On September 13, 2023, China took a noteworthy step in international diplomacy, appointing Zhao Xing as its Ambassador to Afghanistan. This move, occurring in the aftermath of the 2021 Taliban victory, marked China as the first country to designate a new ambassador under the newly established Taliban government. The Chinese Ambassador was warmly welcomed by Mohammad Hassan Akhund, the acting Prime Minister, and Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Foreign Minister, signifying a certain level of diplomatic engagement. China, in an official statement, underscored that Zhao Xing’s appointment reflects the nation’s commitment to strengthening its relationship with Afghanistan. This diplomatic initiative, while stopping short of explicit recognition, is indicative of China’s strategic interest in fostering a more robust connection with the newly established Taliban government in Afghanistan.
China’s strategic interests in Afghanistan extend beyond diplomacy. The country views Afghanistan as a potential source of raw materials and a key component in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Afghanistan’s vast mineral and hydrocarbon wealth, including valuable metals like lithium, presents an opportunity for China’s economic growth. Beijing is keen on ensuring stability in Afghanistan to exploit its resources and establish commercial routes through the region. An additional strategic concern for the Chinese government is preventing Afghanistan from becoming a sanctuary for the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a Uighur jihadist organization. China perceives the ETIM as a threat to both its internal security and the success of initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
China has been actively pursuing agreements with the Taliban-led government to capitalize on Afghanistan’s significant mineral and energy wealth. In a notable mining collaboration, just three months after committing up to US$540 million for a 25-year oil extraction project in the Amu Darya basin, a Chinese company reportedly proposed a substantial US$10 billion investment to mine Afghanistan’s extensive lithium deposits.[i] In addition, driven by its robust demand for lithium fueled by the expanding electric vehicle industry, Beijing is strategically targeting Afghanistan’s Kunar, Nuristan, and Helmand provinces, renowned for their substantial lithium deposits. The Chinese mining entity, Gochin, has purportedly presented a remarkable US$10 billion investment proposition to extract lithium reserves in Afghanistan.[ii] This undertaking encompasses the processing of minerals within Afghanistan’s borders and the establishment of extensive infrastructure, incorporating hydroelectric dams and road networks. Together, these endeavours are anticipated to create around 120,000 employment opportunities.
While the focus for Beijing lies in the exploitation of mineral wealth and hydrocarbons, the agreements go beyond these realms. In May 2023, direct commercial flights operated by the Afghan state airline Ariana resumed, a positive step for bilateral trade relations. This was followed by the opening of a land trade route between China and Afghanistan in July. Additionally, reports suggest that Chinese companies have initiated investments in coal-based energy production.[iii]
Regarding hydrocarbons, in January 2023, Beijing and Kabul reached a significant economic agreement—the most substantial since the Taliban came to power in August 2021. The interim Minister of Mines and Petroleum, Shahabuddin Delawar, and representatives from a subsidiary of the China National Petroleum Corp, Sinkiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas (CAPEIC), signed a contract to exploit oil and gas reserves in northern Afghanistan. The presence of the Chinese Ambassador in Afghanistan and the Afghan First Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, along with live coverage by state-owned Afghan Radio and Television, underscored the political significance both parties attributed to the agreement. China’s ambassador praised it as “a model for Sino-Afghan cooperation” and “a clear example of the alliance and relationship between the two countries”.[iv]
Meanwhile, Kabul views Chinese investments as a crucial opportunity to alleviate the economic void left by a sharp decline in international aid. China’s appeal lies in its non-interference policy, in contrast to Western nations imposing sanctions. Internally, the Taliban-led government aims to showcase commitment to economic recovery, receiving partial recognition for economic stability from international bodies despite lingering challenges. Politically, the government seeks to leverage China’s pragmatic stance by securing international recognition, unconditional aid, and the release of frozen assets. These objectives, consistently reiterated in official meetings, highlight the Taliban’s strategic reliance on Chinese support to navigate economic challenges and enhance political legitimacy on the global stage.
[i] “Is China Engaged in Resource Politics in Afghanistan?”, Think China, https://www.thinkchina.sg/china-engaged-resource-politics-afghanistan, (Date of Accession: 11.01.2024).
[ii] “Sobre La Reactivación De Las Relaciones Entre China Y Afganistán”, Tarpán, https://tarpan.cl/articulos/sobre-la-reactivacion-de-las-relaciones-entre-china-y-afganistan/, (Date of Accession: 11.01.2024).
[iii] “China May Invest In Coal-Fired Power Generation In Afghanistan”, Energy Central, https://energycentral.com/news/china-may-invest-coal-fired-power-generation-afghanistan, (Date of Accession: 11.01.2024).
[iv] “China Y Afganistán: Un Desigual Matrimonio De Conveniencia”, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, https://www.ieee.es/en/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2023/DIEEEO90_2023_JAVRUI_China.pdf, (Date of Accession: 10.01.2024).
