After Nikol Pashinyan took office in 2018, Armenia’s foreign policy rapidly shifted towards a Western orientation. This change became even more evident as the signs of Westernisation and the Western-centred “Colour Revolution” began to be seen in Armenia before, during and after the Second Karabakh War in 2020.
Armenia’s foreign policy approach has adopted a radical pro-Western stance beyond balanced policies. The Pashinyan government pursues a pro-Western foreign policy in contrast to the pro-Russian foreign policy of the previous periods. In this context, Armenian military units carried out a joint military exercise with the USA on 15 July 2024. According to the statements of Armenian Defence Minister Suren Papikyan, this exercise, called “Eagle Partner”, aimed to increase the interoperability of the troops participating in international peacekeeping missions.[i]
Armenia’s pro-Western stance points to a possible NATO expansion in the region. Within the framework of its policy of containment of Russia in the South Caucasus, the US has almost winked at the situation with this military exercise.
Armenia’s new foreign policy approach brings along different searches at the international level. However, the 102nd Russian Military Base in Gyumri in Armenia shows that Russia’s hegemony in the region continues militarily.[ii] In 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s statement “Russia will never leave, on the contrary, we will strengthen our position here”, coupled with his neutral stance in the Second Karabakh War, reveals Russia’s aim to maintain its presence in the region.
While the US shaped its policy in the South Caucasus through NATO-centred strategic moves before the Russian-Ukrainian War, it started to act through the EU after the war started. Georgia stands out as an example of this strategy. Armenia’s turning towards the West will lead the US to indirectly support this process with its “international peacekeeping” rhetoric. However, the Armenian diaspora centred in the US and Europe is also expected to step in to ensure that Armenia adapts to the demands of the West.
The EU’s soft power influence on Armenia manifested itself with the start of visa liberalisation negotiations in EU-Armenia relations in July 2024. The fact that similar processes took place in Georgia,[iii] strengthens the prediction that a similar scenario will be repeated in Armenia. In addition to visa liberalisation in EU-Armenia relations, the €270 million “Resilience and Growth Plan” within the framework of the Armenia-EU Partnership Agenda announced by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also attracts attention.[iv]
Armenia’s rapprochement with the EU and the US brings with it the possibility of increasing Russia’s political and military influence in the region. However, the West’s soft power influence outweighs the growing Russophobia in Armenian society. Attitudes similar to the “Colour Revolution”, such as possible constitutional reform, continue in the country. In this context, Armenia’s reference to the Declaration of Independence for Karabakh, which is one of the current causes of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, has an important place. This controversial preamble in the preamble of the current constitution has been put forward by the Azerbaijani government as a condition for constitutional reform in Armenia in order to finalise peace terms.[v] Pashinyan acknowledged that this part was against the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, but stated that the change would take place over time.[vi]
Although Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan reiterated his recognition of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan in his speech on 18 April 2023, peace negotiations remained inconclusive.[vii] On 18 July 2024, Armenia and Azerbaijan did not attend the summit planned to be held in London, leading both sides to blame each other.[viii]
In this framework, there are not only traces of regional peace but also traces of the “Colour Revolution”. The 2003-2004 Rose Revolution in Georgia and the constitutional amendments that took place afterwards indicate that a similar process may take place in Armenia. The Pashinyan government aims to make constitutional amendments that will strengthen its position, as it did in Georgia in 2004. For instance, the National Movement and the Saakashvili government, which came to power in Georgia in 2003-2004 with the Rose Revolution, adopted an anti-Russian, radical Europeanist and NATOist stance. Subsequently, the Constitution was amended in 2004 with the rhetoric of “for a more democratic basis”. This amendment, on the other hand, almost transferred the checks and balances in the parliamentary system within Georgia from the position of the Prime Minister to the President of the Republic, where Saakashvili was located.
The Pashinyan government, which wants to reconstruct the local dynamics within Armenia in favour of the government, its anti-Russian stance and radical pro-Western stance, may be expected to make changes that will strengthen its position, as it did in 2004, based on the aforementioned pretext of constitutional reform.
The West’s moves on Armenia can also be associated with the efforts of the new President Massoud Pezeshkian, who won the elections in Iran, to revitalise Iran-EU relations within the framework of the nuclear deal. The West’s Westernisation of Armenia may bring with it the possibility of bordering Iran in the region and the idea that relations with Iran will work against China and Russia. However, Iran, which is located at the centre of important logistics corridors such as China’s Modern Silk Road and Russia’s International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), may put its current poor economy in an even more difficult situation with a wrong step. Given the recent positive trend in Armenia-Iran relations, Armenia can be expected to play a mediating role in the negotiations between the West and Iran.
In this process, the Pashinyan government is expected to act within the framework of the “zero problem” diplomatic relationship with the neighbours by not ignoring regional policies.
[i] “Armenia launches military drills with US amid souring ties with old ally Russia”, VOA, https://www.voanews.com/a/armenia-launches-military-drills-with-us-amid-souring-ties-with-old-ally-russia-/7699015.html, (Access Date: 23.07.2024).
[ii] Joshua Kucera, “The Russian Military Base In Armenia At The Eye Of A Geopolitical Storm”, RadioFreeEurope, https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-russian-base-gyumri-alliance-weakening-geopolitical-storm/32874563.html, (Access Date: 23.07.2024).
[iii] “EU to Start Visa Liberalization Talks with Armenia”, Massis Post, https://massispost.com/2024/07/eu-to-start-visa-liberalization-talks-with-armenia/, (Access Date: 23.07.2024).
[iv] “EU announces new €270 million Resilience and Growth package for Armenia”, EU Neighbours East, https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/latest-news/eu-announces-new-e270-million-resilience-and-growth-package-for-armenia/, (Access Date: 23.07.2024).
[v] Onnik James Krikorian, “Baku insists on Constitutional change for Armenia peace accord”, Osservatorio, https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Armenia/Baku-insists-on-Constitutional-change-for-Armenia-peace-accord-232254, (Access Date: 23.07.2024).
[vi] Onnik James Krikorian, “Armenia, Pashinyan pushes for new constitution, opposition screams foul”, Osservatorio, https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Armenia/Armenia-Pashinyan-pushes-for-new-constitution-opposition-screams-foul-229926, (Access Date: 23.07.2024).
[vii] Nane Sahakian ve Lusine Musayelian, “Pashinian Reaffirms Recognition Of Azerbaijan’s Territorial Integrity”, Azatutyun, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32369093.html, (Access Date: 23.07.2024).
[viii] Felix Light ve Nailia Bagirova, “Armenia, Azerbaijan accuse each other of rejecting meeting at UK summit”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/armenia-azerbaijan-accuse-each-other-rejecting-meeting-uk-summit-2024-07-18/, (Access Date: 23.07.2024).
