Analysis

Japan’s Potential Military Cooperation Within the AUKUS Framework

ASEAN members have expressed divergent opinions on the AUKUS agreement.
Considering Japan’s adherence to a non-nuclear weapons policy, it appears improbable that Japan will formally join the AUKUS alliance as a fourth member anytime soon.
Pillar II is a key component of the alliance’s agenda, emphasizing collaborative efforts among its member states to push the boundaries of technological innovation in defence.

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Established in September 2021, from the beginning the AUKUS agreement has sparked controversy in the Indo-Pacific region. This pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States is primarily aimed at enhancing defence cooperation, particularly in the realms of technology, security, and intelligence sharing. Given its strategic implications, the potential inclusion of Japan in this alliance has become a subject of interest and speculation.

Recently, the three countries comprising the alliance have expressed their intention to deepen cooperation with Tokyo, sparking doubts about a potential new member joining the group. While the formalization of Japan’s membership remains distant, the organization has announced its interest in involving the country in some of its programs, particularly Pillar II.

Pillar II is a key component of the alliance’s agenda, emphasizing collaborative efforts among its member states to push the boundaries of technological innovation in defence. This pillar encompasses a diverse range of advanced technologies, including quantum technologies, undersea capabilities, artificial intelligence (AI), cyber defence, and electronic warfare capabilities.

Out of the US allies, Japan stands as the initial contender for formal consideration to join this project, surpassing fellow members of the “Five Eyes” intelligence alliance like Canada and New Zealand. Tokyo´s potential inclusion in the program could bring significant benefits. With its strong alliance with the US, advanced technology, and global industrial position, Japan offers expertise that could enhance AUKUS operations. However, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese clarified that this wouldn’t mean expanding formal membership, as doing so may complicate diplomatic relations with China.

Since its creation, Beijing has strongly opposed the AUKUS alliance, condemning it as a move that would significantly disrupt regional peace and stability. The country has characterized the trilateral pact as a manifestation of antiquated Cold War-era ideologies. In the words of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China: “the three countries should discard the Cold War zero-sum mentality and narrow geopolitical perspective, follow the trends of the times for peace and development, and stop forming exclusive blocs or cliques.[1] China fears that the formation of AUKUS could catalyze a new arms race, as member states may seek to enhance their military capabilities in response to perceived threats or security concerns. This potential escalation of military competition could disrupt existing security frameworks and hinder efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in Southeast Asia.

ASEAN members have expressed divergent opinions on the AUKUS agreement. In response to the alliance’s formation in September 2021, the Indonesian government conveyed its concerns through a five-point statement. While avoiding direct mention of AUKUS, Jakarta expressed deep apprehensions about the escalating arms race and power projection in the region.[2] Similarly, Malaysia’s stance on AUKUS remains cautious. The Malaysian Foreign Ministry emphasized the need for all parties to adhere to established regulations regarding the presence of nuclear-powered vessels within Malaysian maritime jurisdiction. Conversely, Vietnam and the Philippines, both US allies, perceive AUKUS as a welcomed development that contributes to achieving a more balanced strategic environment in the region.

Regardless of Japan’s interests in the alliance, Tokyo must consider its significant dependence on the Asian giant. China remains Japan’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade reaching a total of $318 billion last year.[3] The economies of both countries are deeply interconnected, with numerous industries relying on trade and investment ties for their growth and sustainability. In addition, underlying tensions, such as the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu Islands (known as the Senkakus in Japan) and concerns regarding environmental issues like the discharge of wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear power plant, continue to strain the relationship between Beijing and Tokyo.

As a way to bolster its security and strategic position in the Asia-Pacific region, Tokyo has intensified its cooperation with the United States across various fronts. This enhanced collaboration was underscored during Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s visit to the White House last week, where both nations unveiled a significant array of 70 defence cooperation agreements.

President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Kishida emphasized the importance of enhancing military collaboration, announcing plans for a joint command structure and the development of an advanced air missile defence network in partnership with Australia. Additionally, agreements were reached on technology cooperation, including artificial intelligence, economic collaboration, and accelerating the advancement of nuclear fusion technology. The parties also agreed to strengthen their strategic partnership through the establishment of a collaborative forum for joint missile development and the maintenance of US military assets.[4]

Considering Japan’s adherence to a non-nuclear weapons policy, it appears improbable that Japan will formally join the AUKUS alliance as a fourth member anytime soon. While Japan’s immediate integration into AUKUS seems improbable, the situation may evolve under certain circumstances. A deterioration of security conditions in East Asia coupled with heightened confrontation between Western powers and China and Russia could, eventually, create conditions conducive to Japan’s formal inclusion in the alliance.


[1] “AUKUS: A View from China”, Indian Council of Foreign Affairs, https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=6487&lid=4459, (Date Accessed: 14.04.2024).

[2] “Indonesian And Malaysian Concerns Over AUKUS – Analysis”, Eurasia Review, https://www.eurasiareview.com/16032023-indonesian-and-malaysian-concerns-over-aukus-analysis/, (Date Accessed: 14.04.2024).

[3] “How could an Aukus role for Tokyo affect China’s ties with Japan?”, South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3258877/how-could-aukus-role-tokyo-affect-chinas-ties-japan, (Date Accessed: 14.04.2024).

[4] “US and Japan announce new military agreements aimed at countering China”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/apr/10/us-japan-military-agreement, (Date Accessed: 14.04.2024).

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