In recent years, shifts in global power balances have continued to reshape the international economic and political landscape. In this context, emerging economies seeking alternatives to the economic order established by the West aim to take on more active roles in formations like BRICS.
The 16th BRICS Summit, held in the Russian city of Kazan, is not only an initiative for international cooperation but also represents a challenge to global power dynamics. In this competitive environment, the expansion of BRICS countries, and particularly Kazakhstan’s cautious yet strategic stance, is noteworthy. Kazakhstan’s approach of balancing between the West and the China-Russia axis while safeguarding its economic interests highlights its position at the center of geopolitical complexity.
The 16th BRICS Summit, held in Kazan, Russia, on October 22-24, 2024, was in a race to capture public attention alongside the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in Washington, DC. These competitive developments have elicited various reactions within the international community. Many developing countries have viewed the 16th BRICS Summit as a significant step towards cooperation for reforming the current international economic and financial system, which they consider inadequate to meet their development needs. On the other hand, Western observers have perceived BRICS as a heterogeneous group with differing interests and argued that it holds symbolic meaning rather than tangible actions.[1]
BRICS announced at the summit that it had incorporated 13 new countries with “partner country” status as part of its aim to establish a strategic balance against the West. This expansion included Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand, as well as Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Türkiye, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. This development highlights BRICS’s effort to enhance cooperation with Global South countries and its goal of expanding its influence within multilateral economic systems. However, Kazakhstan has shown a notable stance in this context. Choosing not to become a full member of BRICS, Kazakhstan considers the partnership status sufficient under the current circumstances. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan stated that while maintaining a delicate balance between Russia and China, the fact that China has surpassed Russia to become Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner has shifted the geopolitical balance.[2]
Kazakhstan’s Ambassador to Moscow, Dauren Abayev, also addressed these developments, describing his country’s attainment of partner country status in BRICS as an important step. Emphasizing, “We have obtained partner country status; this is a significant step,” Abayev noted that they are currently refraining from applying for full membership and stated that media speculations are unfounded. Kazakhstan has indicated that it is ready to support BRICS’s constructive initiatives that align with its national interests and will continue to monitor the organization’s development closely. In this context, Kazakhstan’s positive approach towards BRICS, encouraged and influenced by China, demonstrates its strategy of distancing itself from its traditionally strong ties with Russia. Similar to Georgia’s adoption of a “partnership” model while avoiding full NATO membership, Kazakhstan is pursuing a balance policy through commercial and logistical cooperation with China instead of Russia.[3]
Kazakhstan’s cautious approach has been shaped by its efforts to avoid Western sanctions imposed following Russia’s war in Ukraine. At the 2022 St. Petersburg Economic Forum, President Tokayev emphasized their commitment to international legal norms, stating that Kazakhstan would not recognize entities such as Taiwan, Kosovo, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Luhansk, and Donetsk. Tokayev highlighted Kazakhstan’s stance on maintaining international order, saying, “If the right to self-determination is fully realized, more than five hundred states would emerge, leading to chaos.”[4]The same forum, Tokayev’s emphasis on continuing economic projects with Russia and highlighting cooperation in industry, agriculture, and investments demonstrated Kazakhstan’s effort to maintain economic diplomacy. While Tokayev did not attend Moscow’s Victory Day Parade in 2022, he changed this decision in 2023, signaling Kazakhstan’s intent to maintain its relations with Russia.[5]
After Kazakhstan announced in October 2024 that it would not apply for BRICS membership, Russia’s economic pressures on the country became evident, particularly through import restrictions on agricultural products. Kazakhstan’s Minister of Agriculture, Aidarbek Saparov, stated that negotiations had begun to resolve the restrictions imposed by Russia on agricultural imports but noted that this pressure further complicated Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russia for energy exports. The Kazakh Ministry of Agriculture rejected Russia’s phytosanitary concerns cited for the import restrictions and mentioned that similar issues had also occurred in exports from Russia to Kazakhstan. This situation has further highlighted Kazakhstan’s efforts to strengthen cooperation with China and revealed the complexity of trade balances in Central Asia.[6]
Analyses published in 2023 indicate that Kazakhstan, a nominal ally of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), has been striving to strengthen its economic ties not only with the West but also with various international institutions. Although the Kremlin views Kazakhstan as a reliable partner, after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2014 statement that “Kazakhs never created a state,” then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev even considered withdrawing from the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).[7]Nevertheless, Kazakhstan has maintained a steady relationship with Russia, but the Russia-Ukraine War has provided an opportunity for it to implement a multi-vector foreign policy strategy. Moscow’s military operations in Ukraine have led Kazakhstan to establish a more distant relationship with Russia while strengthening its economic ties with China. The geopolitical effects of this balancing policy have drawn attention in international relations.[8]
Kazakhstan is compelled to manage its geopolitical and economic relationships with great caution in the current international landscape. After the 16th BRICS Summit, Kazakhstan, which is maintaining a delicate balance between China and Russia, finds itself at the heart of changes in the global economic system. The rising economic influence of China and the increasing international isolation of Russia have forced Kazakhstan to adopt a multi-faceted foreign policy. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s securing of partner country status for Kazakhstan in BRICS can be considered an important step in reshaping the nation’s economic and political strategies. However, its hesitancy regarding full membership reflects Astana’s desire to avoid Western sanctions and is a result of its complex historical ties with Moscow.
