The Syrian Civil War, which broke out on March 15, 2011, has, over the past 13 years, evolved into a proxy battlefield where all major powers have competed for dominance. Meanwhile, the dynamics of energy security, which have been severely ignored while security issues were prioritized, have been significantly disrupted with the annexation of the region in northern Syria by YPG/PKK terrorist organization. It can be said that the primary reason for Syria’s economic crisis is the YPG/PKK terrorist organization’s usurpation of energy fields.
Syria, in comparison to other Arab countries, possesses more modest oil and natural gas reserves that are sufficient to meet its needs within its national borders. However, the “asymmetric” nature of energy resources has caused significant regional shifts in the country’s economic dynamics. In addition to the terrorist occupation, the frequent sabotage of energy infrastructure, power plants, and substations is among the lasting effects of the civil war.[1] If the concept of electrification is examined in terms of energy security, no country that has not completed or developed its electrification can undertake structural reforms in industry or the economy, nor can it increase its welfare level.
The YPG/PKK terrorist organization controls approximately 70% of Syria’s oil resources. Among the significant oil fields in Syria are the Al-Ward and Al-Taym fields, each producing 50,000 barrels of oil per day. Other important fields include the T2 Station on the Iraq-Syria oil pipeline, as well as the Al-Jafra and Conoco fields. The Al-Suwaydiyah and Al-Rimelan fields, located in the southern countryside of Al-Hasakah province, also have a large production capacity; while the Al-Suwaydiyah fields has 1,322 oil wells, the Al-Rimelan field has 25 gas wells. The combined production of these two fields was approximately 200,000 barrels per day until the end of 2010. Additionally, the small oil wells in the Markada and Tishreen-Kabibiya regions, as well as in the Al-Raqqa province, are also considered significant production areas.
The Al-Shaer field in central Syria stands out with a daily gas production of 3 million cubic meters, and the fields in the Palmyra region, particularly Al-Haik, Arak, Hayyan, Jahar, Al-Mahr, and Abu Rabah, produce a total of 9,000 barrels per day. Syria’s oil production, which reached 600,000 barrels per day in the 1980s, declined to 400,000 barrels per day in 2010. The civil war in 2011 and sanctions led foreign oil companies to halt their operations in Syria.[2]
Energy revenues make up 30% of Syria’s budget. Following the YPG/PKK occupation, oil in the controlled areas is sold through intermediaries or transported illegally to regime-held areas. It was known that hundreds of trucks carrying oil were transported daily to regime-held regions. Production in the areas under YPG/PKK control is largely used for local consumption and fluctates between 50,000 and 100,000 barrels per day.[3] However, as the war has significantly destroyed the infrastructure, full production capacity cannot be achieved. It is known that sanctions have been bypassed through special licensing permits, and there are claims documented that U.S. oil companies have carried out oil trade in the region multiple times, with former special forces members reportedly taking a share of this trade.[4]
It is difficult to determine exact figures regarding the revenue obtained from these fields. This is because part of the trade occurs unlawfully, and there is a lack of transparency. However, according to an estimate made by The New York Times (2019), YPG/PKK is able to obtain up to $50 million dollars annually in oil revenue. Most of these revenues come from sales to local markets and some international buyers. In 2023, it is estimated that the revenues obtained from oil production in the regions controlled by YPG/PKK amounted to approximately $1-2 billion.[5] With the revenues obtained, the organization has not only gained international support over time, but has also expanded its military activities through private companies.[6]
Apart from oil, the YPG/PKK also produces gas from the gas fields in the Deir ez-Zor region. However, gas production is not as significant as oil production, but is still contributes to the region’s energy needs and to the income of the YPG/PKK.
These resources have played a critical role in sustaining the autonomy of the YPG/PKK, but they have also attracted international attention. Specifically, the United States has sent troops to the region to protect these oil fields from other groups or the Syrian regime. Oil trade has become a central point in the geopolitical struggle in Syria, with various actors competing for control over these valuable resources.
With the complete end of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, it is expected that there will be a de facto unification of the factions in the country and the establishment of a national consensus. However, after 13 years of civil war, Syria has lost all critical components of its energy infrastructure. In this situation, the presence of oil revenues in the hands of YPG/PKK is seen as a significant leverage for the drafting of a unifying constitution in the new government. For YPG/PKK, oil trade is not only used as a tool for financing terrorism but also as a geopolitical domain exploited to create international legitimacy.
The oil revenues are of vital importance in the process of reconstructing the country. In the case of a possible conflict, it is not a difficult prediction that opposition forces and YPG/PKK will confront each other on the ground in a short period of time. The creation of a fair and widely distributed revenue model is dependent on preserving the unitary state structure, and during the transitional government period, it is necessary to ensure that institutions are not excessively damaged or that the administrative memory is not erased due to regime change.
It has been determined that the key to Syria’s transition to a legitimate and prosperous society lies in the fields located in the areas occupied by the YPG/PKK terrorist organization. The state, which has largely lost its industry during the civil war, requires all financial resources during the regime transition to open areas that will allow for the launch of reverse migration. In addition to security policies, the establishment of a legitimate Syrian Government recognized internationally will also contribute to the elimination of the YPG/PKK on the ground.
Lastly, Turkey may also be involved in the reconstruction of Syria’s electricity infrastructure. Turkey’s experience in the construction and energy sectors could play a significant role in rebuilding Syria’s energy infrastructure. Such cooperation could offer economic opportunities for Turkey and also serve as an important step in Syria’s reconstruction. A potential collaboration aimed at ensuring regional energy security with Syria’s new government could involve energy lines and pipeline projects. Turkey plays a critical role in the transportation of energy from the Middle East to Europe through energy lines that pass through Syrian territory. In this regard, Turkey and Syria’s new administration could work together to secure energy transport lines.
[1] “Syria Oil and Gas”, The Energy Consulting Group, https://www.energy-cg.com/MiddleEast/Syria/Syria%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20Overview.html, (Date Accessed: 09.12.2024).
[2] “Syria’s oil industry was once booming. Could it be again?”, Al Majalla, https://en.majalla.com/node/321896/business-economy/syria%E2%80%99s-oil-industry-was-once-booming-could-it-be-again, (Date Accessed: 09.12.2024).
[3] “OPINION-Oil production, trade of terrorist group PKK/YPG/PKK”, Energy Terminal, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/oil/opinion-oil-production-trade-of-terrorist-group-pkk-YPG/PKK/39249, (Date Accessed:09.12.2024).
[4] “US oil firm operating in ‘murky’ Syria oil business”, MEM, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20210125-us-oil-firm-operating-in-murky-syria-oil-business/, (Date Accessed: 09.12.2024).
[5] “Annual Report and Accounts 2023”, Gulfsans, https://gulfsands.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Gulfsands_Annual-Report-2023_WEB.pdf, (Date Accessed: 09.12.2024).
[6] “US and British volunteers describe fighting with Kurds in Syria”, MEE, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-and-british-volunteers-describe-fighting-kurds-syria, (Date Accessed: 09.12.2024).
