The book “Europe in the Arc of Fire” by Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, focusing on the past year of EU foreign policy, was made accessible on November 25, 2024, just a few days before he handed over his position to Kaja Kallas. The book primarily draws attention to the events in Ukraine, the Middle East, the South Caucasus, the Sahel and the South China Sea, stating that Europe’s future is more at risk than ever before. It asserts that the only way to tackle this danger is for Europe to ensure its own security.[1]
European security, in essence, began to take shape around the growing Russian threat following the Russia-Ukraine War and was accepted under the aegis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), led by the United States (US). However, considering the socioeconomic consequences caused by Europe’s energy dependence on Russia, reliance on the US for European security began to be questioned. This scrutiny intensified, particulary after Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential elections, accelerating efforts to disengage from the US umbrella in Europe’s security and defense policies.
Certainly, for those supporting the integration of European security, the ultimate goal is the creation of an autonomous European defense with its own military. The Russia-Ukraine War has provided the conducive environment for the realization of this goal, namely the establishment of European defense. However, the idea of European unity in defense, which has frequently been brought up since the founding years of the EU, faces several obstacles, such as the European-Atlanticist divides among member states, capacity and cost limitations, and the prioritization of national defense development. These challenges make the creation of a common European defense more difficult. On the other hand, Europe, known as the “Welfare Continent” after World War II, has faced threats like never before in recent years. Particulary, conflicts are escalating in Ukraine, which is defined as the red line of European security.[2] Moreover, even if the conflicts come to an end, Russia is expected to continue threatening European security, either directly or indirectly, from Eastern Europe to the South Caucasus.
In this regard, European countries, which are struggling to establish a common defense against threats to European security, are increasing their national defense expenditures while also turning to minilateral security coalitions in European security and defense. Notwithstanding that minilateralism in defense and security is not a new phenomenon for Europe, in today’s world, where geopolitical rivalries and conflicts dominate, it can be seen as a pragmatic option that allows for burden-sharing and strengthens the continent.
The establishment of an effective minilateral security coalition by Europeans could facilitate the protection of European interests and enhance Europe’s deterrence in a European war where the use of nuclear weapons is at stake. It could also influence the design of European security and defense, which began undergoing a transformation as of February 24, 2022. Since the contribution of a minilateral group within the EU to the shaping of European security should not be expected to have the same effect on the European security architecture as minilateralism involving non-EU countries. A minilateral European security coalition, whether formed among EU members or with the inclusion of third countries to EU members, can contribute to the creation of a more resilient Europe against the uncertain policies of the post-Biden Trump era and to the Europeanization of European security in any case. At the same time, it can take on the task of promoting a broader and more comprehensive formation in European security and defense. This is because the Western European Union was the first step on the road to NATO.
From this perspective, the meeting of the defense ministers of the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Poland which convened on November 25, 2024, to discuss European security and defense issues, is noteworthy. The formation, referred to as the E5 Group by the UK Defense Secretary,[3] consists of the countries in Europe with the highest military expenditures.[4] At the same time, these countries are known as the leading actors of the EU in terms of economic and political power capacities. These actors are primarily focused on providing assistance to Ukraine. Indeed, on November 19, 2024, the foreign ministers of the Group of Five, who gathered together, expressed their readiness to provide military and financial support to Ukraine.[5] The E5, which does not limit security to Ukraine, operates with the aim of strengthening European defense to tackle current and future threats. At the same time, it has been decided that the policies of the E5 group will be developed independently of NATO and EU provisions. As a result, it is expected that decisions regarding European security and defense will be made and implemented rapidly, as there will be no need for approval from EU or NATO members.[6]
The E5 Group, considering the capacities and capabilities of its actors as well as their objectives, is an effective example of a minilateral security and defense policy. This minilateralism, which could enhance the capacity to tackle the challenges facing European security, and the new minilateral collaborations that will emerge, are thought to be led by France, alongside the United Kingdom, which left the EU with Brexit. Claims regarding the two countries’ plans to send Western and mercenary soldiers to Ukraine[7] support this perspective.
Essentially, there has been a lack of trust between France and the United Kingdom, deepened by AUKUS, alongside the Europeanist-Atlanticist rivalry between the two countries. On the other hand, France, which places importance on European integration, prefers to prioritize strengthening its cooperation with Germany. However, the conjuncture brings France and the United Kingdom closer together. On the one hand, France and Germany, the two major powers of the EU capable of leading European defense, are facing domestic political challenges; on the other hand, in an uncertain geopolitical environment, Europe has been forced to confront numerous threats, as Borrell has also pointed out. France and the United Kingdom, which share similar characteristics, are two strong European countries capable of tackling these threats. Both countries possess the continent’s largest armies in terms of manpower and are nuclear-armed states. They are also permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and NATO members. Furthermore, as demonstrated during the intervention in Libya, the two countries have experience in leading joint minilateral security coalitions. Therefore, the establishment of European defense under the leadership of France and the United Kingdom could strengthen European security.
A minilateral security coalition led by France and the United Kingdom can be said to align with France’s goal of establishing European security independent of the United States, advocating strategic autonomy. From the perspective of the United Kingdom, it could gain the opportunity to be an effective actor in shaping European security and defense without entering into a common commitment such as the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. Additionally, the minilateral group formed against the unpredictable policies of the Trump era could assume a deterrent role.
As a result, Europeans, who have difficulty in creating a common European defense, are resorting to minilateralism to ensure the security of the continent. Minilateralism offers an opportunity for the Europeanization of European security and defense. On the other hand, European countries aim to establish a defense line not only against Putin’s Russia but also against Trump’s United States through minilateral formations. This policy increases the importance of non-EU regional powers in strengthening European security and defense.
[1] “Europe in the Arc of Fire”, European Union External Action, https://t.ly/du74w, (Date Accessed: 28.12.2024).
[2] Dmitry Antonov ve Andrew Osborn, “Russia says hypersonic missile strike on Ukraine was a warning to ‘reckless’ West”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-says-hypersonic-missile-strike-ukraine-was-warning-west-2024-11-22/, (Date Accessed: 28.12.2024).
[3] “E5-a new european security mechanism designed to mitigate Trump’s isolationism”, Tomorrow’s Affairs, https://tomorrowsaffairs.com/e5a-new-european-security-mechanism-designed-to-mitigate-trump-s-isolationism, (Date Accessed: 28.12.2024).
[4] Nan Tian, Diego Lopes Da Silva, Xiao Liang and Lorenzo Scarazzato, “Trends In World Mılıtary Expendıture, 2023”, SIPRI, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/2404_fs_milex_2023.pdf, (Date Accessed: 28.12.2024).
[5] “EU ready ‘to assume the burden’ of Ukraine support from US, says Poland”, France 24, https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20241118-european-ministers-ukraine-trump-security-warsaw, (Date Accessed: 28.12.2024).
[6] “E5-a new european security mechanism designed to mitigate Trump’s isolationism”, a.g.e., (Date Accessed: 28.12.2024).
[7] Chloé Hoorman, Elise Vincent and Philippe Ricard, “Discussions over sending European troops to Ukraine reignited”, Le Monde, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/11/25/discussions-over-sending-french-and-british-troops-to-ukraine-reignited_6734041_4.html, (Date Accessed: 28.12.2024).