Kazakhstan-Russia relations have entered a significant transformation since the onset of the war in Ukraine. Russia’s economic pressures and agricultural restrictions have made Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russia in energy and trade even more complex. In this context, Kazakhstan’s growing economic partnership with China has served as a balancing factor against Russia, with Astana aiming to leverage the increasing Chinese influence in Central Asia. China surpassing Russia to become Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner has permanently altered the region’s economic balance. This situation has led Kazakhstan to pursue deeper cooperation with China in logistics and infrastructure projects, while simultaneously seeking to limit Russia’s influence.
Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy strategy is evident in the complex geopolitical environment created by the ongoing war in Ukraine and Western sanctions pressure on Russia. Given Kazakhstan’s shared historical ties with Russia, a complete break with Moscow is unlikely. However, Kazakhstan’s increasing efforts to pursue a more independent and multilateral foreign policy are clear. Tokayev’s statements at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum and his cautious approach towards BRICS highlight Kazakhstan’s commitment to international law and its goal of protecting its sovereignty.
Looking ahead, Kazakhstan is expected to play an increasingly significant role as a transit country within China’s Belt and Road Initiative. This could turn Kazakhstan into one of the key energy and logistics hubs in Central Asia and further strengthen its economic ties with China. However, this balancing policy will not be easy. Russia’s efforts to maintain its influence in Central Asia, particularly through ties within the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), will continue. The potential for Russia to increase economic pressure on Kazakhstan could force Astana to make difficult decisions.
In the current context, one of Kazakhstan’s biggest challenges is managing its strategic dependence on Moscow, as access to Western markets for energy exports passes through Russia. Therefore, it is crucial for Kazakhstan to develop alternative logistics routes to enhance its energy security and establish new trade routes through China. Regional collaborations in Central Asia, particularly through platforms like the Turkic Council (TDT), could help Kazakhstan strengthen its balancing policy between the West, China, and Russia.
In conclusion, Kazakhstan will need to manage geopolitical and economic balances effectively in the coming years. While continuing to strengthen its strategic partnership with China, maintaining economic and security cooperation with Russia will form the foundation of Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy strategy. It will be crucial for Astana to carefully manage its relations with Russia without facing Western sanctions, while also benefiting from growing cooperation with China. This approach will be critical for Kazakhstan to maintain its increasing geopolitical importance in Central Asia. In this context, Kazakhstan’s future diplomatic and economic steps will be decisive for the overall stability of the region and international power balances.
[1] Izzah Aqilah Norman, “Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand become partner countries of BRICS”, CNA, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/malaysia-indonesia-vietnam-thailand-brics-asean-global-south-russia-china-4699841, (Access Date: 05.11.2024).
[2] Irina Sheludkova, “Kazakhstan Zayavil, Chto Poka ne Budet Vstupat BRIKS, Posle Chego RF Zapretila Vvoz Agroproduktsii”, Euronews, https://ru.euronews.com/2024/10/22/russia-is-pressuring-kazakhstan-around-brics, (Access Date: 05.11.2024).
[3] Catherine Putz, “Additional Kazakh and Uzbek Companies Hit With Russia-Related Sanctions”, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2024/11/additional-kazakh-and-uzbek-companies-hit-with-russia-related-sanctions, (Access Date: 05.11.2024).
[4] “Kazakhstan’s President Addresses Challenging Issues on International Agenda and Relations with Russia at Saint Petersburg Economic Forum”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/mfa/press/news/details/390248?lang=en, (Access Date: 05.11.2024).
[5] “Parad Pobedy na Krasnoy ploshchadi”, Prezindent Rossii, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/71104, (Access Date: 05.11.2024).
[6] “Kazakhstan Hopes to Resolve Agricultural Trade Tension with Russia within a Week”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/kazakhstan-hopes-resolve-agricultural-trade-tension-with-russia-within-week-2024-10-31/, (Access Date: 05.11.2024).
[7] Anna Dolgov, “Kazakhs Worried After Putin Questions History of Country’s Independence”, The Moscow Times, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2014/09/01/kazakhs-worried-after-putin-questions-history-of-countrys-independence-a38907, (Access Date: 05.11.2024).
[8] Nikola Mikovic, “Russia’s ally Kazakhstan turns eyes to the West”, The Interpreter, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/russia-s-ally-kazakhstan-turns-eyes-west, (Access Date: 05.11.2024).
