The long-standing conflicts in the triangle of Israel, Palestine and Lebanon have taken on a more complex geopolitical dimension, especially since the emergence of Hezbollah as a regional actor. The recent Israeli airstrikes against senior Hezbollah commanders signal the continuation of a long-term cycle of conflict in the region.
The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon was a response to the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) attacks on Israel from Lebanon. The invasion caused further regional turmoil in an already civil war-torn Lebanon. The PLO’s withdrawal and Israel’s permanent presence in South Lebanon paved the way for the foundations of Hezbollah. With Iranian support, Hezbollah quickly emerged as a leading force in the defense of southern Lebanon.[i]
Israeli operations against refugee camps and civilian targets in Lebanon expanded Hezbollah’s local support base and made the organization a key force in southern Lebanon. Incidents such as the 1983 bombings of Western peacekeepers in Beirut demonstrated Hezbollah’s early military capability. The 2006 July War between Israel and Hezbollah is considered one of the most critical points in the conflict between the two sides. Hezbollah attacks on Israeli territory and large-scale Israeli operations in response resulted in the deaths of more than 1,200 Lebanese civilians. This war demonstrated that despite Israel’s aim to weaken Hezbollah, the organization maintained its military capacity and consolidated its presence as a more permanent actor in the region.[ii]
The Israeli targeting of senior Hezbollah leaders in September 2024 led to a new escalation in the region. While Israeli operations both in South Lebanon and in the Bekaa Valley aimed at limiting Hezbollah’s rocket capacity, Hezbollah responded to these attacks and continued to launch rocket attacks against Israel.
Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian civil war, especially in 2012, significantly increased the group’s military capacity. Having gained experience both within Lebanon’s borders and in Syria, Hezbollah has become more effective on the battlefield against Israel. In addition, Iran’s logistical and financial support to Hezbollah contributed to the group’s emergence from a mere militia to being recognized as a regional actor. The Israel-Hezbollah conflict is not limited to these two actors. Iran maintains its role in the region as Hezbollah’s biggest supporter and continues to exert influence over Syria and Lebanon. At the same time, the cooperation of Hamas and other resistance groups in Palestine with Hezbollah has made the threats facing Israel multidimensional.
Following the assassination of Hamas’ political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July, the Shura council of Hamas elected Yahya Sinwar as its new leader as the planner of the October 7, 2024 attacks.[iii] On October 18, 2024, Yahya Sinwar’s death was confirmed, at a time when Israel was focusing on its ongoing war with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, and increasing direct confrontations with Iran, despite the attacks in Gaza. The Israeli army’s announcement that Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was killed in a clash in the Rafah area of southern Gaza will create uncertainty about the future of Hamas and possible changes in the course of the war in Gaza.
The Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, which started in 2023, has raised the possibility of a wider regional conflict with Hezbollah launching rocket attacks on Israel from Lebanon. Iran’s active role in this process and its use of Hezbollah as a strategic ally increases the risk of a wider war in the region. Israel’s operations in the Golan Heights and the targeting of Hezbollah commanders deepen the regional dimension of these conflicts.
On October 18, 2024, Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati’s criticism of Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf’s statements about Iran’s readiness to negotiate with France on the implementation of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1701 is a reflection of political and diplomatic tensions in the Middle East. This criticism is based on Iran’s growing influence over Lebanon and the delicate balance of power dynamics in the region. Mikati’s assessment of these statements as interference in Lebanon’s internal affairs and an attempt at tutelage emphasizes Lebanon’s efforts to protect its sovereignty and national integrity.[iv]
UNSC Resolution 1701, adopted in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon-Israel War, calls for Israel to withdraw from the Blue Line on the Lebanese border, with only the Lebanese army and the United Nations Interim Peacekeeping Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) maintaining an armed presence between the Litani River and this line. This decision is critical to ensure Lebanon’s border security and prevent clashes between Israel and Hezbollah. However, Iran, through its support for Hezbollah, is trying to steer this equation in line with its own interests by increasing its influence in the region. Mikati’s tough stance against Iran’s negotiation proposal underlines Lebanon’s desire to act as an independent actor in the international diplomatic arena. Mikati described Iran’s attempts to intervene in this process as “unacceptable tutelage”, specifically referring to France’s diplomatic influence over Lebanon. These statements are a reflection of Lebanon’s efforts to set its own boundaries in its relations with Iran and minimize the influence of external powers in its ongoing conflict with Israel.[v]
Considering the historical development of the conflicts in the Israeli, Palestinian and Lebanese triangle and the strategic positions of the actors in the region, the possibility of an all-out war in the region always remains on the agenda. The history of Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel shows that the organization’s military capacity has increased over time and that Israel’s military moves have made Hezbollah a stronger regional actor rather than weakening it. In particular, Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian civil war increased the group’s combat experience and, together with Iranian support, paved the way for its further strengthening in southern Lebanon.
As for the question of whether a regional war will erupt, the potential for the current conflict to escalate into a wider war cannot be ruled out. Israeli airstrikes against Hezbollah leaders keep the tension alive, and Hezbollah’s capacity for retaliation is always emerging as a factor that could spark a larger conflict.
Today, the deepening of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict is not limited to these two actors. The cooperation of Hamas and other resistance groups in Palestine with Hezbollah further complicates the scale of the conflict. Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel during the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza could be considered a critical step that could lead to a regional war. However, the political balance within Lebanon makes Hezbollah cautious about engaging in a wider conflict. While Hezbollah’s military activities in Syria and its fight against Israel serve Iran’s strategic interests, they also threaten Lebanon’s domestic political stability.
[i] “The history of conflict between Hezbollah and Israel”, AlJazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/18/hezbollah-and-israel-a-timeline-of-conflict, (Access Date: 18.10.2024).
[ii] “The history of conflict between Hezbollah and Israel”, AlJazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/18/hezbollah-and-israel-a-timeline-of-conflict, (Access Date: 18.10.2024).
[iii] “How Israel Found and Killed Hamas Leader Yahya Sinwar in Gaza”, The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/17/world/middleeast/how-yahya-sinwar-killed.html, (Access Date: 18.10.2024).
[iv] “Lübnan Başbakanı’ndan İran’a tepki: ‘Vesayet kurma teşebbüsü’”, Gazete Duvar, https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/lubnan-basbakanindan-irana-tepki-vesayet-kurma-tesebbusu-haber-1728604, (Access Date: 18.10.2024).
[v] “Lübnan-İsrail gerilimi Suriye’deki dengeleri nasıl etkileyecek?”, 24, https://www.yirmidort.tv/dunya/lubnan-israil-gerilimi-suriyedeki-dengeleri-nasil-etkileyecek-205815, (Access Date: 18.10.2024).
