In recent years, the European Union (EU) has signed new formations and documents that require more concrete steps to be taken under the influence of current security crises. Rising tensions on its borders, such as the Russia-Ukraine War, have compelled the EU, which claims to be a global actor with strategic autonomy and the capacity to defend itself, to take strategic responsibility and strengthen its defense industry.
The joint declaration of 5 March 2024 entitled “A New European Defense Industrial Strategy: Ensuring EU Preparedness through a Responsive and Resilient European Defense Industry”[1] of 5 March 2024 consists of an introduction, six chapters and a conclusion. The preamble confirms Europeans’ strong interest and high expectations for greater cooperation in defense matters and states that according to EU opinion polls, 79% of Europeans think that cooperation on defense matters should be increased at the union level and 69% think that the EU’s capacity to produce military equipment should be strengthened.
Based on the findings of an analysis of defence investment gaps and developed following an extensive consultation process, the European Defence Industrial Strategy proposes ambitious approaches to strengthen[2] the industrial pillar of the EU’s defence readiness, supported by the European Defence Industrial Program (EDIP) and the European Defence Fund (EDF), and to promote the transformation of the EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) over the next decade.
The first section states that defense preparedness requires the ability to mass-produce and ensure the rapid and adequate availability of a broad set of defense equipment such as ammunition, drones, air defense missiles and systems, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in times of high-intensity warfare, while the tendency to over-reliance on the United States, anonymously referred to as “third countries”, limits security of supply and freedom of action in times of crisis.
In the second part, the planned mechanisms for strengthening preparedness through investments are mentioned, noting that structurally adapting EU industry, making it more innovative and competitive, requires a significant increase in investment at national and Union level to face the new security reality.
In the third chapter, the third section outlines proposals to ensure that the EDTIB can deliver what is needed in the right quantity, at the right place and at the right time, noting that the Union’s ability to effectively support its security and partners depends on its capacity to rapidly mobilize defence equipment, as has become clear in the wake of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. In addition, this section also sets the target that by 2030, EU countries should “work together to procure at least 40 percent of their defense equipment, spend at least half of their defense procurement budgets on products produced in Europe, and trade at least 35 percent of their defense equipment between the Union countries instead of other countries”.
In the fourth chapter, which states that a significant increase in funding is required to achieve the strategy objectives mentioned in the first three chapters, it is mentioned that a budget of 1.5 billion euros is planned for investment to make EDTIB ready for the defense industry.
The fifth section, with proposals to promote a culture of defence preparedness, stresses the importance of EDTIB having access to an attractive level of funding, while the sixth and final section underlines the need to make greater use of partnerships, in particular with Ukraine, and cooperation with NATO, strategic and like-minded partners and other international organizations.
The concluding chapter highlights the positive contribution of a stronger and more capable EU in security and defence to global and transatlantic security, complementing NATO and highlighting other contributions that the implementation of the strategy will bring.
As a result, realizing the inadequacy of its own stockpiles with its ammunition support to the Russian-Ukrainian War and the impossibility of dealing with Russia with its own resources alone without transatlantic ties, the Union Members seem to have taken another step towards autonomy in the field of defense after the Strategic Compass, taking into account the possibility of prolonging the war / spreading to different geographies in Europe and the possibility that Trump will win the election after the US elections in November and follow different policies than the current Biden government.
In an environment where the German Army has enough ammunition for a two-day war, the French Army has less than 90 heavy artillery systems, the British Army has only about 150 tanks and about a dozen serviceable long-range artillery systems, and Denmark is claimed[3] to have no heavy artillery and no air defense system, it is considered that such a plan is too late to be put into practice.
On the other hand, while it is a matter of debate how likely it is to achieve the objectives mentioned in the New Defense Industry Strategy with an investment of 1.5 billion euros, which is the amount proposed for the 2025-2027 period, it can be said that some EU member states, although aware of the requirements of the real political environment, are still not making sufficient efforts to enter into sufficient financial obligations in order to get rid of the dependence on NATO, which is seen as the basis of European defense and whose 70% budget is covered by the USA, and to ensure the strategic autonomy of the EU in terms of defense.
[1] “A New European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness Through a Responsive and Resilient European Defence Industry”, European Commission, https://t.ly/VX46L, (Date of Access: 20.04.2024).
[2] Aylin Ünver Noi, “Avrupa’nın İlk Savunma Sanayi Stratejisi”, SETA, https://www.setav.org/perspektif-abnin-ilk-savunma-sanayii-stratejisi/, (Date of Access: 20.04.2024).
[3] Max Colchester, David Luhnow and Bojan Pancevski, “Alarm Grows Over Weakened Militaries and Empty Arsenals in Europe”, The Wall Street Journal, https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/alarm-nato-weak-military-empty-arsenals-europe-a72b23f4, (Date of Access: 20.04.2024).
