The political tension between Moldova and Gagauzia presents a complex structure based on a historical context and international interactions. In 1994, an agreement mediated directly by Türkiye granted autonomous status to Gagauzia, which was considered an exemplary solution for preserving ethno-cultural diversity within Moldova’s territorial integrity. However, Moldova’s acceleration of its integration process into the European Union (EU) and the emergence of increasingly centralist tendencies in domestic politics have reopened the debate over both the legal and de facto limits of this autonomy. In particular, Gagauzia’s insistence on preserving its historical, cultural, and political ties with Russia directly contradicts the pro-Western orientation of the Chișinău administration, thereby rendering the region’s position within Moldova increasingly fragile.
This fragility was concretized during the visit of Gagauzia’s Governor Evgeniya Gutsul to Moscow on March 1, 2025. During her meeting with the Chairwoman of the Federation Council of Russia, Valentina Matviyenko, Gutsul stated that the Moldovan central government was violating the rights of the Gagauz Turkic people and requested diplomatic and economic support from Russia.[1] During the same period, new tax regulations in Moldova resulted in VAT reimbursements being shifted to regional budgets, destabilizing Gagauzia’s economy and prompting the withdrawal of numerous businesses from the region. Simultaneously, allegations that Gutsul had established ties with pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Shor led to her exclusion by both Chișinău and EU institutions, deepening Gagauzia’s diplomatic isolation.
The arrest of Gutsul at Chișinău Airport on March 25, 2025, as she was about to depart for Istanbul, marked a new phase in the crisis. She was charged with financing the Shor Party between 2019 and 2022 with funds illegally obtained from Russia, making payments during protests in 2022, and falsifying financial reports with forged documents during the 2023 election campaign.[2] Following her arrest, the prosecution requested a 30-day detention; however, the court partially accepted this request and ordered a 20-day detention.[3]
This decision was perceived not merely as an individual judicial process but as a form of collective punishment in the eyes of the Gagauz Turkic community. In her statement, Gutsul described this act as clear “political revenge” and expressed her reaction by stating, “Gagauzia has been left leaderless today.”[4] In the same statement, she emphasized that Moldova’s Party of Action and Solidarity was attempting to suppress Gagauzia’s autonomy and that politics, rather than justice, was prevailing. In this context, her lawyer Sergey Moraru expressed that he did not expect an impartial ruling from the Chișinău Court of Appeal, raising not only the gravity of the current crisis but also broader questions regarding judicial independence in Moldova.
Following the incident, protest movements began in various parts of Gagauzia, especially in Komrat. Vasiliy Novak, a representative of the “Victory” bloc in Komrat, announced that citizens had launched petition campaigns through mayors and local council members to reach the President and Prime Minister, and stated that the ongoing legal process -despite not yet resulting in formal charges- was perceived as a systematic threat to autonomy.[5]
At the international level, the clearest reaction came on March 27 from Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov. Peskov explicitly condemned Gutsul’s arrest and interpreted it as a reflection of the repressive policies of Moldova’s pro-Western government toward political opponents. Calling on European capitals and institutions to denounce these violations, Peskov emphasized that Moldova was acting contrary to democratic principles.[6] The following day, on March 28, Andrey Safonov claimed that Gutsul’s arrest was part of President Maia Sandu’s EU-backed centralist strategy, arguing that the ultimate goal was to weaken Gagauzia’s autonomy and dissolve Transnistria.[7]
Similarly, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova described the arrest process that took place during the night of March 25-26 as “open political terror,” stressing that Gutsul was targeted specifically for advocating constructive relations with Russia.[8] These strong reactions indicated that Russia was monitoring developments in Gagauzia not only symbolically but also strategically, and that it was ready to use Gagauzia as a pressure point against Moldova’s sharp pro-Western orientation.
In addition to these developments, following her arrest, Gutsul sent a letter via her lawyer to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, stating that the 1994 Gagauzia-Moldova agreement signed under Türkiye’s guarantorship had been violated, and calling on Türkiye to fulfill its historical responsibility in the process.[9] This appeal revealed that the issue of Gagauzia was not merely a regional crisis, but had evolved into a multidimensional matter requiring Türkiye, as the guarantor actor, to reconsider its foreign policy responsibility.
