China’s interest in the Middle East region has significantly increased in recent years. Beijing has developed its relations with the countries in the region, driven by its growing energy needs and the requirements of the Belt and Road Initiative. Iraq and Saudi Arabia, two important countries in the region, are China’s main suppliers of oil. For the region’s countries, China holds the status of a primary trading partner. Therefore, there is a positive approach towards Chinese investments.
In this context, the announcement on June 20, 2023, about Qatar and China being in preparations for a second major liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply agreement is significant. Beijing is one of the world’s largest exporters of LNG as a high-energy consumer. Thus, Qatar’s readiness to make a second major gas supply agreement with a Chinese state-controlled company within a year is important. It is on the agenda that China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and QatarEnergy will sign a 27-year agreement for CNPC to purchase 4 million tons of LNG annually from the Gulf country. As part of this, CNPC will also become a 5% partner in one of the LNG trains in Qatar’s North Field, the world’s largest natural gas reservoir, as part of its expansion project.[1]
Following Chinese State Councilor Xi Jinping’s first visit to the Middle East in 2016, significant strides were made in bilateral relations and cooperation. Undoubtedly, energy has been one of the fundamental building blocks of this cooperation. Subsequently, Beijing shaped its policy towards the region with the first Arab policy document titled “China’s Policy Paper on the Arab States” in 2016, the 2015 “Vision and Action Plan” that encompassed the Maritime Silk Road under the Belt and Road Initiative, and the “China-Arab States Cooperation Executive Program” in 2018. The framework of cooperation outlined in these documents focuses on trade, investment, energy, and infrastructure in the Middle East.[2]
Furthermore, platforms such as the Arab-China Business Conference and the China-Arab Summit, held on June 12, 2023, also hold key importance in the relations between the parties. Through these meetings, various agreements are signed in many areas, with energy being a fundamental sector.
China’s regional security vision within the scope of the Middle East is progressing towards developing a Chinese initiative for global security, encompassing energy security and policies related to economic relations. While strengthening energy cooperation on one hand, mutual partnerships are being elevated to a strategic level on the other. As a result, Beijing has enhanced its ability to play a role in regional issues and has become a more influential player.
The developments over the years in the energy partnership, which forms the basis of bilateral cooperation, are laying the groundwork for new agreements. The recent Qatar-China Agreement serves as confirmation of this trend, as a second agreement on the same subject was reached between the two parties within a year. Various data and findings also indicate that the Beijing-Middle East energy partnership will continue to grow. According to the 2019 report of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, China imports approximately 8.4 million barrels of oil per day, with 3.9 million barrels of that being supplied by the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.[3]
Furthermore, China is Saudi Arabia’s largest trading partner. Riyadh exports over 40% of its crude oil to Beijing. Additionally, Chinese officials signed agreements worth billions of dollars in December 2022 in Saudi Arabia, and the two parties have formulated a comprehensive cooperation plan encompassing 182 collaborative measures in 18 areas such as politics, economy, trade, and investment. Therefore, there is also a significant interest in China from the region.[4]
The United Arab Emirates (UAE), another country in the region, is also strengthening its energy partnership with China. In March 2023, the first natural gas export agreement in yuan currency was signed between Beijing and Abu Dhabi. This development, following Beijing’s historic $60 billion agreement to import LNG from Qatar in November 2022, holds strategic importance for the Middle East-China energy partnership. Additionally, the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank opened its first overseas office in Abu Dhabi in April 2023, aiming to support the agenda of multilateral initiatives. The office is intended to be an “important and strategic hub.” [5]
Lastly, on June 9, 2023, discussions were held between Iraq’s state-owned Missan Oil Company (MOC) and the Chinese company Geo-Jade to develop the Huwaiza Block in Maysan Province. Beijing, within the framework of its relations with Baghdad, is engaged not only in energy imports but also in infrastructure projects. There are ongoing projects under construction as well. Therefore, the relationship between the parties is not solely based on commercial and economic ties. As a significant investor in the region, China places special emphasis on energy projects and investments.
In summary, more than half of China’s oil imports are sourced from the Middle East, which has led Beijing to strengthen its ties with Gulf countries and other regional states. Particularly in recent years, as China has increased its investments in large-scale infrastructure projects, the relationship between the parties has gone beyond trade. As economic relations deepen, Beijing has also begun to pursue a strategy of playing a role in regional issues. In this regard, China’s recent involvement in the reestablishment of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran provides significant clues to a major shift in the region and China’s strategic role there. It can be said that energy partnerships will continue to develop both in terms of investment and trade. As part of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing is expected to elevate its strong bond with the region to more strategic levels.
[1] “Qatar Set to Strike Second Big LNG Supply Deal With China”, Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/4a647749-c88e-4819-9d06-f4cb30579be5, (Date of Accession: 20.06.2023).
[2] “الاستراتيجية الصينية في الشرق الأوسط من منظور تحليلي”, Strategiecs, https://strategiecs.com/ar/analyses/الاستراتيجية-الصينية-في-الشرق-الأوسط-من-منظور-تحليلي, (Date of Accession: 20.06.2023).
[3] Aynı yer.
[4] “الصين من أمن الطاقة إلى السياسة”, Independent Arabia, https://www.independentarabia.com/node/434296/آراء/الصين-من-أمن-الطاقة-إلى-السياسة, (Date of Accession: 20.06.2023).
[5] “بلومبرغ: هكذا تتسلل الصين ببطء إلى الشرق الأوسط”, Asharq Business, https://www.asharqbusiness.com/article/49518/بلومبرغ-هكذا-تتسلل-الصين-ببطء-إلى-الشرق-الأوسط/, (Date of Accession: 20.06.2023).
