and off the coast of Yemen.[1] The aim of the operation was to play an active role in order to protect the strategic interests of European states even if they do not want to increase tensions in the region, to mitigate the negative effects of a disruption in one of the world’s largest trade arteries such as the Red Sea on the global economy and thus on their own economies, and to ensure maritime security in the region.[2]

While countries such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Belgium and Greece support the naval force to be formed for the operation, some EU member states, notably Spain, are not in favor. However, EU High Representative for Foreign Policy Josep Borrell stated: “The fact that some member states will not participate in the operation does not mean that they are against it” and stated that the regulation including the ‘rules of engagement’ to be prepared by the technical teams will be submitted to the approval of the EU Foreign Ministers at the meeting scheduled for 19 February 2024.

Also, Borrell stated that Belgium and Germany have allocated ships for the naval force to be formed and that a total of seven EU member states are ready to provide ships or aircraft for the operation, that the operation will be a purely defensive operation to protect cargo ships from Houthi attacks and that there is no plan to attack ground targets.[3] It was emphasized that the name of the operation, which is currently being decided on the location of its headquarters and which country will command it, will be “Aspides”, which means shield in ancient Greek.[4] The countries named for the command of the operation are Greece, along with France and Italy, which currently have ships in the region,[5] while the headquarters is named for the city of Larissa, where the Greek air force base and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) base are also located.[6]

The operation, which has its legal basis in UN Security Council Resolution 2722 (2024) of January 10, 2024,[7] will also provide support to Operation Welfare Guard, which was launched under the leadership of the United States of America (USA). Although it does not have the potential to completely stop Houthi attacks in the near future, it is considered that it will be an operation that puts into practice the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy and Implementation Plan for Foreign Policy and Security,[8] the Maritime Security Strategy revised in 2023,[9] the Indo-Pacific Strategy,[10] and the Strategic Compass approved in 2022, which sets out the basis of the EU’s autonomous security and defense policies,[11] and will demonstrate the EU’s commitment to ensuring maritime security in areas where the EU has interests.

The success of the operation will also be linked to and supportive of Operation Atalanta, an ongoing military operation undertaken by the EU Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) to combat maritime banditry off the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean, which has recently seen a resurgence[12]  it is considered to be important for the EU’s reputation and could also be merged with Agenor,[13] another EU operation launched in 2020, which aims to increase Maritime Awareness to protect maritime trade in the Strait of Hormuz.

The escalation of conflicts following the US and UK airstrikes against Iran-linked militia groups in Iraq and Syria in retaliation for the attack on the US base in Jordan, and the possibility of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran, have forced the EU to take a politically active role in the region at a time when trade from Asia to Europe by sea has already shifted to the Cape of Good Hope route due to the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, increasing costs enormously.

As a result, in the aftermath of the Russia-Ukraine War, the EU will have to play a greater role in security issues in order to protect its own interests in the future against the possibility of Trump coming to power after the elections in the US, which has made NATO and the EU dependent on it on the European front after the Russia-Ukraine War, and will require the autonomy efforts embodied in the Strategic Compass to be put into practice more effectively.


[1] “EU To Launch a Red Sea Naval Mission Within 3 Weeks to Protect Ships from Continued Houthi Attacks”, AP News, https://apnews.com/article/red-sea-houthis-naval-mission-trade-eu-9f779d51f6fe3ebd8df0032c92221817, (Date of Access: 12.02.2024).

[2] Lal İlhan, ANKASAM, “Kızıldeniz’deki Krizin Küresel Tedarik Zincirlerine Etkisi”, https://www.ankasam.org/kizildenizdeki-krizin-kuresel-tedarik-zincirlerine-etkisi/, (Date of Access: 12.02.2024).

[3] “Italy, In Command of The European Defensive Mission in The Red Sea”, Kiratas, https://www.kiratas.com/2024/02/03/italy-in-command-of-the-european-defensive-mission-in-the-red-sea/, (Date of Access: 12.02.2024).

[4] Simone De La Feld, “Red Sea, EU Aims to Launch Aspides Mission by Feb. 19. Italy, France, And Greece Apply to Lead”, Eunews https://t.ly/cNX2c, (Date of Access: 12.02.2024).

[5] Andrew Grey, “EU Aiming to Launch Red Sea Naval Mission by Mid-Feb”, Reuters, https://t.ly/dSN0k, (Date of Access: 12.02.2024).

[6] “EU To Launch a Red Sea Naval Mission Within 3 Weeks to Protect Ships from Continued Houthi Attacks”, Hellaslife, https://hellaslife.com/eu-to-launch-a-red-sea-naval-mission-within-3-weeks-to-protect-ships-from-continued-houthi-attacks/, (Date of Access: 12.02.2024).

[7] United Nations Digital Library, Resolution 2722 (2024) / adopted by the Security Council at its 9527th meeting, on 10 January 2024, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4033392?ln=en, (Date of Access: 12.02.2024).

[8] European Union, “A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf, (Date of Access: 12.02.2024).

[9] Council of the European Union, “Council conclusions on the Revised EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and its Action Plan”, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/67499/st14280-en23.pdf, (Date of Access: 12.02.2024).

[10] European Commission, “The EU Strategy for Cooperation in The Indo-Pacific”, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/jointcommunication_2021_24_1_en.pdf, (Date of Access: 12.02.2024).

[11] European Union, “A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence”, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/strategic_compass_en3_web.pdf, (Date of Access: 12.02.2024).

[12] Christian Bueger, “Somali Pirates Are Back in Action. A Strong Global Response Is Needed”, SafeSeas, https://www.safeseas.net/piracy-2024/, (Date of Access: 12.02.2024).

[13] “The European-led Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz”, (EMASoH) / AGENOR, https://www.emasoh-agenor.org/about-4, (Date of Access: 12.02.2024).

Emekli Deniz Albay Dr. Ferhan ORAL
Emekli Deniz Albay Dr. Ferhan ORAL
He was born in 1972 in Denizli. He graduated from the Naval War College in 1994. During his 24-year career, he served in various submarines and headquarters. Among his headquarters assignments, he served as the Directorate of Civil-Military Cooperation of the EU Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Directorate of Plans and Policy of the Turkish General Staff, the Operations-Intelligence Directorate of the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), and the Multinational Maritime Security Center of Excellence. He holds a master's degree in Sociology and a PhD in Maritime Safety, Security, and Environmental Management. He has articles published in national peer-reviewed journals. His research and study areas include maritime security, NATO, and EU Defence Policy issues. He speaks English and basic French.

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