Although no official statement has yet been made, Türkiye’s approach to Gagauzia is taking shape within the framework of its current foreign policy orientation, marked by a balanced and cautious stance. It is anticipated that Ankara does not consider Moldova’s integration with the EU contrary to its own strategic interests and is inclined to support this process as long as it does not undermine the autonomous status of the Gagauz Turks. Türkiye is expected to continue development cooperation based on historical and cultural ties while prioritizing constructive diplomacy aimed at safeguarding autonomy. This position highlights Türkiye as a multidimensional and balancing regional actor that maintains harmony with the West without provoking conflict with Russia.
The Gagauzia issue has become a multidimensional strategic dossier situated at the intersection of Moldova’s internal structural sensitivities and external geopolitical influences encountered during its EU integration process. Located in the south of Moldova, Gagauzia holds critical importance in the regional security and foreign policy equation not only due to its constitutional autonomous structure, but also because of its proximity to the Black Sea, its border with Ukraine, and its potential access to energy and logistical transit corridors. For this reason, the region has come under the direct influence not only of Moldova’s domestic politics, but also of the ongoing geopolitical rivalry between the EU and Russia.
In this context, under the first scenario, as Moldova continues its integration process with the European Union, it is expected to increase public investments, infrastructure projects, and development assistance directed toward Gagauzia in order to keep the region aligned with the central structure. With the allocation of direct EU development funds to the region, it is anticipated that the sense of attachment to the central government among the Gagauz Turkish population will be strengthened economically and administratively. In this model, while the legal framework of autonomy is preserved, the aim is to promote a local governance structure compatible with the EU and insulated from external influences. However, the success of this strategy depends on the proper management of social sensitivities in the region and the reduction of perceptions of external interference.
In another possible scenario, it is anticipated that local political actors in Gagauzia may develop a more independent discourse against the central authority through externally supported initiatives. In this process, Russia’s efforts to maintain its influence in the region -particularly through historical ties, cultural affiliation, and financial assistance- are likely to exert pressure on Moldova’s internal political balance mechanisms. The more active use of Gagauzia’s autonomous status, under the influence of such external factors, has the potential to weaken not only center-periphery relations but also Moldova’s foreign policy orientation. In such a case, Gagauzia could shift from being a symbolic administrative structure within Moldovan domestic politics to functioning as a political lever capable of influencing strategic balance. In both scenarios, it is foreseen that the future of Gagauzia will be shaped not only by internal legal arrangements but also in direct connection with Moldova’s pursuit of balance and stability in foreign relations.
[1] Aleksandr Burakov, “Vsled za Pridnestrovyem: lidery Gagauzii prosyat RF o pomoshchi”, DW, https://www.dw.com/ru/vsled-za-pridnestrovem-lidery-gagauzii-prosat-moskvu-o-pomosi/a-68423032, (Access Date: 29.03.2025).
[2] Alexander Tanas, “Moldovan court opens trial of pro-Russian leader of Gagauzia region”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moldovan-court-opens-trial-pro-russian-leader-gagauzia-region-2024-04-30, (Access Date: 29.03.2025).
[3] “Sud v Kishineve Arestoval Glavu Avtonomnogo Regiona Gagauziya Yevgeniyu Gutsul na 20 Sutok”, BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/cy9d9x3ezzgo, (Access Date: 29.03.2025).
[4] “Gutsul Nazvala Svoy Arest Politicheskoy Mestyu”, TASS, https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23543957, (Access Date: 29.03.2025).
[5] “V Gagauzii Nachalis’protesty Posle Zaderzhaniya Yevgenii Gutsul”, News.by, https://news.by/news/v_mire/v-gagauzii-nachalis-protesty-posle-zaderzhaniya-evgenii-gutsul, (Access Date: 29.03.2025).
[6] “Peskov: Zaderzhaniye Gutsul İdet Vrazrez s Printsipami Demokratii”, TASS, https://tass.ru/politika/23529047, (Access Date: 29.03.2025).
[7] “Deputat Safonov: Sandu Raspravlyayetsya s Gagauziyey, Chtoby Likvidirovat Pridnestrovye”, TASS, https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23543689, (Access Date: 29.03.2025).
[8] İlya Taksyur, “Zakharova Prokommentirovala Arest Glavy Gagauzii”, Lenta, https://lenta.ru/news/2025/03/26/zaharova-prokommentirovala-arest-glavy-gagauzii/, (Access Date: 29.03.2025).
[9] “Gutsul Pozhalovalas Erdoganu na Narusheniye Moldaviyey Soglasheniya s Turtsiyey”, RBC, https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/67e51a199a7947bd49d4182e, (Access Date: 29.03.2025).
